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POLICE AND DEMOCRACY 
David Alan Sklansky* 
INTRODUCTION 
What constraints does a commitment to democracy place on law 
enforcement? What implications, conversely, do modern police forces 
have for how we think about democracy? What is the relationship, in 
short, between democracy and policing? 
Everyone seems to agree that the relationship is important. 
References to democracy or to "democratic values" appear regularly 
in judicial decisions setting limits on law enforcement. They are even 
more common in legal scholarship analyzing and appraising those 
limits. And they are a fixture of sociological studies of the police. No 
one could suggest now, as George Berkley did in 1969, that the police 
pose one of the "least recognized problems of modern democracy."1 
Even in 1969 the suggestion was doubtful: Jerome Skolnick's widely 
influential study of the dilemmas of "law enforcement in democratic 
society" was already three years old,2 James Q. Wilson had just 
published his equally influential study tying police practices to local 
political traditions,3 and three presidential commissions had been 
appointed in rapid succession to address problems associated with the 
police.4 In the late 1960s, the police were on many people's minds, and, 
to a remarkable extent, they have stayed there ever since. 
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Jr., Carole Pateman, Nelson Polsby, Daniel Richman, Seana Shiffrin, Jonathan Simon, 
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1. GEORGE E. BERKLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC POLICEMAN 1 (1969). 
2. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966) [hereinafter SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL]. 
3. JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW 
AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES (1968) [hereinafter WILSON, POLICE BEHAVIOR]. 
4. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice was 
appointed in 1965, while the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was 
appointed in 1967, and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 
was appointed in 1968. HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 5 (1977). 
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Discussions of democracy and policing are widespread today, 
particularly with respect to policing outside the United States. 
Increasingly, for example, efforts to create or to strengthen 
democracies overseas take for granted the need to establish police 
forces that are, in some important sense, democratic.5 In a sign of the 
times, part of the retraining that the American military has conducted 
for Iraqi police officers has involved asking them to come up with 
"words consistent with 'democratic policing."'6 
But what exactly is "democratic policing"? The Iraqi police could 
be excused for scratching their heads. For the truth is that relatively 
little effort has been made to spell out, systematically and carefully, 
the connections between policing and democracy. We sometimes talk 
as though there were a simple trade-off between "democratic values" 
on the one hand and, on the other hand, security, order, and law 
enforcement - the objectives of the police. This way of thinking 
assumes both that we know what "democratic values" policing affects 
and that the relationship is straightforward. But the values at stake 
and the nature of the relationship are anything but clear. 
Sometimes, for example, democratic policing seems identified with 
procedural regularity and the "rule of law"; this was an important part 
of Skolnick's account,7 which in turn echoed aspects of earlier 
arguments by Jerome Hall8 and Herbert Packer.9 At other times 
democracy appears tied to respect for certain substantive rights -
rights, for example, against unreasonable search and seizure and 
Skolnick's report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence was 
itself published in 1969, continuing his exploration of the predicaments that the police posed 
for American democracy. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 183-222 
(1969) [hereinafter SKOLNICK, POLITICS OF PROTEST]. 
5. See, e.g. , Carlotta Gall, In Warlord Land, Democracy Tries Baby Steps, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 11,  2003, at A4; Peter S. Green, Kosovo Pins Its Hopes on Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 19, 2003, at AS; Todd S. Purdum, It's Democracy, Like It or Not, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 
2003, § 4, at 1; Amy Waldman, U.S. Struggles to Transform a Tainted Iraqi Police Force, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2003, at Al. 
6. Waldman, supra note 5. 
7. See SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 2, at 1-22; see also Jonathan 
Simon, Speaking Truth and Power, 36 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 37, 39 (2002) ("Skolnick saw the 
identification with the rule of law as the defining aspect of the police and a way to reconcile 
their fundamentally authoritarian character with the democratic society they were 
policing."). 
8. See Jerome Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 143-45, 170 
(1953). 
9. See Herbert Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
In a widely influential formulation, Packer contrasted the "Due Process Model" of criminal 
procedure with the "Crime Control Model" and, without explicitly invoking democracy, 
found the former model rooted in a "complex of values" that included equality and anti­
authoritarianism. Id. at 16-18. 
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compelled self-incrimination.10 An Iraqi village leader invoked this 
idea when complaining about home searches conducted by occupying 
American forces: "How do these soldiers have the right to come into 
my home like this? . . .  Where is the democracy that the Americans 
promised?"11 Sometimes democracy seems tied to popular 
participation in policing, either through some form of civilian 
oversight or through police practices that involve "partnering" with or 
"delegation" to the "community."12 At other times democracy is said 
to require placing police departments under a much more 
thoroughgoing form of community control.13 Democratic values are 
sometimes invoked in support of giving police officers themselves a 
degree of control over the nature of their work.14 (Not surprisingly, 
some Iraqi police officers have taken this view.15) And sometimes 
democracy in policing seems simply a matter of dealing with the public 
in a particular way: what Wilson called the "service style"16 and what is 
now often lumped together with "partnering," "delegation," and 
sundry other fixes under the slogan "community policing."17 The 
10. See, e.g. , Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (calling constitutional limits on search and seizure by the police "an 
indispensable need for a democratic society"). 
11 .  Patrick J. McDonnell, Searches of Homes Just Plain Rude, Iraqis Say, L.A. TIMES, 
July 1, 2003, at AS. 
12. See, e.g. , Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1535-37 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan, Collective Action]; Tracey L. Meares, 
Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1598 (2002) [hereinafter Meares, 
Praying]. 
13. See, e.g. , GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 141-42; Gerald Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 23, 81 (1998); Jerome Skolnick, Neighborhood Police, THE NATION, Mar. 22, 1971, 
at 372; Arthur L. Waskow, Community Control of the Police, TRANS-ACTION, Dec. 1969, at 
4. 
14. See, e.g. , BERKLEY, supra note 1, at 30-35; WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND 
THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORALITY, at xvii (1970). 
15. See Waldman, supra note 5. 
16. WILSON, POLICE BEHAVIOR, supra note 3, at 200-26. Wilson himself was skeptical 
that the "service style" of policing could be employed effectively in large, heterogeneous 
communities. See id. at 249-57, 290. Other scholars, writing around the same time, expressed 
similar doubts. See, e.g. , Maureen Cain, Trends in the Sociology of Police Work, 7 INT'L. J. 
Soc. L. 143, 151 (1979). 
17. Like democratic policing, "community policing" remains ill-defined. Often it seems 
"less a program than a set of aspirations wrapped in a slogan," David H. Baley, Community 
Policing: A Report from the Devil's Advocate, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR 
REALITY 225, 225 (Jack R. Green & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988) - albeit a set of 
aspirations that has become "the new orthodoxy for cops," John E. Eck & Dennis P. 
Rosenbaum, The New Police Order: Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency in Community 
Policing, in THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING: TESTING THE PROMISES 3, 3 
(Dennis P. Rosenbaum ed., 1994). Still, "[f]or all the diverse definitions of community 
policing, it may boil down to this: police treating a neighborhood the way a security guard 
treats a client property." Lawrence W. Sherman, The Police, in CRIME 327, 338-39 (James Q. 
Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995). On the roots of community policing in Wilson's 
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American officials retraining the Iraqi police may have had something 
like the "service style" in mind when they talked about "democratic 
policing"; press reports suggest the Iraqi officers have been urged to 
become more "polite," "kind-hearted," and "service-oriented."18 
As for the trade-offs, we sometimes talk as though effective 
policing is like trains running on time: something we need to sacrifice a 
little if we wish to live in a democracy. The goal is to strike the right 
balance between letting the police do their job and preserving our 
democratic liberties. The more of one, the less of the other. This is the 
assumption that underlay much of the discussion of the "homeland 
security" measures the Bush Administration proposed in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. At other 
times, though, we talk as though democratic policing is the same thing 
as effective policing - as though "democracies can, so to speak, have 
their cake and eat it too,"19 because, with. respect to the police, 
"democracy and efficiency in public administration are one and the 
same."20 A good deal of the discussion about "community policing" in 
recent years, for example, has proceeded from this optimistic 
assumption. Between the poles of strict trade-off and perfect 
convergence, of course, lie other, more complicated possibilities. But 
they remain largely unexplored. 
The vagueness of most discussions of democratic policing is 
particularly striking given the efforts that philosophers, political 
scientists, sociologists, and legal scholars have made over the past half­
century to think rigorously about the nature of democracy. Since the 
1950s, "democratic theory" has been a rich, lively, and sprawling field 
of interdisciplinary inquiry. The field has attracted more than its share 
of gifted thinkers and has generated more than its share of arresting, 
influential work. But little of this work directly addresses the police; 
this is one sense in which Berkley was right to complain that the 
problems of democratic policing were under-recognized. And few 
discussions of policing draw explicitly on democratic theory. 
Certainly this is true of criminal procedure, the field of 
jurisprudence and legal scholarship concerned with how the police 
carry out their business. In often minute detail, criminal procedure law 
regulates how and when the police can conduct searches, seizures, and 
interrogations. Almost everybody appears to believe that these 
"service style," see, for example, DOROTHY GUYOT, POLICING AS THOUGH PEOPLE 
MATTER 5-7 (1991). 
18. Waldman, supra note 5. 
19. BERKLEY, supra note 1, at 196. 
20. Id. (quoting Woodrow Wilson). For similar sentiments, see, for example, Hall, supra 
note 8, at 156, 161, and Lawrence W. Sherman, Consent of the Governed: Police, Democracy, 
and Diversity, in POLICING, SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17, 18 
(Menachem Amir & Stanley Einstein eds., 2001). 
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restrictions have important implications for democracy, but the nature 
of those implications is rarely examined with care, either by judges 
deciding cases or by scholars reviewing what the judges have done. As 
a result, invocations of democracy in criminal procedure cases often 
seem to be little more than lip service. In criminal procedure 
scholarship, sometimes even the lip service is missing. 
Moreover, criminal procedure has almost nothing to say, in any 
direct fashion, about other questions of apparent pertinence to the 
relation between policing and democracy, such as the structure of 
decisionmaking within police agencies and the arrangements by which 
the police are made subject to or insulated from external, political 
control. In part, but only in part, this selective silence reflects our 
collective decision to entrust the development of criminal procedure 
rules to courts, and our sense, which may or may not be well-founded, 
that courts are ill-suited to address questions of systemic design.21 
Because thinking about criminal procedure has tended to focus on the 
questions taken up by courts, the unfortunate result has been not just 
that judges have largely failed to consider the systemic requirements 
for democratic policing, but that most of the rest of us have, too. 
None of this is to suggest that democratic theory and criminal 
procedure have had nothing to say to each other. It is just that the 
conversation has been largely below the surface. 
This Article seeks to unearth half of that conversation: the 
changing ideas about American democracy that have informed the 
development of criminal procedure jurisprudence and scholarship over 
the past several decades. Those ideas, I hope to show, largely track, in 
a delayed fashion, developments in democratic theory over roughly 
the same period. The most important of these developments were, 
first, the emergence during the 1950s of the so-called "pluralist" theory 
of democracy, an unusually rich and resonant account that emphasized 
the roles of elites, interest groups, and competition in sustaining 
American democracy; and second, beginning in the 1960s, the gradual 
shift away from this theory and toward accounts of democracy 
emphasizing popular participation, community, and deliberation. 
Arranging democratic theories on a timeline can be deceptive, 
because intellectual history is seldom tidy. The recent focus on the 
participative and deliberative dimensions of democracy harks back to 
eighteenth-century ideas that the democratic pluralists expressly 
repudiated, and pluralism itself is far from vanquished today. Like the 
just and unjust versions of Calvino's city of Berenice, ideas about 
democracy are all "present in this instant, wrapped one within the 
21. See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1286-92 (2002). 
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other, confined, crammed, inextricable."22 In some critical respects, 
moreover, pluralism and its rivals converge; they share, in particular, a 
strong sense that democracy is more a matter of culture than of 
institutions. 
Still, the simple story of pluralism's rise and fall holds enough truth 
to make it a helpful way to approach the complexities of democratic 
theory. The story is particularly useful because it finds its reflection in 
certain developments over the past several decades in criminal 
procedure jurisprudence and in scholarship about the police. The first 
aim of this Article is to trace these connections between democratic 
theory and criminal procedure. A second, broader goal is to use this 
excavated history, and the perspective it provides on modern-day 
assumptions, to build a framework for thinking systematically about 
the relationship between policing and American democracy. 
The great advantage that democratic theory and criminal 
procedure offer for this larger purpose is the traditions of rigor they 
lend to the enterprise, rigor respectively about the nature of 
democracy and about the proper limits on policing. In order to explore 
the relationship between democracy and policing critically and 
systematically, we need to get some distance from ways of thinking 
that have grown to seem natural. We need to see the points of 
contingency; we need to gain some analytic leverage. The best way to 
gain that leverage is to recover ways of thinking that not so long ago 
seemed natural but that now seem strange. The traditions of rigor in 
democratic theory and criminal procedure, together with the changes 
the fields have undergone, mean that each field has left a trail of 
discarded ideas that can be contrasted usefully with current 
orthodoxies. These are precisely the materials we need. 
For these purposes, though, we will need to construe the field of 
criminal procedure broadly, to include not only the jurisprudence of 
policing and academic commentary on that jurisprudence, but also 
studies of the police carried out by social scientists like Berkley, 
Skolnick, and Wilson. Work of this latter sort is not normally thought 
part of criminal procedure, but the divide between the two fields is 
artificial. Judges and law professors often cite work on the police by 
sociologists and political scientists, and social scientists writing about 
the police draw heavily, in turn, on judicial opinions and legal 
scholarship. Criminal procedure, with its evaluative emphasis, and 
"police studies,'' with its more descriptive leaning, in combination 
form a field roughly comparable to democratic theory, which is 
noteworthy for its integration of normative and empirical inquiries (as 
well as notorious for at times conflating them). In any event, tracing 
22. ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES 163 (William Weaver trans., 2d ed., Harvest/HBJ 
1978) (1972). 
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the connections between ideas about democracy and legal thinking 
about the police will often require us to take account of trends in 
social science about the police, if for no other reason than that the 
paths of influence have often run through that work. 
The argument here will proceed as follows. Part I of the Article 
describes the emergence in postwar America of a particular 
understanding of a democracy, an understanding generally referred to 
as "democratic pluralism," "analytic pluralism," "pluralist theory," or 
simply "pluralism." Pluralism in this sense was not at bottom an 
embrace of diversity. It was not the "noetic pluralism" of William 
James, the "cultural pluralism" of Horace Kallen and Alain Locke, or 
the "reasonable pluralism" of John Rawls23 - although it shared with 
them, among other things, the taste for multifaceted explanation that 
so exercised people like C. Wright Mills.24 Democratic pluralism was a 
nuanced, interrelated set of ideas about American democracy that 
during the 1950s became extraordinarily influential, even omnipresent, 
both within and without academia. Those ideas included a distrust of 
mass politics, a preoccupation with social stability and the avoidance 
of authoritarianism, and a focus on group competition rather than 
reasoned discourse as the engine of democracy. We will spend a fair 
bit of time unpacking pluralism, because its fine points will prove 
important when we turn to the task of tracing its reflections in criminal 
procedure.25 
That task is taken up in Part II, which examines the ways in which 
the central tenets of democratic pluralism found echoes in criminal 
procedure - construed broadly to include not only jurisprudence and 
legal scholarship but also social science about the police. I argue that 
pluralism helps to make sense of several interrelated hallmarks of 
criminal procedure and police studies in the Warren and Burger Court 
eras: the focus on the group psychology of the police, the concern with 
police discretion and the reliance on judicial oversight, the emphasis 
on personal dignity, the attraction to "second wave" police 
professionalism, the embrace of modernity, the centrality of 
consensus, and the disregard of institutional structure. 
23. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 61-74, 77 (Bruce Kuklick ed., Hackett 1981) (1907); 
HORACE M. KALLEN, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: STUDIES IN 
THE GROUP PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLES 11, 41-43, 115-25 (1924); Alain 
Locke, Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy, in 1942 CONF. ON SCI., PHIL. & RELIGION 196, 
reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALAIN LOCKE: HARLEM RENAISSANCE AND BEYOND 53 
(Leonard Harris ed., 1989); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36-37 (1993). 
24. See C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 244-45 (1956). On this theme, see also the 
justly acclaimed treatment of democratic pluralism in MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, THE 
INTELLECTUALS AND MCCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPECTER 268-82 (1967). 
25. Despite the dangers of ambiguity, I will often, as here, use "pluralism" as a synonym 
for democratic pluralism. 
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Part III traces the rise, beginning in the 1960s, of "participatory 
democracy" and later "deliberative democracy" - theories of 
democracy that were framed in explicit opposition to pluralism and 
that rejected most of its premises. The new theories were never as 
unified or as consistent as pluralism in its heyday, but they tended to 
include each of the following elements: an embrace of grassroots 
politics, a distrust of elites, an emphasis on cooperation and collective 
reasoning, and an appreciation for the intrinsic value of democracy 
wholly apart from its utility as a rule of decision. 
Part IV notes the ways in which theories of participatory and 
deliberative democracy made themselves felt in jurisprudential and 
academic discussions of the police. I suggest the shift away from 
pluralism is reflected in several themes in contemporary criminal 
procedure: the enthusiasm for community participation, the premium 
placed on transparency, the distrust of elites and expertise, the 
preoccupation with legitimacy, and the retreat from modernity. Other 
features of criminal procedure jurisprudence and scholarship today -
the continued treatment of the police as a breed apart, the persistent 
de-emphasis of institutional structure, and the relative inattention to 
issues of equality - reflect, I argue, important points of continuity 
between pluralism and the theories that supplanted it. 
Finally, Part V draws from the earlier discussions some provisional 
lessons for thinking more carefully about democracy and policing. I 
suggest that our ideas about policing could benefit from a more 
rounded understanding of democracy - an understanding sensitive to 
the tradition of democratic oppositionalism and mindful of the core 
insights of democratic pluralism, 1960s-style participatory democracy, 
and eighteenth-century political economy. And I explore in a tentative 
fashion how such an understanding of democracy might affect our 
thinking about five important issues in contemporary law 
enforcement: community policing, racial profiling, police privatization, 
police personnel practices, and public disclosure of law enforcement 
practices. 
A final word is in order at the outset. Not everyone agrees that 
careful thinking about democracy today is worth the effort. Plenty of 
thoughtful people, for example, suspect democracy is no longer, if it 
ever was, "a sensible tool of analysis or even a coherent ideal,"26 but 
has become simply a term of "vague endorsement"27 - a "'hurrah' 
26. JACK LIVELY, DEMOCRACY 1 (1975). 
27. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 2 (1989). Dan Kahan, for 
example, seems to take this position when he suggests that sensible arguments about 
institutional structures must "be grounded in normative considerations outside the concept 
of democracy." Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795, 800 
(1999). But he may be claiming only that we should be clear about our particular conception 
of democracy. See id. at 796-97. This would be consistent with Kahan's own work in criminal 
procedure, which, as we will see, draws heavily on a specific set of ideas about democracy. 
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word."28 That position receives some support from the frequently 
remarked fact that almost every government in the world today claims 
to be democratic in some sense or another. Even if the concept of 
democracy has discernable content, moreover, it may lack modern 
relevance; it may be too bound up, for example, with the direct 
democracy of the ancient Greeks. 29 And even if democracy is a 
meaningful concept, and a concept with present-day relevance, the 
pursuit of greater democracy may be a mistake.30 That might be 
particularly true when it comes to policing. Perhaps the last thing we 
should want is genuinely democratic policing; perhaps the whole point 
of constitutional criminal procedure is, and should be, precisely to 
remove politics from fundamental decisions about law enforcement.31 
I think these misgivings are unwarranted. I think the careless use of 
the term democracy is no reason to abandon the effort to use it more 
precisely; I think the concept of democracy has long transcended its 
classical origins; and I think the concept of democracy is rich enough 
to incorporate protections against the pathologies of simple 
majoritarianism. I also think that the concept of democracy has 
become so central to our thinking about institutions and society -
W.B. Gallie called it "the appraisive political concept par excellence" 
- that we probably are stuck with it, like it or not.32 But I will not 
pursue these matters here. My chief task in this Article is to trace the 
links between democratic theory and criminal procedure. If, as I 
conclude, our thoughts about the police have reflected our thoughts 
28. LIVELY, supra note 26, at 1. 
29. For an extended argument along precisely these lines, see Edward L. Rubin, Getting 
Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (2001). 
30. This is the gist, for example, of Fareed Zakaria's recent argument about "illiberal 
democracy." FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FuTuRE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT 
HOME AND ABROAD (2003). He contends that both the United States and the world in 
general suffer from an excess of democracy - which he takes to require only free and fair 
elections - and a deficit of what he calls "constitutional liberalism": a "bundle of freedoms" 
including "the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of 
speech, assembly, religion, and property." Id. at 17. His primary prescription is to delegate 
more governmental decisions to institutions insulated from politics, such as the Supreme 
Court and the Federal Reserve Board. See id. at 248-54. "What we need in politics today," he 
argues, "is not more democracy but less." Id. at 248. 
31. See, e.g. , Philip Pettit, ls Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
427 (2002). Zakaria's ideas are closely paralleled by Pettit's proposal for establishing "penal 
policies board[s]" that would "operate[] at arm's length from parliament and government," 
much "[l]ike a central bank." Id. at 442. 
32. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 167 
(1955-56), reprinted in THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE 121, 135 (Max Black ed., 1962); cf 
LIVELY, supra note 26, at 1-2 (concluding that "the very fact that the term is so persistently 
and so ardently canvassed in the ordinary language of politics creates a need for it to be 
given as great a coherence and clarity as is possible," and that there is "no compulsion on us 
to allow bad usages to drive out the good"). 
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about democracy, or about things that we lump together with 
democracy, that seems worth knowing - even if the reflection has 
been largely baneful, or if the linkage to democracy has been 
surplusage. Much of the motivation for this Article, it is true, is to lay 
the groundwork for thinking more carefully about policing and 
democracy, and the various qualms I have described about the analytic 
usefulness of democracy do indeed throw doubt on that larger project. 
But each of these qualms amounts to the suspicion that there is no 
coherent conception of democracy worth pursuing today, at least not 
in the context of policing. That suspicion can be rebutted most 
convincingly, if at all, by finding a theory of democracy useful in 
addressing modern-day problems of law enforcement. And ultimately 
we will not know whether there is such a theory until we look. 
I. PLURALISM'S RISE 
The difficulty is in choosing where to start. I begin in the 1950s -
long after Aristotle, long after Rousseau, long after Madison, long 
after Tocqueville. This decision needs some justifying. I make no 
claim, of course, that the democratic pluralists were more gifted than 
their predecessors or more permanently influential. Nor, as we will 
see, did pluralist thinking represent a clean and lasting break with the 
past. There were strong similarities, for example, between 1950s 
pluralism and 1790s Federalism. Moreover, the theories that later 
emerged to challenge pluralism, chiefly participatory and deliberative 
democracy, often drew inspiration from writers the pluralists had 
thought unhelpful, including Aristotle, Rousseau, and the anti­
Federalists. And both sides found things to like in Tocqueville. 
The rise of democratic pluralism in the 1950s was nonetheless a 
watershed development in several respects. First, the emergence of 
pluralism marked the beginning of "democratic theory" as a self­
conscious, broadly recognized field of interdisciplinary inquiry; it 
therefore began a tradition of sustained academic thinking about the 
nature of democracy. (Robert Dahl, perhaps the most influential of 
the pluralists and certainly the most prolific, recalls that "the term 
'democratic theory' hardly existed" when he began his work.33) 
Second, the theory developed by the pluralists was unusually coherent, 
unified, and powerful; its power derived in part from the manner in 
which it responded to the felt realities of postwar America. Third, 
pluralism was the first fully developed account of democracy that 
reflected the epochal rise, in late nineteenth- and early twentieth­
century America, of psychological and sociological understandings of 
33. ROBERT A. DAHL, TOWARD DEMOCRACY: A JOURNEY: REFLECTIONS: 1940-1997, 
at 6 (1997); see also Gallie, supra note 32, at 33. 
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collective life - what my brother Jeffrey Sklansky has characterized 
as "the fall of political economy and the rise of social psychology" as 
'the prevailing "science of American society."34 Fourth, and partly for 
the foregoing reasons, democratic pluralism has proven 
extraordinarily influential over the past half-century. For most of the 
1950s, the cluster of ideas at the heart of pluralism went almost 
unquestioned in mainstream discussions of American democracy; in 
Theodore Lowi's words, the theory "was considered so fruitful as to be 
virtually true."35 Into the 1970s, pluralism still seemed to its critics 
(who were by then proliferating) to provide "the dominant description 
and ideal of American politics."36 The theories of participatory and 
deliberative democracy that have emerged since the 1950s have been 
framed largely as responses to pluralism, and the pluralist view itself 
still has many sympathizers. Fifth and finally, police studies and the 
modern field of criminal procedure emerged close on the heels of 
democratic pluralism, and they grew to maturity in its shadow. So 
there are special reasons to start with democratic pluralism when 
pursuing the inquiry at the heart of this Article: What connections 
have there been between our ideas about democracy and our thinking 
about the police? 
It will be useful in the discussion that follows to keep in mind four 
separate questions that can be asked regarding democracy, questions 
respectively about purposes, processes, proximity, and particularity. 
The question of purposes concerns the ultimate aim of democracy -
the reasons the system is valued. The question of processes involves 
the mechanisms of democracy - the ways in which the purposes of 
democracy are advanced. The question of proximity is evaluative; it 
asks how close our present system is to the democratic ideal. Finally, 
the question of particularity addresses the degree to which the answers 
34. JEFFREY SKLANSKY, THE SOUL'S ECONOMY: MARKET SOCIETY AND SELFHOOD IN 
AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1820-1920, at 5, 11 (2002). On this theme, see also JAMES 
LIVINGSTON, PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
1850-1940 (1994). 
35. Theodore J. Lowi, Foreword to KENNETH PREWITT & ALAN STONE, THE RULING 
ELITES: ELITE THEORY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at vii, vii (1973). Mancur 
Olson noted in 1965 that parts of the pluralist account were sufficiently uncontroversial that 
they were "passed on to the young in the textbooks almost without qualification." MANCUR 
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 124 n.54 (1965) (citing JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & JAMES WALTER PELTASON, 
GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 310-11  (4th ed. 1960)). 
36. William E. Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 
3 (William E. Connolly ed., 1969). For similar, contemporary assessments, see, for example, 
CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 14 (1970); PREWITT & 
STONE, supra note 35, at 114; and Darryl Baskin, American Pluralism: Theory, Practice, and 
Ideology, 32 J. POL. 71, 80 (1970). 
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to the other three questions relate to one specific society - say, the 
United States - or, on the contrary, are universally applicable. 
The democratic pluralists of the 1950s sometimes spoke as though· 
they were addressing only the second of these questions: as if they 
were pursuing a strictly empirical inquiry into the actual workings of 
modern American democracy. But the questions are difficult to 
disentangle, and in fact the pluralists answered all four. Their answers 
were heavily informed by their era. They had witnessed the calamitous 
rise of European fascism and Soviet-style communism. Those 
experiences left them with a deep distrust of mass politics, a distrust 
that then shaped and was in tum strengthened by their understanding 
of McCarthyism as a lineal descendant of populism. They grew to see 
ideological extremism as the paramount political vice, and 
compromise and moderation as prerequisites for a stable democracy. 
They came to view authoritarianism as the antithesis of democracy, 
and democratic stability as the chief protection against a descent into 
authoritarianism. And, as the Cold War progressed, they sought an 
understanding of democracy that explained and made manifest the 
political superiority of America to the Soviet Union.37 
All of this drove the pluralists toward an understanding of 
democracy that de-emphasized mass participation while still assuring 
the dispersion of political power. The chief obstacle to such an 
understanding lay in the long-standing celebration of grassroots 
politics in America, the universal "tumult" and "confused clamor" in 
which Tocqueville had found, admiringly, Americans of all "ranks" 
and "classes" engaged in the ongoing project of government.38 Asking 
an American to consider only "his own affairs," Tocqueville wrote, 
would be like robbing him "of half of his existence; he would feel an 
immense void in his days, and he would become incredibly unhappy."39 
Tocqueville saw widespread political participation as America's chief 
bulwark against despotism, and that view had at least as much surface 
appeal when the pluralists began writing as it does today. The imagery 
of the New England town meeting ran deep. 
It was that imagery, above all else, that the pluralists rejected. They 
were not the first, of course. Max Weber had thought democracy, in its 
full and traditional sense, an inevitable casualty of the increasing 
37. On these themes, see PATEMAN, supra note 36, at 1-21; EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF 
VALUE 235-72 (1972); and ROGIN, supra note 24, at 1-31, 216-82. Not all pluralists saw 
McCarthyism as a mass phenomenon. See, e.g. , Nelson W. Polsby, Toward an Explanation of 
McCarthyism, in NELSON W. POLSBY ET AL., POLITICS AND SOCIAL LIFE, 809 (1963); 
Nelson W. Polsby, Down Memory Lane with Joe McCarthy, COMMENT., Feb. 1983, at 55. 
38. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 232 (Harvey c. Mansfield & 
Delba Winthrop trans. & eds., 2000) (1835). 
39. Id. at 233. 
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complexity of modern government and the associated rise of 
bureaucracy.40 He shared this view with his friend Robert Michels, 
author of the famous "iron law of oligarchy": "Who says organization, 
says oligarchy."41 But Weber and Michels saw this dynamic as tragic. 
The pluralists, in contrast, thought low participation not only was 
required by modern circumstances, but was a source and a reflection 
of democratic strength. 
The pluralists had nothing but derision for what David Truman, 
the only of their number to rival Robert Dahl for influence, called "the 
myth of omnivigilant citizenship, the picture of the nation as a sort of 
continuous town meeting with perfect attendance."42 Truman himself 
saw "considerable validity" in Joseph Wood Hutch's light essay, 
Whom Do We Picket Tonight?, which asked half seriously, "Wouldn't 
a really healthy citizen in a really healthy country be as unaware of the 
government as a healthy man is unaware of his physiology?"43 Dahl 
was of the same view. It "would clear the air of a good deal of cant," 
he thought: 
if instead of assuming that politics is a normal and natural concern of 
human beings, one were to make the contrary assumption that whatever 
lip service citizens may pay to conventional attitudes, politics is a remote, 
alien, and unrewarding activity. Instead of seeking to explain why citizens 
are not interested, concerned, and active, the task is to explain why a few 
citizens are.44 
"In liberal societies," Dahl concluded, "politics is a sideshow in the 
great circus of life."45 
The most elaborate statement of this position came from Angus 
Campbell and his colleagues at the Survey Research Center at the 
University of Michigan, who in 1960 completed an analysis of election 
surveys conducted in 1952 and 1956. The results, published under the 
40. Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196 (H.H. 
Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., 1946). 
41. ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE 
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 342, 365 (Eden & Cedar Paul 
trans., 2d ed., Free Press 1968) (1911). 
42. DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: PUBLIC INTERESTS AND 
PUBLIC OPINION 356 (2d ed. 1971) (1951) [hereinafter TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL 
PROCESS]. 
43. Id. (quoting Joseph Wood Krutch, Whom Do We Picket Tonight?, HARPER'S, Mar. 
1950, at 66, 67). Krutch said he found himself "looking backward with a certain sense of 
nostalgia into all those ages of Western civilization when no one supposed that being a good 
citizen was more than a part-time job." Krutch, supra, at 68. 
44. ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN 
CITY 279 (1961) [hereinafter DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?]. 
45. Id. at 305; see also, e.g. , id. at 225 ("Homo civicus is not, by nature, a political 
animal."). 
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title The A merican Voter, revealed "an electorate almost wholly 
without detailed information about decision making in government" 
and "almost completely unable to judge the rationality of government 
actions. "46 The authors were neither surprised nor terribly troubled. 
"For a large part of the public," they supposed, "political affairs are 
probably too difficult to comprehend in detail."47 More importantly, 
even those voters who could be well-informed had no reason to spend 
the time it would take: "It is a rather unusual individual whose deeper 
personality needs are engaged by politics, and in terms of rational self­
interest, the stakes do not seem to be great enough for the ordinary 
citizen to justify expending the effort necessary to make himself well 
informed politically."48 
The hope for democracy, the pluralists thought, lay not in the 
masses but in responsible leaders. The role of the masses was simply to 
help keep the leaders responsible.49 This perspective was hardly new; 
the pluralists shared it most conspicuously with the Federalists.so But 
the Federalists lived in a different world. They had an Enlightenment 
faith in abstract moral truths and in the essential unity of human 
knowledge. They understood human conduct in the terms of political 
economy, as a fundamentally rational pursuit of individual self­
interest. And they saw society as a voluntary assemblage of sovereign, 
atomistic individuals.s1 This world was as foreign to the pluralists as it 
is to us today. By the 1950s, abstract moral reasoning had a bad 
reputation among American intellectuals; it ran counter to the legacy 
of Pragmatism and to the growing association of "ideology" with 
frightening forms of utopianism.s2 The pluralists thus had no use for 
46. ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER 543 (1960). Dahl and Truman 
both served on the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Political Behavior, 
which helped plan the 1952 study and thereafter remained associated with the work at the 
University of Michigan. See id. at vi. The Committee on Political Behavior also included 
V.0. Key, Jr., whose book, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS, first published in 
1942, did much to popularize democratic pluralism. See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra, at vi; V.O. 
KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (5th ed. 1964) (1942). 
47. CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 46, at 543. 
48. Id. at 544. Similar results were reached in an earlier, influential study of how voters 
in Elmira, New York made up their minds in the 1948 presidential election. BERNARD R. 
BERELSON ET AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN 306-11  (1954). Like THE AMERICAN VOTER, the Elmira study found average 
citizens uninformed, uninvolved, and uninterested in politics. But the system still worked 
impressively well. "Where the rational citizen seems to abdicate, nevertheless angels seem to 
tread." Id. at 311.  
49. See PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE 7-9 
(1967); ROGIN, supra note 24, at 25; Jack L. Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of 
Democracy, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 285, 286-89 (1966). 
50. See ROGIN, supra note 24, at 45. 
51. See id. at 46; SKLANSKY, supra note 34, at 16-27. 
52. See, e.g. , CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE AGONY OF THE AMERICAN LEFT 171 (1969); 
PURCELL, supra note 37, at 197-217. 
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Walter Lippman's brand of neo-Aristotelian elitism, which they 
thought amounted to "a kind of benevolent despotism in the guise of a 
set of Platonic guardians unhappily subject to the vagaries of popular 
election."53 The pluralists' view of human nature was heavily colored 
by Freudianism, then still in its heyday.54 And their understanding of 
society reflected the early twentieth-century triumph of the social­
science paradigm, which exalted "an ever-widening identification of 
self and world, individual and society, conceived not as a federation of 
autonomous agents, but as an indivisible union of interdependent 
parts."55 
For all these reasons, the pluralists could not place their trust 
where the Federalists had placed theirs: in constitutional machinery 
balancing "ambition" against "ambition."56 Dahl's Preface to 
Democratic Theory, probably his most influential book, was framed in 
large part as a critique of "the 'Madisonian' theory of democracy," 
which Dahl found at odds with "modern concepts of behavior" and the 
findings of "contemporary social scientist[ s]. "57 Similarly, David 
Truman began The Governmental Process by invoking and then 
rejecting Madison's famous call for institutional guards against 
"factions."58 Dahl and Truman, like the pluralists more generally, 
thought the real prerequisites for a successful democracy were "social" 
rather than "constitutional."59 As Dahl put it, the Constitution did not 
keep the United States democratic; rather "the Constitution has 
remained because our society is essentially democratic."60 
To find the essence of democracy, the pluralists turned not to 
institutions but to the twentieth-century understanding of society. 
53. David B. Truman, The American System in Crisis, 74 POL. Ser. Q. 481, 486 (1959) 
[hereinafter Truman, American System]; see also, e.g. , ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 50 (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, PREFACE] ("Philosopher kings are 
hard to come by."). For a good discussion of Lippman's writings on democracy, see 
PURCELL, supra note 37, at 104-07. The key works are WALTER LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION 
(1922), and w ALTER LIPPMAN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925). 
54. See ROGIN, supra note 24, at 18. 
55. SKLANSKY, supra note 34, at 228. The authors of the Elmira study, for example, 
sought ultimately to understand "the social psychology of the voting decision." BERELSON 
ET AL., supra note 48, at 277. 
56. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 252 (James Madison) (Cambridge 2003). 
57. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 4, 18. 
58. See TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, supra note 42, at 3-13 (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)). 
59. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 82; see also, e.g. , SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, 
POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 9 (1960); TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL 
PROCESS, supra note 42, at xii, 529-31; Truman, American System, supra note 53, at 493. 
60. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 143 (emphasis added). 
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More specifically, they turned to four fixtures of the new social-science 
paradigm: consumerism, groups, consensus, and personality. 
First, consumerism. The rise of mass markets in late nineteenth­
century America seemed to call for a new understanding of the 
relation between individuals and the economy, replacing the old 
model of the free market as a kind of tumultuous bazaar in which 
buyers and sellers, comparably situated, negotiated face-to-face 
bargains informed by the shouting all around them. A new model 
emerged that acknowledged the passive nature of modern 
consumption.61 Demand could be cultivated and channeled; this was 
what made the mass market useful to society. Rather than 
independent agents, merchants and customers were part of an 
interconnected whole. The role of merchants was to promote demand 
and then to satisfy it; the role of customers was to enjoy the better life 
made possible by new and cheaper products. The model retained a 
remnant of the invisible hand: acting en masse, consumers presumably 
set some limits to the pliability of demand.62 As long as sellers 
competed for customers, good detergent at the same price should still 
drive out bad detergent.63 But the heart of consumerism was the idea 
that average people found their freedom not in the market itself, but 
in what the market produced. 
The pluralists of the 1950s did not need to extend the theory of 
consumerism into the realm of politics; Joseph Schumpeter had 
already done it for them. Writing in 1942, Schumpeter stressed the 
parallel between mass markets and modern elections. Democracy 
consisted simply of pitting would-be leaders against each other in "a 
competitive struggle for the people's vote";64 "the reins of 
government" were "handed to those who command more support than 
do any of the competing individuals or teams. "65 Political campaigns 
functioned exactly like commercial advertising.66 And just as economic 
61. See, e.g., WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS, POWER, AND THE RISE 
OF A NEW AMERICAN CULTURE 231-44, 288-91, 372-78 (1993); SKLANSKY, supra note 34, at 
178-91. 
62. See, e.g. , GARY CROSS, AN ALL-CONSUMING CENTURY: WHY COMMERCIALISM 
WON IN MODERN AMERICA 17-65 (2000). 
63. Assuming, of course, that consumers could be counted on to prefer good detergent, 
which Veblen famously doubted. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE 
CLASS (1899). But even Veblen gave consumers a degree of collective agency, albeit an 
agency they were apt to use foolishly. See SKLANSKY, supra note 34, at 185. 
64. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (Harper 
Perennial 1976) (1942). 
65. Id. at 273. 
66. Id. at 263. Schumpeter was not, of course, the first to draw this comparison. The 
pioneering publicist Edward Bernays, for example, had called politics "the first big business 
in America," and had suggested that politicians could learn a great deal from businessmen 
about "methods of mass distribution of ideas and products." EDWARD L. BERNAYS, 
PROPAGANDA 95 (1928). On Bernays, see, for example, LEACH, supra note 61, at 319-22, 
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competition was generally imperfect but "never completely lacking," 
so "in political life there is always some competition, though perhaps 
only a potential one, for the allegiance of the people. "67 The "social 
function" of democratic politics was "fulfilled, as it were, incidentally 
- in the same sense as production is incidental to the making of 
profits."68 
Like the pluralists after him, Schumpeter argued that the system 
actually worked better when average citizens stayed relatively 
uninvolved in politics. The political world was remote from the day-to­
day lives of average citizens, so they were unlikely to care much about 
it or to approach it with a sense of responsibility: 
Normally, the great political questions take their place in the psychic 
economy of the typical citizen with those leisure-hour interests that have 
not attained the rank of hobbies, and with the subjects of irresponsible 
conversation. These things seem so far off; they are not at all like a 
business proposition; dangers may not materialize at all and if they 
should they may not prove so very serious; one feels oneself to be moving 
in a fictitious world.69 
With respect to political matters, the average citizen was "a  member of 
an unworkable committee, the committee of the whole nation," and 
therefore he spent "less disciplined effort on mastering a political 
problem than . . .  on a game of bridge."70 
Schumpeter's understanding of electoral politics as akin to mass 
marketing, together with his rejection of "town meeting" picture of 
American democracy, heavily influenced the pluralists.71 Unlike 
Schumpeter, the pluralists thought elections actually gave voters a 
and LARRY TYE, THE FATHER OF SPIN: EDWARD L. BERNAYS AND THE BIRTH OF PUBLIC 
RELATIONS (1998). 
67. SCHUMPETER, supra note 64, at 271. 
68. Id. at 282. 
69. Id. at 261. 
70. Id. 
71. See, e.g. , BACHRACH, supra note 49, at 17-25; LIVELY, supra note 26, at 35-41, 76; 
PATEMAN, supra note 36, at 3, 5. The authors of the Elmira study dissented from "the usual 
analogy" between voting and "the more or less carefully calculated decisions of consumers 
or businessmen or courts"; they thought political "preferences" were more like "cultural 
tastes" in "music, literature, recreational activities, dress, ethics, speech, social behavior." 
BERELSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 311.  But classifying voting with clothing choices rather 
than with calculated economic decisions was very much in keeping with a mass-market view 
of elections. (Elsewhere the authors compared political views with food selections in a 
cafeteria. See id. at 318.) Moreover, investigations of "voting behavior" such as the Elmira 
study and THE AMERICAN VOTER, see supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text, themselves 
reflected, in their very methodology and choice of subject matter, a consumerist view of 
politics. They brought to political science "the theory and techniques of market research." 
Robert B. Westbrook, Politics as Consumption: Managing the Modern American Election, in 
THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION: CRmCAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1980, at 
143, 163 (Richard Wightman Fox & T.J. Jackson Lears eds., 1983). 
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significant amount of control over leaders, but they agreed with him 
that the control was limited and indirect, because "[t]he public's 
explicit task is to decide not what government shall do but rather who 
shall decide what government shall do."72 The pluralists also shared 
Schumpeter's understanding of democracy as simply "a political 
method," not "an end in itself."73 Democracy was desirable, 
Schumpeter believed, only to the extent that it could be expected to 
advance other interests or ideals, such as individual freedom.74 
Schumpeter did in fact think that democracy could be expected to 
protect individual freedom, although only as a very general matter; the 
relationship was contingent and far from secure.75 His legacy to the 
pluralists, though, included the notion that "the value of the 
democratic system for ordinary individuals should be measured by the 
degree to which the 'outputs' of the system, in the form of security, 
services, and material support, benefit them," and that therefore "the 
less the individual has to participate in politics on the 'input' and 
demand side of the system in order to gain his interests on the output 
side, the better off he is. "76 
The pluralists' debt to Schumpeter has so frequently been 
emphasized that their differences from him are sometimes overlooked. 
Keeping those differences in mind will help to bring pluralism into 
sharper focus. The pluralists shared Schumpeter's consumerist view of 
the purpose of democracy; they agreed it was simply a method for 
arriving at good policies. They shared his view that an election was 
more like a supermarket than like a town hall, and they placed the 
same emphasis he did on "the vital fact of leadership."77 But 
Schumpeter took an especially bleak view of the ability of ordinary 
citizens to think rationally about politics. The remoteness of political 
questions from everyday life meant not only that most people found it 
hard to care much about politics, but that, when they did care, they 
were apt to act foolishly and irresponsibly. The average person, 
Schumpeter thought, "drops down to a lower level of mental 
performance as soon as he enters the political field," reasoning "in a 
way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of 
his real interests."78 And "if for once he does emerge from his usual 
72. CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 46, at 541; see also, e.g., DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 
53, at 131-32 & n.12; ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, 
AND WELFARE 283 n.15 (1953). 
73. SCHUMPETER, supra note 64, at 242. 
74. Id. at 242-43. 
75. See id. at 243, 271-72, 290. 
76. BACHRACH, supra note 49, at 95. 
77. SCHUMPETER, supra note 64, at 270. 
78. Id. at 262. 
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vagueness" about political matters, the typical citizen "is as likely as 
not to become still more unintelligent and irresponsible."79 Public 
opinions were largely "manufactured" by the political process; this was 
why Schumpeter thought elections were unlikely to give voters even 
indirect control of government in any meaningful sense.so 
Consequently, Schumpeter argued that the success of democracy 
depended at bottom on a fairly rigid class structure, a healthy dose of 
"traditionalism," and a great deal of political quietude.s1 It required, 
first of all, a stable, elite "social stratum" that saw political leadership 
as its special calling.s2 Next, a separate, intermediate stratum - "not 
too rich, not too poor , not too exclusive, not too accessible" - was 
needed to staff a powerful, professional bureaucracy.s3 Certain issues 
then had to be placed off-limits to democratic politics - by, for 
example, delegating them to independent agencies.84 
Most important of all was what Schumpeter called "Democratic 
Self-Control,"s5 by which he meant much more than broad acceptance 
of "the rules of the democratic game."s6 Voters and elected officials 
had to be sufficiently smart and upright to resist "the offerings of the 
crook and the crank."s7 Backers of particular programs had to be 
"content to stand in an orderly breadline; they must not attempt to 
rush the shop. "88 And ordinary citizens had to confine their political 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 263. The pluralists' divergence from Schumpeter on this point was consistent 
with the emerging position of social scientists in the 1950s that public attitudes resisted easy 
manipulation - a position that itself was based in part on the Elmira study of voting 
behavior. On this so-called "law of minimal effects," see, for example, BERELSON ET AL., 
supra note 48, at 248; KEY, supra note 46, at 483-85; JOSEPH T. KLAPPER, THE EFFECTS OF 
MASS COMMUNICATION 4-9, 43-47 (1960); and Westbrook, supra note 71, at 164. 
81. SCHUMPETER, supra note 64, at 290-96. 
82. Id. at 290-91 .  
83. Id. at  293-94. 
84. Id. at 291-92. This is, of course, precisely the suggestion made today by people like 
Fareed Zakaria and Philip Pettit. See supra notes 30-31. Interestingly, Schumpeter's example 
of an issue that should be placed beyond politics was similar to Pettit's: the detailed content 
of a criminal code. Crime, he pointed out, "is a complex phenomenon," the "[p]opular 
slogans about it are almost invariably wrong," and it is prone to be approached in "fits of 
vindictiveness" or "fits of sentimentality." SCHUMPETER, supra note 64, at 292. Schumpeter 
used the Bank of England, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and "certain of our . . .  
state universities" to illustrate the point that "[d]emocracy does not require that every 
function of the state be subject to its political method." Id. at 292-93. 
85. SCHUMPETER, supra note 64, at 294. 
86. Id. at 301. 
87. Id. at 294. 
88. Id. 
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activity to voting: " [T]hey must understand that, once they have 
elected an individual, political action is his business and not theirs."89 
Schumpeter's prerequisites for a successful democracy pretty 
clearly excluded the United States, even in the relative calm of the 
postwar period. His model seems to have been Victorian England,9() 
augmented by a European-style civil service.91 He thought civil 
services of this kind were bound to expand of their own accord, 
"whatever the political method a nation may adopt"; their growth was 
"the one certain thing about our future."92 But if a successful 
democracy required a stable class system and a politics of "self­
control," it was hard to be optimistic about America. Schumpeter 
himself was comfortable with pessimism. His book amounted to an 
extended requiem for bourgeois capitalism, which he thought was 
done in by its own successes - including modern democracy.93 But to 
the pluralists, American democracy seemed thriving. They therefore 
searched for the secret of democratic success someplace other than in 
social stratification and a culture of restraint. They found it in groups. 
Schumpeter's view of "pressure groups" was close to Madison's: he 
saw them as a kind of democratic disease, aberrational and injurious.94 
The pluralists, in contrast, celebrated interest groups as the lifeblood 
of modern democracy.95 They took their lead here from Arthur 
Bentley, who described society in 1908 as "nothing other than the 
complex of groups that compose it."96 Bentley had hardly originated 
the notion that groups rather than individuals were the key unit of 
social analysis. "Group theory," based in part on studies in the newly 
emerging field of anthropology, was a broad intellectual current in 
America at the beginning of the twentieth century.97 Bentley's 
contribution was to apply group theory, in a particularly 
89. Id. at 295. 
90. See, e.g. , id. at 275-81, nn.16-19, 21-22. 
91. See id. at 293. 
92. Td. at 294. 
93. See, e.g. , id. at 300-02. 
94. Id. at 263, 298. Schumpeter accepted political parties, which he saw as opportunistic 
alliances for the purpose of achieving political power. The political process needed them, in 
the same way that the mass market needed department stores. See id. at 283. But he had no 
use for groups actually united by a common interest: "(G]roups with an ax to grind." Id. at 
263. 
95. See Baskin, supra note 36, at 73-79. 
96. ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL 
PRESSURES 222 (Transaction Publishers 1995) (1908). On Bentley's influence, see, for 
example, OLSON, supra note 35, at 117-31, and PURCELL, supra note 37, at 254. 
97. See R. JEFFREY LUSTIG, CORPORATE LIBERALISM: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY, 1890-1920, at 109-49 (1982); SKLANSKY, supra note 34, at 
131. 
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uncompromising form, to the study of politics. "When groups are 
adequately stated," Bentley wrote, "everything is stated. When I say 
everything I mean everything."98 Politics was competition among 
groups, no more and no less. Groups meant interests: every group had 
its interest, and interests manifested themselves only through groups. 
There was no such thing as the "social whole"; there were only groups 
working against each other.99 Government was the balancing or 
adjustment of group interests,100 and the eventual resolution inevitably 
reflected the relative strengths of the underlying groups.101 
Bentley took his pragmatism as seriously as he took his group 
theory; the one-sentence forward to his book declared it "an Attempt 
to Fashion a Tool." He therefore had nothing but scorn for the notion 
that government should be detached and impartial. Abstract standards 
such as "justice, truth, or what not" were simply products and 
manifestations of group pressures. Reason itself was just one 
"technique" for balancing those pressures,102 and an overrated 
technique at that. Parties would do better to "drop their set, formal, 
logically coherent policies," and simply to give "more efficient 
expression to the underlying interests they represent."103 
Unlike the pluralists, Bentley had relatively little interest in the 
nature of democracy or in the special conditions for its success. In his 
view all forms of government amounted to the same thing: "interest 
groups wrestling with one another. "104 But he ventured that perhaps 
"pure despotism" and "pure democracy" could be understood as 
hypothetical extremes at opposite ends of a continuum, with 
despotism "consisting of an individual who passes personally on every 
group antagonism at its inception and allays it by appropriate action," 
and democracy involving "a government in which every interest would 
be able to find a technique for organizing and expressing itself in a 
system in which every other interest was equally represented on 'fair' 
terms, so that in the final course of action all interests would get their 
'due' weight."105 And he suggested in passing that the dispersed form 
of interest adjustment found in "governments like that of the United 
98. BENTLEY, supra note 96, at 208-09. 
99. See id. at 220-21. 
100. See id. at 211,  258-59. 
101. See id. at 226-27. 
102. Id. at 448. 
103. Id. at 452. 
104. Id. at 307; see also id. at 447-59. 
105. Id. at 305-06. 
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States" was remarkable "for the trifling proportion of physical 
violence involved considering the ardent nature of the struggles."106 
Bentley's account of government through interest groups received 
little attention until after World War II, when the pluralists picked it 
up and ran with it.107 They embraced his view of society as a complex 
of groups, they liked his notion that logrolling and lobbying were the 
very stuff of governance rather than a degradation of some pristine 
ideal, and they were intrigued by his suggestion that democracy might 
be stabilizing and pacifying. Like Bentley, the pluralists viewed group 
conflict as the essence of politics. And like Bentley, the pluralists were 
struck by the scattered, multiplicitous adjustments of those conflicts in 
the United States. They came to see the diversity of interest groups in 
the United States, and the diversity of mechanisms for the balancing of 
group interests, as signal strengths of American democracy. 
This was the "pluralism" in democratic pluralism. It should not be 
minimized. For all their discomfort with mass politics, the pluralists 
had no touch of pastoral traditionalism. They placed their faith in 
precisely those aspects of modernity - industrialization and 
urbanization - that people like Ortega y Gasset found so 
threatening.108 Old affiliations might be swept aside, but new ones 
arose in their place.109 The image of the town meeting left the pluralists 
cold not just because it seemed inapplicable to national politics; the 
image smacked of nostalgia for small-town life, and the pluralists were 
moderns. They shared the broad tendency of intellectuals in postwar 
America to associate democracy with a kind of freewheeling 
cosmopolitanism, expressed through "a culture that denied absolute 
truths, remained intellectually flexible and critical, valued diversity, 
and drew strength from innumerable competing subgroups."110 
106. Id. at 453. 
107. See DAHL & LINDBLOM, supra note 72, at 330 n.7; Thelma Z. Lavine, Introduction 
to BENTLEY, supra note 96, at xiv. 
108. See JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES (anon. trans., 1932). 
109. The insight is Michael Rogin's. Rogin persuasively characterized pluralism as in 
part "a theory of history in which industrialization is the major actor." ROGIN, supra note 24, 
at 10. "For the modern pluralists, industrial society destroys old groups and loyalties, but it 
also creates new ones" - "more utilitarian than traditional," but stabilizing nonetheless. Id. 
at 12. Indeed, it was precisely "the success of industrialization" that allowed "group politics 
to dominate a society." Id. at 10. 
110. PURCELL, supra note 37, at 211; David A. Hollinger, Ethnic Diversity, 
Cosmopolitanism and the Emergence of the American Liberal Intelligentsia, 27 AM. Q. 133 
(1975). Hollinger describes the "cosmopolitan ideal" of midcentury intellectuals as "a desire 
to transcend the limitations of any and all particularisms in order to achieve a more complete 
human experience and a more complete understanding of that experience." Hollinger, supra, 
at 135, 150. He makes the intriguing suggestion that the rise of this ideal may have been 
linked to the rise of elitism. Cosmpolitanism, he argues: 
is difficult to maintain as a prescription for society at large unless one is willing - as most 
American intellectuals have not been - to attribute to the general populations a prodigious 
capacity for growth. The cosmopolitan ideal commanded the widest allegiance from 
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Adding together interest-group lobbying and electoral control, the 
pluralists arrived at a much rosier view than Schumpeter regarding the 
ability of average citizens to exert meaningful control over 
government. Individuals might not have many ways to influence 
government policy, but groups did. David Truman suggested that "the 
outstanding characteristic of American politics" was its "multiplicity of 
points of access," its "decentralized and more or less independent" loci 
of influence over government decisionmaking.111 Robert Dahl also 
praised the "decentralized" nature of American politics, which made it 
likely "that any active and legitimate group will make itself heard 
effectively at some stage in the process of decision."112 In his influential 
study of how pressure groups shaped federal legislation governing 
freight delivery charges, Earl Latham commended lobbying and 
backroom bargaining - the hobgoblins of "good government" 
reformers - as triumphs of American democracy. It was "impossible 
to witness the process," he thought, "without admiration" for the 
manner in which it allowed "a free people" to "refine[] and sift[]" a 
"fantastically complicated question of public policy."113 
The pluralists were not in complete accord about the nature of 
groups. Latham, for example, thought groups served solely to promote 
the preexisting interests of their members; they were "devices" 
through which "the individual fulfills personal values and felt 
needs."1 14 In contrast, Truman saw groups as not simply reflecting 
individual interests but helping to shape them. Groups molded 
attitudes and behavior; they were "the primary, though not the 
exclusive, means by which the individual knows, interprets, and reacts 
to the society in which he exists. "115 (Dahl seemed to side with 
Truman.116) But the pluralists all agreed that groups were "the basic 
political form"117 and a key to the success of American democracy. 
And they agreed that group politics functioned not just outside 
government but also within it: between branches, between agencies, 
American intellectuals when it was implicitly understood to be their peculiar possession. 
when members of the intelligentsia did not feel obliged - as many of them did after the mid-
1960s - to adopt values that could be justified in the wider context of general social theory. 
Id. at 150-51. 
111. TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, supra note 42, at 507-19. 
1 12. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 150. Similar claims may also be found in, for 
example, KEY, supra note 46, at 6-8. 
1 13. EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS: A STUDY IN BASING-POINT 
LEGISLATION 226-27 (1952). 
1 14. Id. at 13, 28. 
1 15. TRUMAN, GOVERNMENT AL PROCESS, supra note 42, at 21.  
116. See DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 18. 
117. LATHAM, supra note 1 13, at 10; see also, e.g. , KEY, supra note 46, at 17. 
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between bureaus and branch offices, and so forth.118 Official and 
unofficial groups were "inhabitants of one pluralistic world,"119 and 
government bureaucracies were part of "the 'normal' American 
political process. "120 
The pluralists were optimistic about group politics in the United 
States for several related reasons. First, they thought America was 
particularly rich with groups. They liked Tocqueville's notion that in 
no other nation had "the principle of association been more 
successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects,"121 and 
they thought the observation as sound in the mid-twentieth century as 
in the early-nineteenth. Second, they believed groups were constantly 
forming and evolving in response to changing circumstances and 
changing interests. In Latham's words, the process was "dynamic, not 
static; fluid, not fixed"; society was "a moving multitude of human 
clusters," combining to "form coalitions and constellations of power in 
a flux of restless alterations. " 122 Third, the pluralists thought that the 
nature of group politics in the United States worked to stabilize the 
system and to prevent any one group from gaining too much power. It 
was not just that there were so many groups, but also that the groups 
overlapped in complicated ways, that they focused on different but 
intersecting sets of issues, and that each group tended to enjoy its own 
distinctive array of political resources - some had time, some had 
money, some had expertise, some had social connections, and so on.123 
118. See, e.g. ,.LATHAM, supra note 114 at 38-49; DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 136-
37, 145; KEY, supra note 46, at 690-712. 
1 19. LATHAM, supra note 1 13, at 49. 
120. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 145. 
121. TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, supra note 42, at 7 (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 191 (Phillips Bradley ed., Knopf 1945) (1835)); 
see also, e.g. , DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 27, at 295. 
122. LATHAM, supra note 113, at 37-49; see also, e.g. , TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL 
PROCESS, supra note 42, at 31-35, 51-52; Truman, American System, supra note 53, at 488. 
Latham thought this ceaseless activity was "fully in accord with the American culture pattern 
which rates high in the characteristics of optimism, risk, experimentalism, change, 
aggressiveness, acquisitiveness, and a colossal faith in man's ability to subdue and bend 
nature to his desire." LATHAM, supra note 113, at 37. Presumably it was rhetoric like 
Latham's that C. Wright Mills had in mind when he dismissed the pluralists as "romantic," 
caught up in "a kind of bewildering, Whitmanesque enthusiasm for variety." MILLS, supra 
note 24, at 244. 
123. Thus, for example, Robert Dahl concluded in his study of New Haven politics: 
Probably the most striking characteristic of influence in New Haven is the extent to which it 
is specialized; that is, individuals who are influential in one sector of public activity tend not 
to be influential in another sector; and, what is probably more significant, the social strata 
from which individuals in one sector tend to come are different from the social strata from 
which individuals in other sectors are drawn. 
DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?, supra note 44, at 169. Like "a number of old American cities," 
New Haven had evolved "from a system in which resources of influence were highly 
concentrated to a system in which they are highly dispersed," from "a system of cumulative 
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The strength of the system lay in "complexity, or more to the point, 
multiplicity: multiplicity of issues, multiplicity of groups, multiplicity of 
memberships, multiplicity of influence resources, and multiplicity of 
access or check points."124 All this multiplicity meant that American 
politics "worked essentially by bargaining."125 In Dahl's memorable 
formulation, the United States had a system not of "government by a 
majority" nor of "government by a minority," but rather of "rule by 
minorities. "126 American democracy was "not a majestic march of great 
majorities united upon certain matters of basic policy"; instead it was 
"the steady appeasement of relatively small groups."127 
All this bargaining, all this "flux of restless alterations," held 
together only because of a powerful underlying consensus. After 
consumerism and group theory, the notion of consensus was the third 
social-science fixture incorporated by the pluralists, and William 
Connolly may have been right to call it "the most important force 
sustaining political pluralism."128 
The pluralists thought that a successful democracy on the 
American model required two kinds of consensus. The first was rough 
agreement about the range of reasonable policy alternatives. Dahl, in 
particular, stressed that unless the options on the table were somehow 
"winnowed down to those within [a] broad area of basic agreement," 
democracy "would not long survive the endless irritations and 
frustrations of elections and party competition." Consequently, 
democracy depended on an "underlying consensus on policy" among 
"a predominant portion of the politically active members" of society.129 
Second, and even more fundamental, was broad agreement on 
underlying democratic norms - what Truman, echoing Schumpeter,130 
inequalities in political resources to a system of noncumulative or dispersed inequalities in 
political resources." Id. at 227-28. 
124. Baskin, supra note 36, at 73-79. On the importance of overlapping memberships, 
see especially BERELSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 318-20, and TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL 
PROCESS, supra note 42, at 168, 514, 520. 
125. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 145; see also id. at 150 (suggesting that "perhaps 
in no other national political system in the world is bargaining so basic a component of the 
political process"); LATHAM, supra note 113, at 224 (stressing centrality of "the principle of 
toleration and compromise, without which the democratic process would not function at 
all"). 
126. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 133. 
127. Id. at 146. 
128. Connolly, supra note 36, at 13; see also, e.g. , BACHRACH, supra note 49, at 62-63. 
Thus George Berkley, drawing on pluralist scholarship in 1969 for insight into democratic 
policing, took it as uncontroversial that democracy "first of all requires consensus." 
BERKLEY, supra note 1,  at 2. 
129. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 132; see also id. at 77-80; BERELSON ET AL., 
supra note 48, at 313, 319; KEY, supra note 46, at 227; LATHAM, supra note 113, at 225. 
130. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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called the "rules of the game."131 The precise nature of these 
procedural principles was never completely clear, but they seemed to 
rest "at bottom on a respect for the dignity of man,"132 and the 
pluralists agreed that "social training" in them was critical to the 
success of a democracy.133 
They agreed, too, that the critical figures in forging consensus both 
on policies and on procedural norms were members of an elite 
"political stratum":134 "the politically active and articulate portion of 
the population."135 Unlike Schumpeter's stable, class-based leadership 
stratum, the pluralist elite was in theory porous and heterogeneous.136 
It was for all that an elite, comprising not just government officials, but 
also, crucially, leaders of interest groups and shapers of public opinion. 
Members of the political stratum were apt to be better educated and 
more effectively trained in democratic values. They also tended to 
belong to more groups, and their leadership roles made them more 
worldly. The consensus at the heart of pluralism was thus an "elite 
consensus,"137 a consensus formed through "the affiliations of the 
guardians."138 As Michael Rogin put it, pluralism ultimately was "not 
the politics of group conflict but the politics of leadership conflict."139 
The fourth and final social-science concept relied upon by the 
pluralists was personality, in the Freudian sense of a complex, largely 
unconscious mental structure governing attitudes and behavior. The 
pluralists were particularly attracted to the notion that democratic and 
131.  TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, supra note 42, at xii, 159, 512, 524. Truman, 
for example, thought these included: 
acceptance of the rule of law over a resort either to violence or to arbitrary official action, 
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, effective modes of mass participation both in the 
institutions of government itself and in the organized groups in the society broadly, and a 
measure of equality of access to the fruits of the social enterprise. 
Id. at xxxvii; see also id. at 512-13. 
132. Truman, American System, supra note 53, at 490. 
133. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 47, 76-77; see also KEY, supra note 46, at 12-13; 
TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, supra note 42, at 512-13, 524. 
134. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?, supra note 44, at 90-94. 
135. TRUMAN, GOVERNMENT AL PROCESS, supra note 42, at xxxviii. 
136. See DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?, supra note 44, at 91. 
137. BACHRACH, supra note 49, at 47-64. 
138. TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, supra note 42, at 535; see also Truman, 
American System, supra note 53, at 495-97. The authors of the Elmira study similarly stressed 
the importance of "opinion-leading relationships," through which "the total information and 
knowledge possessed in the group's present and past generations can be made available for 
the group's choice." BERELSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 321; see also id. at 322-23. Opinion 
leaders were thus the "angels" that seemed to intercede when "the rational citizen seems to 
abdicate." Id. at 311.  
139. ROGIN, supra note 24, at 25.  The same point is made in PREWITT & STONE, supra 
note 35, at 201, and Walker, supra note 49, at 287. 
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antidemocratic values were psychologically embedded, and that, in 
particular, there was something that could be called "the authoritarian 
personality."140 The widely influential book first articulating this view 
described the authoritarian "character structure"141 as including all of 
the following dispositions: "[r]igid adherence to conventional, middle­
class values"; a " [s]ubmissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized 
moral authorities of the ingroup"; a "[t]endency to be on the lookout 
for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate 
conventional values"; " [o]pposition to the subjective, the imaginative, 
and the tender-minded"; a "belief in mystical determinants of the 
individual's faith"; a "disposition to think in rigid categories"; a 
" [p]reoccupation" with " [p]ower and 'toughness"'; a " [g]eneralized 
hostility" and "vilification of the human"; a "disposition to believe that 
wild and dangerous things go on in the world"; a "projection outwards 
of unconscious emotional impulses"; and an "[e]xaggerated concern 
with sexual 'goings-on.'"142 
This cluster of dispositions, the authoritarian personality, was 
thought to be especially prevalent among those with low to moderate 
levels of education, income, and political activity - that is to say, 
among people outside the political stratum.143 The role of personality 
in politics thus provided another reason to leave the day-to-day 
functions of democracy to the elite. For reasons of individual 
psychology, broadening political participation was likely to mean 
bringing "the authoritarian-minded into the political arena."144 Mass 
politics was authoritarian politics; democratic politics was, 
paradoxically, elite politics. 
The notion of the authoritarian personality reinforced and in tum 
was strengthened by the pluralist emphasis on bargaining. For part of 
what distinguished "the authoritarian-minded" was precisely their 
extremism, their discomfort with compromise, their affinity for "total 
140. T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950) ; see also, e.g., 
DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 18; LIPSET, supra note 59, at 105; Morris Janowitz & 
Dwaine Marvick, Authoritarianism and Political Behavior, 17 PuB. OPINION Q. 185 (1953); 
Robert E. Lane, Political Personality and Electoral Choice, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 173 
(1955). For assessments of the role of personality in pluralism, see PuRCELL, supra note 37, 
at 253-54, and ROGIN, supra note 24, at 18. 
141. ADORNO ET AL., supra note 140, at ix. 
142 Id. at 228; see also, e.g., Lane, supra note 140, at 176. On reactions to THE 
AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY, and on the study's roots in earlier work by Adorno and 
other members of the Frankfurt School, see MARTIN JAY, THE DIALECTICAL 
IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL 
RESEARCH, 1923-1950, at 219-52 (2d ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1996) (1973). 
143. See, e.g., DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 18, 81-82; LIPSET, supra note 59, at 97-
130; Janowitz & Marvick, supra note 140, at 191, 195, 199. 
144. DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 89. 
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politics."145 They cared too much; they were too reluctant to yield. 
They were overly attracted to the revolutionary aspirations that by the 
1950s had come to seem a "deep betrayal, treason not only to the 
narrow interests of the United States but to the basic values of 
Western civilization."146 Democratic politics was thus elite politics in 
part because average citizens, if they became politically engaged, were 
likely to become engaged in the wrong way. They were apt to become 
"highly partisan" if not "rigidly fanatic. "147 Democracy depended on 
"an implicit division of political labor," in which the bulk of the work 
was left to those who could occupy the psychological middle ground 
between indifference and extremism.148 
The psychoanalytic orientation of the pluralists contributed to their 
mixed position on the subject of expertise. On the one hand, the 
pluralists shared Dewey's disdain for Platonic "philosopher kings," a 
disdain that by the 1950s had become intellectual orthodoxy.149 And 
their attraction to Bentley's group theory of politics made them 
unsympathetic to "good government" managerialism of the kind 
associated with Herbert Hoover. They did not believe government was 
or should be a science. On the other hand, they did believe that 
government, and our views about government, should be informed by 
science, and by social science in particular. They saw themselves, after 
all, as bringing social science to bear on the practical problems of 
democracy.150 They were empiricists - often in methodology, and 
always in disposition. An important part of their empiricism was 
rooted in Freud. They shared his faith in the analyst's ability to 
subjugate the irrational through detached inquiry, and they tended to 
see themselves as engaged in essentially the same project.151 And, of 
145. BERELSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 319. 
146. LASCH, supra note 52, at 172. For the classic declaration of "the end of deep 
political conflict in the West, the end of utopian attempts to reconstruct society," id. at 171, 
see Daniel Bell's collection of essays, DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE 
EXHAUSTION OF POLffiCAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES (1961). 
147. BERELSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 314, 323. 
148. Id. at 321, 323; see also, e.g. , Walker, supra note 49, at 287. 
149. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 205 (Gateway Books 1946) 
(1927); see also TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
On Dewey's influence, see PURCELL, supra note 37, at 197-217. 
150. See, e.g., BERELSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 306; DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, 
at 18; TRUMAN, GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, supra note 42, at 14-44. 
151. David Truman, for example, opened his essay on McCarthyism - the same essay in 
which he dismissed Lippman as a Platonist - by warning that America's failure in China, 
together with the Sputnik crisis, had "produced a variety of responses, a good many of which 
were inappropriate in the sense that they were not adequately based on reality," although 
they may have been "comforting" and "psychologically useful." Truman, American System, 
supra note 53, at 481. Later, he suggested that "psychoanalytic examination" of Lippman 
himself "might be revealing," although Truman did not propose to carry it out. Id. at 487. 
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course, they had little confidence in the ability of the average citizen to 
think rationally about public affairs, and a strong belief in the 
importance of delegating the main work of politics. All of this meant 
that respect for certain kinds of expertise - particularly scientific and 
professional expertise - suffused democratic pluralism.152 
We finally are in a position to summarize the pluralist account of 
democracy. Consider in tum the four dimensions of democracy we 
identified earlier: purposes, processes, proximity, and particularity.153 
Purposes. The pluralists saw democracy not as end in itself but as 
purely instrumental, a means of protection against violent upheavals 
and authoritarianism. Individuals were prior to politics. The purposes 
of democracy were to promote stability and to preserve a certain 
baseline of civil liberty. 
Processes. The pluralists believed that democracy depended at 
bottom not on specific institutional arrangements but rather on 
personality and culture. They spoke of democratic societies, not 
democratic governments. The one institutional arrangement they did 
think critical was election of the officials with final say over 
government policy. But the true engines of politics were groups, both 
inside and outside government, and democratic politics required 
resolving group conflicts through competition, bargaining, and 
compromise. Those processes in tum required that politically active 
members of the community have democratic personalities, be trained 
in democratic norms, and share a rough consensus about the range of 
acceptable policies. These conditions, finally, were easier to secure 
when politics was largely the province of an elite, and the elite in tum 
made appropriate use of scientific and technical expertise. 
Proximity. The pluralists thought that American democracy, while 
obviously imperfect, was on the whole fair, open, and remarkably 
successful. They therefore believed it far less important to improve the 
system than to recognize and to preserve its strengths. This 
orientation, in turn, reinforced and accentuated their concern with 
political stability.154 
Particularity. Pluralism was very much a theory of American 
democracy. Partly because democracy was a property of a society 
152. This tendency of pluralism, present from the outset, grew more pronounced after 
October 1957. Pluralism was always a response to the felt realities of the times, and few 
realities were felt as sharply as Sputnik. See PAUL DICKSON, SPUTNIK: THE SHOCK OF THE 
CENTURY 108-33, 223-34 (2001); ROBERT A. DIVINE, THE SPUTNIK CHALLENGE 3-96 
(1993); WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY 
OF THE SPACE AGE 137-65, 227-30 (1985); Walter A. McDougall, Technocracy and Statecraft 
in the Space Age - Toward the History of a Sa/talion, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 1010, 1023-24 
(1982). 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
154. See, e.g., LIVELY, supra note 26, at 82; PA TEMAN, supra note 36, at 1-2. 
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rather than of a system of government, the pluralists did not assume 
that what worked here would work elsewhere.155 American democracy 
was part and parcel of America's distinctive culture: daring, restive, 
and optimistic.156 The pluralists, in short, were American 
exceptionalists, joining fully in the postwar "celebration of American 
deviation from Old World tradition."157 In this respect, as in so many 
others, they were of their time. They lived and worked in a period 
when, as Edward Purcell has written, America seemed to many people 
"more and more a norm in itself, standing for practical democratic 
achievement and the fulfillment of that last, best hope."158 
II. PLURALISM AND POLICING 
I want now to trace the connections between democratic pluralism 
and criminal procedure, understood broadly to include not just judge­
made rules for police practices, but also scholarship about those rules 
and about the police more generally. I do not seek to show that 
democratic pluralism or its constituent concepts "caused" criminal 
procedure and scholarship about the police to take the forms that they 
did in the 1950s and 1960s - in the sense that without the ideas about 
democracy, the ideas about the police would not have emerged as they 
did. Ideas rarely stack upon each other in such straightforward ways; 
the arrows of causation run in too many directions. Ideas about the 
police influence ideas about democracy, as well as vice versa. What I 
hope to demonstrate is not that democratic pluralism is responsible 
for, say, the Miranda decision, but rather that pluralism can help to 
explain the ruling, by making more understandable certain broad 
features of Warren and Burger Court criminal procedure and of 
contemporaneous studies of the police. Ideas about democracy and 
ideas about the police were related: they "resonate[d] and fit 
together. "159 
Needless to say, it did not take the democratic pluralism of the 
1950s to get the Supreme Court interested in the police. In important 
respects modern criminal procedure law can be traced back to the 
1920s and 1930s. It was in these earlier decades that the Court, largely 
155. Here is Dahl, for example: "Probably this strange hybrid, the normal American 
political system, is not for export to others." DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 151. 
156. See id. ; LATHAM, supra note 1 13, at 35. 
157. Alan Taylor, The Exceptionalist, NEW REPUBLIC, June 9, 2003, at 33; cf MILLS, 
supra note 24, at 25 (criticizing " [t]hose who have abandoned criticism for the new American 
celebration"); id. at 358 n.* (calling American history the "common denominator of the 
conservative mood in America today"). 
158. PURCELL, supra note 37, at 271; see also Hollinger, supra note 110, at 147. 
159. David Nelkin, Using the Concept of Legal Culture, 29 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1, 9 
(2004). 
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as a result of Prohibition, began to confront the kinds of search-and­
seizure issues that have come to constitute such a large part of criminal 
procedure law - electronic surveillance,160 automobile searches,161 the 
uses of informants.162 More importantly, it was during the interwar 
period that the Supreme Court first applied the federal Constitution to 
overturn state criminal convictions - a pivotal move, because law 
enforcement in the United States was and remains chiefly a 
responsibility of state and local governments.163 The seeds of Warren 
Court criminal procedure thus were planted long before the pluralists 
began to write.164 
Unsurprisingly, though, the criminal procedure decisions of the 
1920s and 1930s were rooted in concerns different from those that 
chiefly occupied the pluralists. In particular, the Court's initial forays 
into state criminal procedure are best understood as responses to the 
worst excesses of Jim Crow: cases in which Black defendants were 
sentenced to death with barely the facade of trial.165 The Court 
confronted trials held in the midst of lynch mobs,166 trials in which 
Black defendants were denied anything resembling adequate 
counsel,167 trials held before juries from which Blacks were flatly 
excluded,168 and trials based on confessions obtained from Black 
defendants by torture.169 These were race cases, not democracy cases. 
More precisely, if they were democracy cases it was largely because 
they were race cases - and race was never central to the pluralist 
account of democracyP0 Pluralism was compatible with a certain 
measured egalitarianism, but on the whole the pluralists tended to 
160. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
161. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
162. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
163. See, e.g. , Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local 
Law Enforcement, 2 CRIM. JUST. 81 (2000). 
164. See, e.g. , CRAIG BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
REVOLUTION 18 (1993). 
165. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of 
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1305-06 (1982); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of 
Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000); Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and 
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 26-30 (1942); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About 
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 841-44 (1994). 
166. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
167. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
168. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
169. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) . 
170. Here, again, is Dahl: "[P]erhaps in no society have the conditions of polyarchy been 
so fully present as they were in the United States in the ante-bellum period (save, of course, 
for the position of Negroes)." DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 53, at 142-43. 
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think that groups could fend for themselves, even groups as 
historically disadvantaged as African Americans.171 
Of the state criminal procedure cases the Court decided in the 
1920s and 1930s, only Brown v. Mississippi, the confession-by-torture 
decision, involved the police. Brown became the basis for a series of 
coerced confession decisions in the 1940s, a line of cases that, as it 
progressed, had less and less to do with race and more and more to do 
with police brutality.172 These decisions reflected, in part, a drive 
toward police "professionalism" that began in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century and reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s. 'Police 
professionalism meant politically insulated police departments 
organized along hierarchical, quasi-military lines, with strong 
commitments to efficient operations, centralized command, 
technological sophistication, well-trained personnel, and high 
standards of integrity.173 Police professionalism proved compatible 
with democratic pluralism, for reasons we will explore later, but its 
roots lay in the "good government" managerialism of the Progressive 
Era and the interwar period.174 Managerialism of this kind, so 
antithetical to the thinking of someone like Arthur Bentley, 
permeated the work of the National Commission of Law Observance 
and Enforcement, appointed by President Herbert Hoover and 
chaired by George Wickersham.175 The Wickersham Commission was 
sharply and famously critical of "the third degree," which it viewed as 
simply one particularly egregious instance of the general problem of 
"lawlessness in law enforcement."176 That criticism, so fully in accord 
with the "good government" approach to police reform, helped lay the 
groundwork for the coerced confession cases of the 1940s. To the 
extent the coerced confession cases reflected ideas about democracy, 
therefore, those ideas were not identifiably and specifically those of 
the pluralists. 
171. See id. at 121, 138; DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?, supra note 44, at 293-96; TRUMAN, 
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS, supra note 42, at 103-04, 511,  518. 
172. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); 
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). 
173. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 2-3; GUYOT, supra note 17, at 5-7. The 
canonical works are AUGUST VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY (1936), and 
o.w. WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION (1950). Vollmer was the chief of police in 
Berkeley, California, until 1932 and then taught police administration at U.C. Berkeley. 
Wilson, Vollmer's protege, was the Dean of the School of Criminology at U.C. Berkeley and 
later directed the police departments in Fullerton, Wichita, and Chicago. On Wilson's 
influence, see, for example, Lawrence W. Sherman, The Sociology and the Social Reform of 
the American Police: 1950-1973, 2 J. POL. SCI. & ADMIN. 255, 256 (1974). 
174. See, e.g. , GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 2-3, 133-34, 144. 
175. See id. 
176. See, e.g. , BRADLEY, supra note 164, at 9-10. 
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By contrast, the distinctive outlook of democratic pluralism was 
reflected in Warren and Burger Court criminal procedure, and in the 
scholarship about policing that accompanied and informed those 
decisions. Democratic pluralism was not the only intellectual influence 
on criminal procedure in this period; it may not even have been the 
most important. I will argue, though, that pluralism helps us make 
sense of several interrelated hallmarks of criminal procedure and 
police studies in the Warren and Burger Court eras: the focus on the 
group psychology of the police, the concern with police discretion and 
the reliance on judicial oversight, the emphasis on personal dignity, 
the attraction to "second wave" polic'.! professionalism, the embrace of 
modernity, the centrality of consensus, and the disregard of 
institutional structure. 
A. The Focus on the Group Psychology of the Police 
The year that Earl Warren became Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, 1953, also marked a turning point in scholarship about the 
police. The few prior studies of policing tended to be the work of 
journalists, public figures like George Wickersham and his fellow 
commissioners, or reform-minded police executives.177 There was no 
tradition of independent, academic examination of American police. 
That changed with the publication in 1953 of two pioneering and 
highly influential articles, one by the sociologist William Westley and 
the other by the legal scholar Jerome Hall.178 Westley's study, adapted 
from a doctoral dissertation later published in its entirety,179 reported 
the results of firsthand observation of and interviews with working 
police officers. Hall's article was an "emergence study" of the modern 
law and practice of policing. Both authors focused on the ways in 
which the actual operations of police departments conflicted with 
"democratic ideals"180 and "legal mandate";181 both sought to 
177. The second category included, for example, RAYMOND B. FOSDICK, AMERICAN 
POLICE SYSTEMS (1920). The third category included, most notably, the work of August 
Vollmer, see supra note 173, as well as, for example, ARTHUR WOODS, POLICEMAN AND 
PUBLIC (1919). For an important but limited exception to the generalization in the text, see 
the discussion of police graft in WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE, STREET CORNER SOCIETY: THE 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF AN ITALIAN SLUM 123-46 (1943). 
178. See Hall, supra note 8; William Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 AM. J. Soc. 34 
(1953) (hereinafter Westley, Violence and the Police] . 
179. See WESTLEY, supra note 14. In addition to the part of the dissertation published in 
1953, a second portion appeared as William A. Westley, Secrecy and the Police, 34 Soc. 
FORCES 254 (1956) [hereinafter Westley, Secrecy and the Police]. 
180. Hall, supra note 8, at 145-46. 
181. Westley, Violence and the Police, supra note 178, at 41; see also WESTLEY, supra 
note 14, at 10. 
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understand the "basic causes" of those conflicts;182 and both believed 
that the causes were to be found in social relations - relations among 
police officers, and relations between police officers and the wider 
society. In each of these respects, the work of Westley and Hall set the 
pattern for the many academic studies of the police published during 
the Warren and Burger Court eras.183 
Westley, in particular, set the pattern in another respect as well. 
Drawing heavily on the group theory incorporated within democratic 
pluralism, Westley argued that the key to understanding the police was 
to analyze them "as a social and occupational group."184 More 
precisely, the police were a "conflict group," 185 united by the manner in 
which the job they shared isolated them from the community and 
threatened their collective sense of status. The police officer 
"regard[ed) himself to be a pariah"186 and came to "regard the public 
as an enemy."187 The collective alienation of police officers drove them 
to create a distinctive set of group norms, at war in important respects 
with "formal social controls."188 The norms of the police approved the 
selective use of illegal violence against suspects, for example, and they 
forbade officers from testifying against each other. New recruits were 
systematically indoctrinated into both norms. 
Westley thus thought that the key to understanding the police was 
to understand their shared mentality, and that the key to their shared 
mentality was the nature of their job, including the ways in which their 
job estranged them from the community and threatened their 
collective self-esteem. This set of premises - "the Policeman as 
Other" - became a central motif of police sociology in the 1960s and 
1970s.189 It links together, for example, the work of James Q. Wilson 
182. Hall, supra note 8, at 146. 
183. See, e.g. , Cain, supra note 16, at 144-48. 
184. WESTLEY, supra note 14, at 8; see also Westley, Secrecy and the Police, supra note 
179, at 256-57; Westley, Violence and the Police, supra note 178, at 34. 
185. Westley, Secrecy and the Police, supra note 179, at 256. 
186. Westley, Violence and the Police, supra note 178, at 35. 
187. Westley, Secrecy and the Police, supra note 179, at 256. 
188. WESTLEY, supra note 14, at 10. 
189. Maureen Cain, Some Go Forward, Some Go Back: Police Work in Comparative 
Perspective, 22 COMP. Soc. 319, 320 (1993); see also, e.g. , Stuart A. Scheingold, Cultural 
Cleavage and Criminal Justice, 40 J. POL. 865, 881-82 (1978); John Van Maanen, Working the 
Street: A Developmental View of Police Behavior, in THE POTENTIAL FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFORM 83, 84-85 (Herbert Jacob ed., 1974). For a skeptical review, see Robert W. 
Balch, The Police Personality: Fact or Fiction?, 63 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 
106 (1972). For an early, dissenting perspective, see MICHAEL BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN 
THE COMMUNITY 215-68 (1964). 
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and Jerome Skolnick, two scholars whose perspectives are in other 
respects so different.190 
Wilson and Skolnick shared another premise. Like other police 
scholars of the era, they believed that the psychology of the police was 
shaped not just by occupational role and outcast status, but also by a 
cluster of dispositions that officers brought with them to the job. 
Wilson speculated that the "working-class backgrounds" of police 
officers inclined them to view violence as legitimate and gave them "a 
preoccupation with maintaining self-respect, proving one's 
masculinity, 'not taking any crap,'  and not being 'taken in.'"191 
Skolnick found it plain that "a Goldwater-type of conservatism was 
the dominant political and emotional persuasion of police. " 192 The 
worldview of the police included a simplistic, acontextual 
understanding of criminality, an apprehensive traditionalism, an 
intolerance for nonconformity, and a hostility to permissive 
childrearing.193 It sounded very much like the "authoritarian 
personality." Skolnick himself hesitated to call the police mentality 
"authoritarian," but other sociologists did not.194 And even Skolnick's 
hesitation stemmed not from doubts about the accuracy or descriptive 
value of the term,195 but rather from a belief that the dispositions in 
question were shared with the "great mass of people."196 That was 
what the pluralists thought, too. 
The notion that the police have a distinctive mentality - rigid, 
insecure, inclined toward violence, hostile to anyone "different" -
became widespread by the late 1960s, particularly on the Left and 
particularly after the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago.197 It 
does not appear explicitly in the Warren and Burger Courts' criminal 
procedure decisions, but it is hard not to sense in some of those cases a 
degree of lurking wariness about the group psychology of the police. 
190. See SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 2, at 45 n.4, 49-59, 231; James 
Q. Wilson, The Police and Their Problems: A Theory, 12 PUB. POL'Y 189, 191-94 (1963). 
191. WILSON, POLICE BEHAVIOR, supra note 3, at 33-34, 47. 
192. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 2, at 61. 
193. See SKOLNICK, POLITICS OF PROTEST, supra note 4, at 259-62. 
194. See, e.g. , ARTHUR NIEDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD: THE POLICE IN URBAN 
SOCIETY 103-51 (1967); cf Balch, supra note 189, at 107 (noting that "the typical policeman, 
as he is portrayed in the literature, is almost a classic example of the authoritarian 
personality"). 
195. See NIEDERHOFFER, supra note 194, at 192. 
196. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 2, at 61. "Therefore it is 
preferable to call the policeman's a conventional personality." Id. 
197. See, e.g. , LASCH, supra note 52, at 207; Thomas R. Brooks, New York 's Finest, 
COMMENTARY, Aug. 1965, at 29, 31; James Ridgeway, The Cops & the Kids, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 7, 1968, at 11; Waskow, supra note 13. 
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When insisting that searches and seizures be conducted pursuant to 
warrants, for example, the Court liked to quote Justice Jackson's 
famous warning in United States v. Johnson that the decision should 
not be entrusted to "the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime."198 So fond was the Court of this 
formulation that one begins to suspect it was, at least at times, a 
diplomatic way to address worries beyond an excess of zeal. Justice 
Jackson himself seemed concerned that the "point" of the Fourth 
Amendment was "often not grasped" by the police199 - even, 
presumably, in their reflective moments - and that concern was 
echoed in the Court's later opinions.200 Herbert Packer, hardly 
unsympathetic to the direction the Warren Court took in criminal 
procedure, suggested in 1966 that, "[t]o anywhere from five to nine 
members of the Court, depending on how hair-raising the facts of the 
particular case appear to be, the police are suspect."201 The judiciary in 
general, Packer explained, was "unconvinced that the police regard 
the rights of the accused as anything but a nuisance and an 
impediment. "202 Packer shared that skepticism, as did many if not most 
legal scholars writing in the 1960s and 1970s. Their concerns about the 
police mentality were only heightened by developments to which we 
will return later: the nature of police responses to rioting and political 
demonstrations in the late 1960s, and the campaigns that law 
enforcement administrators and police unions mounted against key 
Warren Court rulings and against emerging proposals for civilian 
review boards. 
Ideas about social psychology are not necessarily ideas about 
democracy. But the two sets of ideas were closely related for the 
pluralists: their beliefs about the mentality of the masses heavily 
informed their notions about the importance of elites. So, too, we will 
see, underlying ideas about the group psychology of the police likely 
informed the views of many people in the 1960s and 1970s, perhaps 
including Supreme Court justices, about the proper ways to reconcile 
law enforcement and democracy. Tracing the connections requires 
us to consider other pervasive themes of criminal procedure 
in the Warren and Burger Court eras. But two points merit passing 
mention here. 
198. 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
199. Id. 
200. See, e.g. , Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971}; Chapman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 610, 614 (1961). 
201. Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, The Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 238, 241 (1966). 
202 Id. 
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First, the conception of the police as a discrete and unified group, 
alienated from mainstream society, encouraged the notion that 
effective regulation of the police required strong oversight from a 
different group - if not politicians, then judges or some kind of 
civilian oversight board. It contributed to the great pessimism shown 
by scholars in the 1960s and later decades about the potential for 
police departments to regulate themselves, or even to cooperate with 
systems of outside review.203 
Second, a concern for the group mentality of the police may help to 
explain the lax standards the Warren and Burger Courts applied to 
searches by government agencies other than the police. Initially the 
Warren Court entirely exempted "administrative searches" from the 
warrant and probable-cause requirements imposed on searches 
conducted in the course of criminal investigations.204 Later the Court 
held that an administrative search did require a warrant, but that the 
warrant could issue without the kind of probable cause that a criminal 
search would require - in fact without any individualized suspicion at 
all.205 In the early 1970s, the Court loosened the requirements again, 
holding that warrants often were not required for administrative 
searches of closely regulated businesses.206 Subsequently the 
administrative search doctrine was broadened into the "special needs" 
doctrine, applying relaxed standards to searches by public school 
teachers, government office managers, and so on.207 
There has always seemed something counterintuitive about giving 
the government more leeway to search when no crime is suspected.208 
The explanation cannot be simply, as the Court has said, that lower 
standards are necessary in order for the searches to go forward: a 
similar argument could just as easily justify reduced standards for 
203. See, for example, Herbert Jacob's fairly typical characterization of the police as 
engaged "in a gigantic conspiracy against the outside world," a conspiracy so "deeply 
embedded in the norms and work routines of policemen" that "civilian review of police 
activities is bound to arouse frantic opposition by the police" and "even in-house 
investigatory agencies will usually fail to penetrate the protective wall that policemen have 
built around themselves." Herbert Jacob, Introduction to THE POTENTIAL FOR REFORM OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9, 10 (Herbert Jacob ed., 1974). 
204. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
205. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967). 
206. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); see Colonade Catering Corp. v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
207. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325, 351 (1985} (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
208. See, e.g. , 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.l(b}, at 373-80 (3d ed. 
1996). 
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searches in criminal investigations.209 Nor, despite the Court's 
suggestions, does the fact that no criminal case is contemplated seem 
to make a search any less invasive. If criminal searches felt more 
"hostile" to the Court,210 perhaps that had less to do with the prospect 
of criminal charges than with the involvement of a specific group of 
government officials: the police. It is true that on occasion the Court 
has applied the administrative search and "special needs" doctrines to 
searches carried out by police officers.211 But those decisions were 
outliers, and they have always seemed the least convincing 
applications of the doctrines. 
B.  The Concern with Police Discretion and the Reliance on Judicial 
Oversight 
Jerome Hall's influential article of 1953 drew attention to the many 
circumstances in which the police operated without clear standards. 
He warned that the wide scope of police discretion opened the door to 
discrimination against minorities, and he argued that it violated a core 
component of democracy, the "rule of law."212 The rule of law was also 
a key concept for many of the democratic pluralists. It was part of 
what David Truman meant by the "rules of the game": the whole 
system of interest-group competition made sense only if government 
involved something more than officials acting on their arbitrary 
whims.213 Many of the social scientists who turned their attention to 
the police beginning in the 1950s shared the pluralists' view in this 
regard, and they agreed with Hall that police discretion represented a 
worrisome deviation from the rule of law - all the more worrisome 
given the characteristic mindset of the police. Westley thought this 
way: he warned that the internal norms of the police threatened the 
"formalized controls" on which society increasingly depended.214 
Skolnick thought this way: that was why he titled his major work 
Justice Without Trial.215 And when legal scholarship on the police 
209. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 650 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
210. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530. 
211. See, e.g. , Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); New York v. 
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 ,  717 (1987). 
212. Hall, supra note 8, at 153, 156, 171. 
213. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
214. WESTLEY, supra note 14, at 10. 
215. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 2. 
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began to proliferate in the 1960s, much of it focused on the problem of 
police discretion.216 
There was general agreement, too, that the principal solution lay in 
greater judicial oversight of the police. This was definitely what Hall 
had in mind. Stronger executive control of the police was too 
dangerous for democracy: "Certainly we do not Walf t our police to be 
a Praetorian Guard available to some would-be Caesar."217 Skolnick, 
reflecting the prevailing tone of criminal procedure scholarship in the 
1960s, placed even more weight on the rule of law than Hall. As 
Jonathan Simon has noted, Skolnick saw identification with the rule of 
law to be both "the defining aspect of the police" and "a way to 
reconcile their fundamentally authoritarian character with the 
democratic society they were policing."218 And the rule of law was 
applied to the police officer chiefly by the judge, both directly and 
through the intermediary of the prosecutor.219 
This combination of diagnosis and prescription - the problem of 
police discretion and the solution of judicial oversight - was not 
restricted to scholars. It was perhaps the most characteristic feature of 
the Warren Court's approach to the police. Consider just the decisions 
that: extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to state law 
enforcement;220 conditioned investigatory stops and pat-downs on 
grounds sufficiently "articulable" to allow judicial review;221 inserted 
defense attorneys as witnesses at interrogations and lineups;222 
constrained interrogations with bright-line requirements of prescribed 
216. See, e.g. , Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: 
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960); Sanford 
H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. 
REV. 904, 906-15 (1962); Wayne R. LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law (pts. 
1 & 2), 1962 WISC. L. REV. 105, 180; Packer, supra note 9, at 24-38; Charles A. Reich, Police 
Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1 161, 1 164-70 (1966). 
217. Hall, supra note 8, at 155. 
218. Simon, supra note 7, at 39. 
219. See SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 2, at 199-202, 227-29. On the 
tendency of scholars in the 1960s to favor judicial control of the police, see, for example, 
Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 5 AM. Soc. REV. 699, 699-
700 (1967). In his widely admired lectures at the University of Minnesota in 1974, Anthony 
Amsterdam urged the use of police administrators as intermediaries, expanding on an earlier 
suggestion by the administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp Davis. Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); see also KENNETH 
CULP DA VIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 65, 95 (1969). Amsterdam argued that police 
discretion should be reined in by police rulemaking, but he stressed that police rulemaking 
could be "created and maintained in working order only by the stimulation and the oversight 
of courts enforcing constitutional law." Amsterdam, supra, at 380. 
220. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
221. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
222. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). 
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warnings and automatic shutoffs;223 required warrants for electronic 
surveillance;224 required warrants for home searches following 
arrests;225 and required warrants after a fashion - for 
administrative inspections.226 
Warrants, in fact, were the principal motif of the Warren Court's 
approach to the Fourth Amendment. The constitutional text does not 
explicitly require warrants; it requires only that searches and seizures 
be reasonable, and that warrants, when they do issue, be appropriately 
narrow and based on probable cause. The Court's efforts to harmonize 
these two commands were always erratic, but by the time Warren took 
the bench the Court seemed inclined to the general view that searches 
and seizures were constitutional if they were reasonable, regardless 
whether they were pursuant to warrant.227 The Warren Court 
emphatically rejected that position. Again and again, the Court 
insisted that, with certain narrow exceptions, searches and seizures 
were reasonable only if the police obtained "advance judicial 
approval" in the form of a warrant.228 The point was that judges should 
decide, not police officers. Adopting a position Justice Frankfurter had 
often expressed in dissent,229 the Warren Court saw the Fourth 
Amendment as aimed above all at the evil of the arbitrary exercise of 
discretion, and it saw judicial prescreening of searches and seizures as 
the Constitution's favored remedy. This view of the Fourth 
Amendment persisted into the Burger Court era, though its 
application grew more sporadic.230 
As a prescription for the problem of police discretion, judicial 
oversight could draw strength from democratic pluralism in several 
ways. To begin with, of course, courts specialized in procedural 
regularity, so they seemed ideal bodies for applying the rule of law. 
More fundamentally, judges were independent of the police. They 
were a separate group, within the government, that could serve as a 
counterbalance against other governmental groups, including the 
223. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
224. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
225. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
226. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967). 
227. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
228. See, e.g. , Katz, 392 U.S. at 20. The most explicit rejection of Rabinowitz came in 
Chime/, 395 U.S. at 759-68. 
229. See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Harris v. United States, 
331 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 
595 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Amsterdam, supra note 219, at 396-97. 
230. See, e.g. , Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
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police, in the classic manner described by the pluralists.231 Skolnick 
invoked this idea quite explicitly. Like "any agency," he explained, 
"the police would of course engage in activities promoting self-serving 
ends," unless other "regulators" intervened. It was precisely the 
inability of the police to "capture" their regulators - the judiciary -
that kept our system from resembling a "police state."232 (Disregard 
for a moment the weighty term "police state": we will return to that 
piece of vocabulary shortly.) In addition to their independence and 
their association with procedural regularity, judges tended to belong to 
the political elite - those educated, civically engaged people to whom 
pluralist theory gave the task of defending democratic values.233 Police 
officers clearly did not. Finally, pluralism took the sting out of the 
most obvious objection to placing police under the control of 
unelected judges: what Alexander Bickel famously called the 
"countermajoritarian difficulty. "234 That objection counted for little if, 
as the pluralists believed, there was no such thing as majority rule to 
begin with.235 Hall invoked this very concept to reject the argument 
that police illegality might simply reflect what the public wanted. 
" [T]here is no 'the public' in a democracy," he insisted, only various 
"groups and organizations" - many of which surely wanted the police 
to obey the law.236 
Now back to "police state."  This was a familiar trope in criminal 
procedure by the time Skolnick wrote in 1966. Beginning in the 1930s 
231. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. For a nice illustration of how pluralists 
tended to view the courts, see WALTER E. MURPHY, WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL: A CASE 
STUDY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1965). Murphy took the history of wiretapping to show 
that the "basic process" of American governance remained "essentially the same," 
regardless whether the "major contestants" were "private citizens or government officials." 
In either case, the system provided so many "avenues of access" that " [r]epresentatives of 
the losing interest . . .  in one governmental forum" generally could "take their threatened 
cause to another governmental agency"; this process continued until the opposing interests 
were "physically or financially exhausted, a viable compromise reached, or the problem 
outlived." Id. at 160. 
232. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 2, at 229. 
233. Dahl made precisely this point in an influential essay on the Supreme Court: "[I]t 
would appear, on political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose 
members are recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court Justices would long hold to norms of 
Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite." Robert A. Dahl, 
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. 
L. 279, 291 (1957) [hereinafter Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy]. 
234. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
235. Dahl put it this way: "Few of the Court's policy decisions can be interpreted 
sensibly in terms of a 'majority' versus a 'minority.' In this respect, the Court is no different 
from the rest of the political leadership." Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy, supra note 
233, at 294. 
236. Hall, supra note 8, at 160. 
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and 1940s, �otalitarianism had established itself as - to use William 
Connolly's term - the chief "contrast-model" for American 
institutions, including the machinery of criminal justice.237 The first 
point of comparison to surface in Supreme Court opinions pertained 
to the brutal interrogation practices of "dictatorial" regimes; oblique 
references to the atrocities of the Gestapo and the NKVD helped the 
Court to underscore its condemnation of police torture in the United 
States.238 Jerome Hall drew the same contrast, for the same purposes, 
more explicitly.239 
Beginning in the late 1940s, references to totalitarianism in 
Supreme Court opinions grew more pointed and more common. The 
term "police state" began to be used. And the valence of the concept 
began to shift. Some justices began to emphasize judicial control of the 
police, rather than civilized police practices, as the critical distinction 
between a democracy and a "police state. "240 The closing lines of 
Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court in Johnson v. United States 
were particularly influential in this regard: the Fourth Amendment, he 
suggested, was "one of the most fundamental distinctions between our 
form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police­
state where they are the law."241 
The specter of the police state became a fixture of criminal 
procedure rhetoric in the 1960s.242 Invocation of the term functioned 
not just to invoke totalitarianism as the contrast-model for democracy, 
and not just to make the role of the police a defining difference 
between the two ideals, but also, and more specifically, to suggest that 
237. Connolly, supra note 36, at 22-23. 
238. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 
(1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940); cf Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 
114, 142 (1941) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stressing the importance of protecting civil liberties, 
including Fourth Amendment rights, "[a]t a time when the nation is called upon to give 
freely of life and treasure to defend and preserve the institutions of democracy and 
freedom"). 
239. Hall, supra note 8, at 140. 
240. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 149 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Harris v. United 
States, 331 U.S. 145, 171 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). On the general subject of 
antitotalitarian rhetoric in postwar criminal procedure, see Margaret Raymond, Rejecting 
Totalitarianism: Translating the Guarantees of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. 
REV. 1193 (1998). 
241. 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948); cf Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Writing for the 
Court in Wolf, Justice Frankfurter called protection from "arbitrary" police intrusions "basic 
to a free society." Id. at 27. It did not take "the commentary of recent history," he noted, for 
the "knock at the door . . .  as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the 
authority of the police . . .  to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human 
rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking 
peoples." Id. at 28. 
242. See, e.g. , Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343, 349, 352 (1966) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466, 470 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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democracy depended in part on the systematic substitution of judicial 
judgment for police judgment. 
C. The Emphasis on Personal Dignity 
If judicial control of police discretion was the primary procedural 
theme of Warren Court criminal procedure, the main substantive 
theme was the protection of personal dignity against the threat of an 
overpowering state. Thus the coerced confession cases progressed 
from a focus on torture in the 1930s and 1940s to a focus on more 
subtle, psychological means of manipulation.243 By the time the Court 
decided Miranda v. Arizona, it saw the confession problem as 
essentially about defending "human dignity" against increasingly 
sophisticated efforts to "subjugate the individual to the will of his 
examiner."244 The Fourth Amendment, similarly, came to be 
understood less as a protection of individual sovereignty and more as a 
prophylactic against the prying eye of the government. No longer did 
the Fourth Amendment provide an "indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty, and private property."245 Now it safeguarded 
"reasonable expectations of privacy," which could be "defeated by 
electronic as well as physical invasion. "246 
Like the concern with police discretion, the Warren Court's 
emphasis on personal dignity drew support from the anti­
authoritarianism strand of democratic pluralism. The overpowering, 
omnipresent state was not just a hypothetical hazard; it was modern 
democracy's very real rival. The "police state" trope thus advanced the 
substantive as well as the procedural theme of Warren Court criminal 
procedure.247 
Just as it encouraged a judicial remedy for the problem of police 
discretion, democratic pluralism lent support to the notion that dignity 
should find its protection in the courts. Here as well, if there was no 
majority rule to begin with, there was no countermajoritarian 
difficulty. The value of dignity was part of the consensus the pluralists 
thought was a prerequisite for democracy. It was often taken to be the 
243. See, e.g. , Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 
(1959). 
244. 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966). 
245. Boyd v. United States, 1 16 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). On the fading of Boyd, a decision 
praised as late as the 1940s and 1950s as the leading interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, see, for example, Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-
1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184 (1977). 
246. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); accord, e.g., 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
247. See, e.g. , Raymond, supra note 240, at 1210-20. 
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core of that consensus. David Truman, for example, thought it obvious 
that "the system rests at bottom on a respect for the dignity of man. 
This much is imperative; this much is indispensable. "248 
In giving content to that commitment, it made no sense under the 
pluralist view to rely on popular votes. Elections were useful for 
resolving conflicts between groups and for concentrating the minds of 
government officials. But democratic norms were not up for grabs; 
they were the "rules of the game." They needed to be a matter of 
social consensus - not among everyone but among the elite. Judges, 
again, were members of that elite. So were legislators and party 
leaders, but their jobs naturally focused them less on preserving norms 
and more on balancing group interests. So it made sense to entrust 
judges with responsibility for articulating and enforcing the core 
democratic value of dignity. Robert Dahl argued, in fact, that the 
Supreme Court's highest function was precisely "to confer legitimacy, 
not simply on the particular and parochial policies of the dominant 
political alliance, but upon the basic patterns of behavior required for 
the operation of a democracy."249 
D. The Attraction to "Second Wave" Police Professionalism 
Although its roots lay in reform movements of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, police professionalism entered a new 
phase in the 1950s. Early police reformers, drawn mainly from the 
ranks of civic and religious groups,250 had aimed above all to get 
officers out of the hands of ward bosses and into the front lines in the 
fight against crime and, more particularly, vice. Their principal 
organizational strategies, shifting control from precincts to 
headquarters and adopting quasi-military lines of command, were 
adopted and expanded in the 1930s through the 1960s by a different 
set of reformers for a different set of ends. Robert Fogelson calls this 
the "second wave" of American police reform.251 It crested in the 1950s 
and early 1960s. 
The second wave reformers differed from their predecessors in 
several ways. They were police administrators, not civic or religious 
crusaders, and they tended to see police departments as first and 
248. Truman, American System, supra note 53, at 490-91; see also BERKLEY, supra note 
1, at 4 (noting that "[a]lthough in former days the contract theory was often viewed as 
expressing the essence of democracy, more contemporary thinkers focus on . . . the 
affirmation of individual worth. Adlai Stevenson, for example, felt that the essence of 
democracy is the dignity of man"). 
249. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy, supra note 233, at 295. 
250. Vollmer was an important exception, in this respect and in others. See VOLLMER, 
supra note 173. 
251 .  ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 167-92 (1977). 
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foremost organizations not all that different from military or industrial 
units.252 They continued to insist on the political independence of the 
police, but their primary concerns were administrators' concerns: 
streamlining operations, strengthening lines of command, raising the 
quality of personnel, leveraging personnel with technology, clarifying 
the organizational mission, and building public support. Because they 
thought the mission of the police was crime control, they fought to rid 
the police of other, distracting responsibilities, like operating lockups 
or running youth programs. 253 And they viewed the public through the 
lens of consumerism, as a market that needed to be cultivated and 
directed.254 
Chief William Parker of the Los Angeles Police Department, 
which in the 1950s emerged as the leading model of police 
professionalism,255 was particularly clear about this last point. Like a 
private business, he argued, the police could not be successful without 
a market, and markets had to be created: "They seldom spring full­
blown from the unshaped desires of the people. The vital elements of 
our civilized life, including our most sacred institutions, at one time or 
another have been laboriously sold to the people. "256 The way to do 
this was first to sell the police mission to "practical community 
leaders" ;  they would then help to sell it to the public.257 The key point 
was that public demands should be shaped to conform to the mission 
of the police department, and not the other way around.258 
Much more than the first wave of reformers, the second wave took 
"professionalism" as their watchword.259 By professionalism they 
emphatically did not mean that police officers should have substantial 
252. See, e.g. , WILSON, supra note 173, at 8; William H. Parker, The Police Challenge in 
Our Great Cities, 291 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 5, 6 (1954). 
253. FOGELSON, supra note 251 ,  at 161; Parker, supra note 252, at 7-8. 
254. See, e.g., BANTON, supra note 189, at 1 (quoting police administrators); WILSON, 
supra note 173, at 421 (advising that "[t]he solution of most police problems involves 
influencing mass attitudes, which can only be molded, directed, and controlled by the force 
of public opinion"). Vollmer, too, had stressed the importance of public opinion. See 
VOLLMER, supra note 173, at 6-7. 
255. See, e.g. , GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 2. 
256. Parker, supra note 252, at 6. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 6-7. Parker did not like the term "public relations," precisely because he 
thought it suggested too much responsiveness on the part of the police. See id. at 7. 
259. See FOGELSON, supra note 251, at 141-66. Fogelson argues the first wave reformers 
had a military model for the police rather than the professional model adopted by the second 
wave. See id. at 40-66, 154. The distinction between the two models may be overdrawn, see 
Egon Bittner, The Rise and Fall of the Thin Blue Line, 6 REV. AM. HIST. 421, 424-27 (1978), 
and Fogelson makes clear, in any event, that some of the early reformers, including Vollmer, 
favored a professional model, see FOGELSON, supra note 251, at 154. 
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latitude to exercise trained judgment in matters of importance, nor did 
they mean that police officers should regulate themselves collectively 
in the manner of a guild. Rather they had in mind enhanced prestige 
for the occupation of policing, high standards of integrity for officers, 
improved training, insulation from partisan politics, and the 
application of modern concepts of administration. It was a 
professionalism of police forces, not of police officers. It claimed 
autonomy "primarily for the institution of policing, and only 
secondarily, and then only in a severely limited sense, for its 
functionaries. "260 
In part because it resonated with the idea of the police as a distinct 
group, and in part because it sought to give individual officers less 
leeway rather than more, police professionalism as it gained 
ascendance in the 1950s was fully compatible with democratic 
pluralism and with Warren and Burger Court criminal procedure. The 
strong position of leading law enforcement administrators in favor of 
stricter standards for officers did much to create a climate hospitable 
to heightened judicial oversight of the police. In return the justices -
like the pluralists - proved more comfortable with claims of quasi­
scientific expertise than with neo-Aristotelian assertions of practical 
wisdom. The hunches and vague suspicions of patrol officers counted 
for little,261 but the judgments of forward-thinking police 
administrators could be a different matter. In Miranda, for example, 
the Court couched its ruling as extending to state and local police 
certain longtime practices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
practices which the Court suggested had not interfered with the FBl's 
"exemplary record of effective law enforcement."262 The Burger Court 
later pursued a similar strategy when it gave constitutional status to 
the emerging practice of metropolitan police departments to restrict 
the use of lethal force against fleeing felons.263 And the Burger Court 
carved out exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements 
for certain inventory searches conducted pursuant to internal 
regulations.264 Writing in one of these cases for a unanimous Court, 
Chief Justice Burger stressed that the justices were "hardly in a 
position to second-guess police departments as to what practical 
administrative method" was most appropriate for inventory 
searches.265 Second-guessing police officers, of course, was something 
260. Bittner, supra note 259, at 426; see also GUYOT, supra note 17, at 5-10. 
261. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 27 (1968). 
262. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483-86 (1966). 
263. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 ,  18-19 (1985). 
264. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 
364 (1976). 
265. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648. 
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else entirely; the Court did that all the time. The whole effort to rein in 
police discretion through judicial oversight amounted to 
institutionalized second-guessing of the police, and it was defended on 
precisely those grounds. 
There was still another reason that "second wave" police 
professionalism proved congenial to democratic pluralism and to 
criminal procedure during the years of the Warren and Burger Courts. 
Professionalism, like constitutional constraints on the police, offered a 
way to protect policing from mass politics while preserving, at least in 
form, the tradition of local control. That tradition was widely thought 
to guard against authoritarianism: it kept the police close to the 
communities they served, and it prevented the emergence of an 
American Fouche.266 Public opinion, as Justice Frankfurter wrote for 
the Supreme Court, could "far more effectively be exerted against 
oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible to the 
community itself" than against "remote authority pervasively exerted 
throughout the country."267 But local politics seemed to offer fewer 
mechanisms for mediating group conflicts through elite consensus, and 
more opportunities for factions to seize control of the police for their 
own purposes.268 That was the lesson of the police torture cases of the 
1920s and 1930s. Police professionalism offered a solution: 
decentralization without true community control. By the 1970s this 
arrangement had began to look to many people like a sham,269 but in 
the 1950s and through most of the 1960s it seemed a logical response 
to the "political meddling . . . facilitated by local control of police 
forces. "270 
E. The Embrace of Modernity 
Perhaps the simplest appeal of police professionalism in the 1950s 
and 1960s has yet to be mentioned. Police professionalism seemed 
266. See BERKLEY, supra note 1, at 21-22. Even J. Edgar Hoover - probably the closest 
this country ever came to a homegrown version of Napoleon's security chief - disavowed 
any interest in transforming the FBI into a national police force. Law enforcement, he 
agreed, should remain primarily a local responsibility, controlled by authorities attuned to 
"the pulse of the community"; centralized policing would pose "a distinct danger to 
democratic self-government." John Edgar Hoover, The Basis of Sound Law Enforcement, 
291 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40-42 (1954). 
267. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1949). It was partly on this basis that Wolf 
refused to apply the exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court 
reversed that decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ,  but not because it had come to 
doubt the wisdom of decentralized policing. 
268. See, e.g. , WILSON, POLICE BEHAVIOR, supra note 3, at 289. 
269. See, e.g. , GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 131-32. 
270. Wilson, supra note 190, at 191. 
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modern - new, scientific, and bold. The attraction of the Warren and 
Burger Courts to police professionalism reflected, in part, the 
pluralists' broader embrace of modernity. That broader embrace had 
at least two other manifestations in criminal procedure law and 
scholarship. 
The first of these was the virtual disappearance of original intent as 
a guide to interpreting constitutional restrictions on the police. This 
development was particularly striking in search-and-seizure law, where 
the Supreme Court had long relied on eighteenth-century history to 
clarify the vague commands of the Fourth Amendment. The Warren 
Court abandoned that tradition and refocused Fourth Amendment 
law on the realities of modern life - particularly modern urban life.271 
Electronic surveillance of a telephone booth, for example, was a 
"search" within the meaning of the Constitution, and therefore 
required a warrant, not because of the language or history of the 
Fourth Amendment, but simply because of "the vital role that the 
public telephone has come to play in private communication."272 The 
coverage of the Fourth Amendment depended not on text or original 
intent but on "reasonable expectations of privacy" in today's world.213 
Similarly, the constitutional restrictions on street confrontations 
between police officers and suspects were set not by eighteenth­
century understandings but rather by the reasonableness of particular 
intrusions in light of modern urban circumstances.274 In interpreting 
the Fourth Amendment, the justices and most scholars were in 
agreement: " Its language is no help and neither is its history."275 
Warren Court and early Burger Court criminal procedure reflected 
the pluralist embrace of modernity in another respect as well. The idea 
that democracy resided in an open, flexible, diverse, and freewheeling 
culture - the notion, in short, of twentieth-century democracy as 
distinctively urban276 - contributed to the relatively low priority the 
271 .  I have described this shift in greater detail elsewhere. See David A. Sklansky, Back 
to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 149-60 (2002). 
272. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
273. See id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
274. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 23-24. 
275. Amsterdam, supra note 219, at 395; see also, e.g. , Peter Arenella, Fourth 
Amendment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1092 (Leonard W. Levy 
et al. eds., 2000). 
276. Cf Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (noting that the United States, "once 
primarily rural in character," had become "predominantly urban"). In requiring that state 
legislative districts be of roughly equal population, the Court understood itself to be 
preventing the unfair advantaging of rural areas at the expense of cities and suburbs. The 
Court purported, of course, to care only about evenhandedness: Chief Justice Warren's 
majority opinion warned that "[m)alapportionment can, and has historically, run in various 
directions." Id. at 567 n.43. Still, the opinion had a faint but unmistakable air of urban 
condescension: "Legislators represent people, not trees or acres . . . .  [P)eople, not land or 
trees or pastures, vote." Id. at 562, 580. 
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Court gave to the values of order, decorum, and safety. In striking 
down vagrancy statutes as unconstitutionally vague, for example, the 
Court was only partly concerned with the risk of arbitrary or 
discriminatory enforcement. It saw vagrancy laws as archaic 
constraints on "independence," "creativity," "self-confidence," and 
"high spirits" - the "unwritten amenities" at the heart of modern, 
democratic ways of life.277 These were the very "amenities" against 
which the "authoritarian personality" found itself in conflict, so 
placing a premium on them meant, among other things, having even 
more reason to worry about the mindset of the police. 
It also inclined the Court and its academic commentators toward a 
certain resignation about the risk of victimization. Crime was among 
the hazards of modern life, like industrial accidents and traffic 
fatalities. To some extent this attitude reflected the historically low 
crime rates of the 1950s and early 1960s.278 But crime rates were only 
part of the story. Homicide rates, for example, are now at the same 
levels they were in the mid-1960s. At their peaks in the late 1970s 
through the early 1990s, moreover, they were roughly twice the levels 
of the 1950s and early 1960s - hardly a change in order of 
magnitude.279 And people in the 1950s and 1960s did not think that 
crime rates were low. When they thought about crime rates at all, the 
rates seemed high to them. But there was relatively little alarm about 
crime - a fact about which police executives regularly complained, 
and which their "marketing" efforts attempted to change.280 Even 
among law enforcement professionals, the goal was "crime control"; 
no one spoke yet of "zero tolerance."281 And outside law enforcement, 
277. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972); see also Reich, supra 
note 216, at 1 172 (warning that although "safety requires measures" so do "independence, 
boldness, creativity, high spirits"). The Court's opinion in Papachristou, written by Justice 
Douglas, cited Reich's article and plainly shared its spirit. 
278. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 24-25 (1997). 
279. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last modified Sept. 
28, 2004). 
280. See, e.g. , Parker, supra note 252; O.W. Wilson, Police A uthority in a Free Society, 54 
J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 175 (1963). On the relative lack of alarm about 
crime in this period, despite rising crime rates, see DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF 
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 66, 147, 152-54 (2001). 
Garland suggests that, starting in the 1970s, the threat of crime began to be experienced as a 
"normal social fact," an "everyday risk" comparable with traffic accidents. Id. at 106, 109. 
This seems to me to get things backwards. What happened in the 1970s was that crime ceased 
to be accepted as a normal, everyday risk. But Garland's larger point about this social 
transformation seems plainly right: crime became, beginning in the 1970s, "much more 
salient as a social and cultural fact." Id. at 148. 
281. See, e.g. , PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMIN. OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 12 (1967) (setting forth "the 
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particularly among scholars, there was widespread sympathy for the 
view that the chief task of criminal procedure was to protect 
individuals against the state because " [i]t inflicts no tangible harm on 
anyone when a criminal evades punishment."282 That view was 
rendered more plausible by the rise during the 1960s of "labeling 
theory" as an approach to the sociology of crime: the rise, that is to 
say, of the views that designating someone a criminal or a delinquent 
was likely to be self-fulfilling, and that the initial designation often said 
as much about society as about the individual in question.283 
All these intellectual currents echoed the pluralist enthusiasm for 
the spontaneity and freedom of modern urban life. That enthusiasm 
grew less evident in the opinions of the Supreme Court during the 
Burger Court era - a development that was very much an intended 
consequence of Richard Nixon's election in 1968.284 Nixon's "law and 
order" campaign was in large part a backlash against protests and 
disturbances that themselves reflected, in ways we will explore, attacks 
on the pluralist understanding of democracy. It was a testament, in a 
way, to pluralism's continuing purchase that both sides in the late 
1960s found things to hate about it. 
F. The Centrality of Consensus 
We have already seen two ways in which criminal procedure law 
and police scholarship, as they developed in the 1960s, reflected the 
pluralists' emphasis on consensus. The reliance on judicial oversight 
and the embrace of "second wave" police professionalism both can be 
understood in part as efforts to regulate the police through consensus, 
specifically through consensus developed and defended by elites. The 
emphasis on consensus cut still deeper, though, in Warren and Burger 
foundations of a crime control program"). On the transformation of crime from a 
"challenge" to a "crisis," to be eliminated rather than managed, see also Markus Dirk 
Dubber, Criminal Justice Process and War on Crime, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO 
CRIMINOLOGY 49 (Colin Sumner ed., 2004). 
282. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' 
ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 91 (David Luban ed., 1983); see also, e.g. , Murray L. 
Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 553 (suggesting 
that "the basic purpose" of criminal procedure is "to avoid one type of error"). By 1983, 
when both these pieces were published, homicide rates were significantly higher than in the 
1950s or today - suggesting, again, that crime rates go only so far in explaining levels of 
concern about crime and disorder. 
283. See Cain, supra note 16, at 148-49. The seminal work was HOWARD S. BECKER, 
OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963). 
284. The change also reflected, in part, changes in urban life itself, and particularly 
changes in patterns of urban crime. Unlike national homicide rates, big-city homicide rates 
really did begin to skyrocket in the late 1960s. See Eric Monkkonen, Homicide Over the 
Centuries, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM: ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 163, 166-67 
(Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher eds., 1997). On other contributions to the decline 
of the "cosmopolitan ideal," see Hollinger, supra note 1 10, at 149-51. 
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Court criminal procedure. Consensus was not just a strategy for 
controlling the police; it was a way in which the criminal justice system 
served the larger goal of social stability. Broad agreement on the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system thus became not just a sign 
that the system was operating effectively; it became part of what it 
meant for the system to operate effectively. 
This made imagery greatly important, and it further underscored 
the critical significance of personal dignity. The core elements of 
Warren Court criminal procedure - the exclusionary rule, the 
Miranda doctrine, the Terry rules for stops and frisks - have all been 
criticized, particularly in retrospect, as more about symbolism than 
about substance. The exclusionary rule keeps the courtroom clean but 
does little to stop police illegality.285 Miranda dresses up interrogations 
without altering their fundamental dynamics.286 Terry purports to 
regulate the police but actually gives them wide berth.287 These 
criticisms were raised when the cases were decided, too, but the 
criticisms then seemed in some ways beside the point. The point was, 
at least in part, to sustain the consensus without which, it was thought, 
American society would fly apart. Social stability preserved 
democracy, and consensus preserved social stability. As the 1960s 
wore on, social stability grew to seem more precarious, and consensus 
became, correspondingly, all the more imperative. 
In seeking stability through consensus, criminal justice 
jurisprudence in the 1960s and early 1970s paralleled and built upon 
the work performed by the series of blue-ribbon commissions 
appointed in this period to investigate the causes of urban riots and 
campus unrest. The most important of these were the Governor's 
Commission on the Los Angeles Riots (commonly known as the 
McCone Commission), the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders (commonly known as the Kerner Commission), the 
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, and 
the President's Commission on Campus Unrest.288 Each of these task 
forces visibly embodied the pluralist ideal of elite consensus: a cross­
section of group leaders, informed by experts, hammering out and 
285. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles). 
286. See, e.g. , Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 718-47 
(1992). 
287. See, e.g. , Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men 
and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271 (1998). 
288. See GOVERNOR 's COMM'N ON THE L.A. RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN THE CITY - AN END 
OR A BEGINNING? (1965); NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 
(1968); NAT'L COMM'N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, TO ESTABLISH 
JUSTICE, TO ENSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY (1969); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CAMPUS 
UNREST, REPORT (1970). 
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lending credence to a middle-of-the-road response to threats to social 
stability.289 It does not take away from the real contributions made by 
some of these bodies, particularly the Kerner Commission, to 
recognize that they were, to a large extent, exercises in pluralist 
political theater. There was an element of that, too, in criminal 
procedure law: the elite endorsement of a moderate path of reform 
that redeemed and legitimized the underlying system, in part by 
safeguarding and valorizing its cherished symbols and its core 
commitment to dignity. 
G. The Disregard of Institutional Structure 
The pluralist emphasis on psychology and sociology encouraged 
people interested in the police to train their sights on the behavior of 
individual officers and the police mentality. It discouraged attention to 
the structure of decisionmaking within police department�. Even 
without pluralism, the reliance on judges to regulate the police 
probably would have directed criminal procedure away from questions 
of systemic design; those are not the kinds of questions judges are 
thought well-positioned to address. But the psychosocial framework of 
pluralism made this selective competence of courts seem like a happy 
fortuity, and all the more reason to lean heavily on the judiciary in 
approaching the problems of the police. The problems that courts 
were ill-equipped to tackle were not the important ones, anyway. 
It was not just judges who paid less attention to the institutional 
structure of law enforcement than to police psychology and sociology; 
scholars did the same. In part this reflected the ability of the Supreme 
Court to set the intellectual agenda of law professors and the 
unremarkable tendency of sociologists to focus on sociology. But 
political scientists studying the police also tended to neglect questions 
of organizational design, and here the guiding role of pluralism is 
particularly easy to discern. James Q. Wilson, the only student of the 
police to rival Skolnick for influence in the 1960s, was in many ways a 
thoroughgoing pluralist. He took group theory and consumerism as 
givens: '" [T]he people' do not govern - organizations, parties, 
factions, politicians, and groups govern. The people choose among 
competing leaders and thereby constrain them."290 He shared, too, the 
pluralists' overriding concern with social stability; their strong aversion 
to mass politics; their focus on group psychology; and - most 
fundamentally - their conviction that institutional structures were 
epiphenomena!, that the real action took place at the level of cultural 
289. See THE POLmcs OF RIOT COMMISSIONS, 1917-1970, at 3-54, 259-527 (Anthony 
Platt ed., 1971). 
290. WILSON, POLICE BEHAVIOR, supra note 3, at 289; see also, e.g. , id. at 250 
(characterizing voters as "political consumer[s]"). 
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norms. Wilson therefore sought to explain police policies as 
expressions of the local "political culture. "291 
The political culture created a police culture within each 
department. Initially Wilson suggested that police cultures came in 
two versions: a rule-bound, "good government" professionalism and a 
patronage-based network of relationships and reciprocity. He called 
the first "the code of professionalism" and linked it to what Richard 
Hofstadter had characterized as the '"Yankee-Protestant' style" of 
politics; he called the second "the code of the system" and linked it to 
Hofstadter's "immigrant" style.292 Because Wilson saw police cultures 
as outgrowths of the broader political cultures of particular 
municipalities, he was pessimistic about efforts to graft police 
professionalism onto the political systems of inner-city areas 
traditionally run in the "immigrant" style: "the law of the Yankee" 
was not made for "the conditions of the jungle."293 
Later, in a comparative study of eight American police 
departments, Wilson identified three "styles" of law enforcement: the 
"watchman style," which corresponded roughly to the "code of the 
system"; the "legalistic style," which was more or less the "code of 
professionalism"; and the "service style," which was the form of 
policing Wilson found in the affluent New York suburbs of Brighton 
and Nassau County.294 Once again, he attributed the styles of 
particular police departments to the local political cultures in which 
they operated. He was therefore dismissive of most efforts at police 
reform, particularly those involving structural innovations.295 It was all 
pie in the sky: "The 'problems of the police,"' Wilson thought, were 
"longstanding and inherent in the nature of their function."296 The 
reform proposals of the late 1960s revealed simply that "our definition 
291. See id. at 233. 
292. Wilson, supra note 190, at 200-12 (quoting RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF 
REFORM (1960)). 
293. Id. at 216. A fair amount might be said about Wilson's use of the term "jungle" to 
refer to the inner city. Among its tamer connotations, the term signaled Wilson's concern for 
orderliness, and his rejection of the pluralist enthusiasm for the hurly-burly of modern urban 
life. These themes grew more pronounced in his later writings, most famously in James Q. 
Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. On 
that essay's "aesthetic of orderliness, cleanliness and sobriety," see BERNARD E. 
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 
23-27 (2001). On the broad influence of the essay, see infra notes 482-485 and accompanying 
text. 
294. WILSON, POLICE BEHAVIOR, supra note 3, at 140-226. 
295. See id. at 227-99. 
296. Id. at 299. 
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of those problems has changed and, by changing, has misled or 
unsettled us."297 
By 1969, when Wilson offered that counsel of quietism, pluralism 
and the police were both under attack. The attacks were related in 
ways we will explore. For now, though, the important point is the way 
in which pluralism shaped Wilson's response to attacks on the police. 
Not only did it give him an almost Burkean suspicion of institutional 
engineering, it made him particularly unsympathetic to calls for 
greater community control of urban policing - calls that he correctly 
understood to reflect widening interest in "participatory 
democracy."298 Wilson warned that the "service style" could work in 
homogeneous communities of the well-off and well-educated, but not 
in the inner city. Group conflicts there were too acute, and norms of 
cooperation too weak. "Community control" would therefore mean 
"putting the police at the mercy of the rawest emotions, the most 
demagogic spokesmen, and the most provincial concerns. "299 The end 
result could well be authoritarianism rather than democracy; Wilson 
compared proposals for neighborhood control of policing to the Soviet 
Union's system of "People's Patrols."300 
Wilson had little more sympathy for the growing calls among 
police officers themselves for greater participation in departmental 
decisionmaking; he dismissed police unions as a form of "criminal 
justice syndicalism. "301 In this respect he found himself once again in 
accord with Skolnick. Skolnick's wariness about police unions had 
much to do with the circumstances of the late 1960s. Police unionism 
surged in that period, and it was a highly politicized form of unionism: 
the rallying cry was as likely to be opposition to civilian review boards 
or reform-oriented chiefs as support for better benefits or enhanced 
job security.302 Skolnick therefore saw police activism as a threat to the 
rule of law: like judges or soldiers, police officers should be 
apolitical.303 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 288. 
299. Id. at 289; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 132-34 (1975) 
[hereinafter WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME]. 
300. WILSON, POLICE BEHAVIOR, supra note 3, at 285 n.5. 
301. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME, supra note 299, at xix. 
302. On the critical role that proposals for citizen review boards played as focal points 
for police organizing in the late 1960s, see, for example, STEPHEN C. HALPERN, POLICE­
ASSOCIATION AND DEPARTMENT LEADERS: THE POLITICS OF CO-OPTATION 11-88 (1974); 
SKOLNICK, POLITICS OF PROTEST, supra note 4, at 278-81 ;  and SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT 27-29 (2001). 
303. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LA w ENFORCEMENT IN 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 249-50, 258-62 (2d ed. 1975); SKOLNICK, POLITICS OF PROTEST, 
supra note 4, at 286-88. An important development in this regard was the 1971 vote of no 
confidence in Chief Charles Gain of the Oakland Police Department by the local Police 
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Even without pluralism, the direction taken by police unions in the 
late 1960s would have soured many people on the prospects for 
bringing true participatory democracy to policing: there was always 
the nettlesome difficulty of participation by the police themselves. The 
point I wish to emphasize here, though, is that pluralism made this 
reaction more likely in two different ways. First, it made many people, 
such as Wilson, suspicious of any calls for broadening political 
participation, including by the police. Second, it led many people, 
including Skolnick, to see police unionism first and foremost as a 
social movement, and not as a set of institutional possibilities. It would 
have been difficult in any event in the late 1960s to think past the 
immediate political context and to imagine what collective bargaining 
or arbitration might mean once police unions had become 
"normalized." Normalization of anything was not on the horizon in 
1968. But the strong emphasis that pluralism placed on social 
psychology made it even harder to think in terms of institutional 
structure. Structure seemed superficial. 
This is not to say that the institutional structure of policing was 
wholly ignored in the 1960s and 1970s. Police administrators spent 
time thinking about the structure of their institutions, but with few 
exceptions they focused on efficiency, not democracy. Outside 
reformers did think about restructuring police departments to make 
them more democratic, but their energies were overwhelmingly 
devoted to a particular, relatively modest form of restructuring: adding 
a layer of civilian review to particular categories of police 
decisionmaking.304 Building on the model of judicial review, this 
innovation found support in the pluralist emphasis on group politics, 
while also appealing, if only symbolically, to emerging notions of 
participatory democracy. What was missing in this period was 
sustained, systematic attention to the ways in which organizational 
design in law enforcement might advance democracy. For reasons to 
be explored below, it is still missing today. 
Officers' Association. Gain was a committed reformer who won the respect not only of 
Skolnick but also other scholars who used the Oakland department for sociological research 
on the police. See WILLIAM KER MUIR, JR., POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS (1977); 
HANS TOCH, J. DOUGLAS GRANT & RAYMOND T. GALVIN, AGENTS OF CHANGE: A STUDY 
IN POLICE REFORM (1975); Byron Michael Jackson, Leadership and Change in Public 
Organization: The Dilemmas of an Urban Police Chief (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author). Berkley, too, was 
favorably impressed with Gain's reforms. See BERKLEY, supra note 1, at 97, 104, 168, 198. 
Further discussion on Gain will appear later. See infra text accompanying notes 398-400. 
304. See WALKER, supra note 302. 
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* * *  
We have not exhausted the ways in which pluralism influenced 
criminal procedure and police scholarship in the 1960s and beyond. 
The American exceptionalism incorporated within pluralism, for 
example, may well have contributed to the relative disinterest that 
judges and scholars showed in police procedures abroad. But I hope 
the discussion so far has established three important points. 
First, ideas about democracy are linked to ideas about the police. 
Democratic pluralism helps to explain the focus on the group 
psychology of the police in the 1960s and 1970s, the concern with 
police discretion and the reliance on judicial oversight during the same 
period, the emphasis of the Warren and Burger Courts on personal 
dignity in criminal procedure, the Court's attraction to 1950s-style 
police professionalism, the broader embrace of modern urban life by 
the Warren Court and its commentators, the centrality of consensus in 
criminal procedure during the 1960s and 1970s, and the tendency both 
of the Court and of many scholars in this period to disregard 
institutional structure. These were not minor features of Warren and 
Burger Court criminal procedure; they were some of its most 
conspicuous features. They are also features that from today's vantage 
point can seem particularly mysterious and hard to justify. 
It bears repeating that pluralism was not the only influence on 
criminal procedure law in the 1960s and 1970s. The widely recognized 
theme of racial equality in Warren Court criminal procedure, in 
particular, is hard to trace to the pluralists.305 Pluralism may well have 
played a role, though, in keeping that theme "domesticated" and 
almost entirely subtextual.306 I will have more to say later about the 
relationship between democracy and equality - or, more precisely, 
between democracy and opposition to entrenched systems of 
inequality.307 For now, the important point is that pluralism 
downplayed this relationship: first, through its emphasis on leadership 
elites, and second, through its assumption that the complexity of the 
American political system prevented any particular group from 
achieving undue dominance. Pluralism thus does little to explain the 
egalitarianism of criminal procedure in the Warren Court era, but it 
305. On that theme, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming 
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1 156-59 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & 
Meares, The Coming Crisis], and Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) 
Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2315-17 (1998) (book 
review). 
306. See Seidman, supra note 286, at 673; see also Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong with 
Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 230 (2003). Consider, for example, the Court's deliberate 
de-emphasis of race in Miranda. See Seidman, supra, at 751 n.254. 
307. See infra notes 513-524 and accompanying text. 
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may help to explain why that egalitarianism never became more 
thoroughgoing, more explicit, or more lasting. 
Second, in order to trace the connections between ideas about 
democracy and ideas about the police, we need to pay attention to the 
complexity of ideas about democracy. Pluralism, for example, is 
sometimes counterposed with faith in expertise.308 There is truth in 
that formulation: the pluralists were eager to distance themselves from 
people like Walter Lippman, and they stressed the role of group 
competition in sustaining American democracy. But the real pluralists 
were not ideal types; their theory of democracy was richer and more 
complicated than a simple analogy of politics to markets. They 
tempered their distaste for philosopher kings with an appreciation of 
scientific and technical know-how, and they matched their emphasis 
on competition with a heavy reliance on consensus. It was this actual 
set of beliefs, held by flesh-and-blood people, that influenced ideas 
about policing in the 1960s, the 1970s, and into the 1980s. 
Oversimplifying pluralism obscures its significance. 
Third, and more particularly, pluralism must be understood within 
the context of the social-science paradigm from which it emerged. 
Ignoring that paradigm makes the central tenets of pluralism harder to 
identify, and it makes pluralism's largest impacts on criminal 
procedure and police studies all but invisible. It also, as we will see, 
obscures an important point of continuity between pluralism and the 
theories that emerged as its chief rivals, participatory democracy and 
deliberative democracy. 
The continuity is important, because it explains two of the most 
persistent themes in our thinking about the police: the conception of 
the police as a breed apart, and the sense that culture matters more 
than structure in regulating the police. There are good grounds for 
both of these views. The social-science paradigm triumphed for a 
reason. But democratic pluralism triumphed for a reason, too. Its 
explanatory power was no illusion. The problem with pluralism, as its 
critics pointed out, was not so much what it said but what it left out.309 
Over the past decade or so, some of what pluralism left out -
participation, deliberation - has worked its way back into our 
thinking about policing. What the social-science paradigm leaves out, 
on the other hand, still remains muted in criminal procedure. 
In a larger sense, for reasons we will explore, democracy itself has 
become muted in criminal procedure. Theories of participatory 
democracy and deliberative democracy have never achieved the 
308. See, e.g. , Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 1276 (1984). 
309. See, e.g. , ROGIN, supra note 24, at 269; Connolly, supra note 36, at 13. 
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combination of comprehensive explanatory power and broad, almost 
unquestioned acceptance that pluralism enjoyed in its heyday. 
Pluralism itself retains adherents, although it survives largely in forms 
that sacrifice clarity and rigor for ecumenicalism. Even pluralists now 
endorse participation. Our ideas about democracy are broader today 
than they were in the 1950s and early 1960s, but they are also less 
coherent. That may be one reason that democracy tends to enter into 
discussions of policing today in ways that are hesitant, weak, and 
confused. 
Ill. PLURALISM'S FALL 
A. A "Democracy of Participation" 
The disastrous course of the Vietnam War, followed by the 
revelations of Watergate, would have placed great strain on any theory 
of democracy that relied as heavily as pluralism on leadership elites. 
But pluralism's decline began long before Watergate, and before 
Americans took up arms against the Vietcong. A signal event came in 
1960, when the philosopher Arnold Kaufman coined the term 
"participatory democracy" in the course of an argument that insisted 
on what the pluralists above all else denied: the importance of 
widespread political involvement.310 The phrase "participatory 
democracy" had an extraordinary career over the next decade and a 
half. It became the slogan of the New Left, and then, remarkably, it 
went mainstream. The story of that progression is, to a great extent, 
the story of pluralism's downfall. 
Kaufman's essay did not contest the utility of representative 
government for promoting social stability and safeguarding individual 
liberty. But he thought those arrangements could and should be 
supplemented with "institutional forms" that facilitated a "democracy 
of participation." The chief purpose of these other arrangements was 
not to promote good policy, but to assist "the development of human 
powers of thought, feeling, and action." Participation was "an essential 
condition of the good society and the good life."311 These were old 
ideas, of course, and Kaufman's essay was self-consciously an effort at 
recovery. In this respect it continued a small counter-tradition in 
political theory that had been slowly gathering steam for half a 
decade.312 But Kaufman's essay was also a direct and pointed attack on 
the consumerism the pluralists had inherited from Schumpeter - the 
310. Arnold S. Kaufman, Human Nature and Participatory Democracy, in NOMOS III: 
RESPONSIBILITY 266 (Carl J .  Friedrich ed., 1960). 
311. Id. at 272, 289. 
312. See, e.g. , HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958). 
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notion that political "outputs" were all that mattered, and that the 
complexity of modern life made widespread participation impractical. 
Kaufman's argument, and even more so his phrasing, proved 
enormously influential, largely by virtue of their incorporation into the 
manifesto adopted by Students for a Democratic Society at the 
organization's June 1962 conference in Port Huron, Michigan. The 
principal drafter of the manifesto, Tom Hayden, was a student of 
Kaufman's, and Kaufman himself attended the conference as an 
informal adviser. "Participatory democracy" was the rhetorical 
centerpiece of the Port Huron Statement.313 The document called for 
"a democracy of individual participation, governed by two central 
aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining 
the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to 
encourage independence in men and provide the media for their 
common participation."314 The Port Huron Statement became possibly 
"the most widely distributed document of the American left in the 
sixties,"315 and - somewhat to Kaufman's dismay - it helped make 
participatory democracy the catchphrase of the New Left, the slogan 
that "defined what was new about this left."316 
Participatory democracy in the 1960s was not first and foremost a 
theory of scholars; it was a theory of activists. (For all their influence, 
Arnold Kaufman and C. Wright Mills may have mattered less to the 
student radicals at Port Huron than the model set by the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.)317 Partly as a result, 
participatory democracy was never as coherent and consistent as 
democratic pluralism. It also changed over time: there was quite a 
distance, for example, from the committed pacifism of the Port Huron 
Statement - "we find violence to be abhorrent"318 - to the 
glorification of street crime at the decade's end.319 The ambiguities and 
313. JAMES MILLER, DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS: FROM PORT HURON TO THE 
SIEGE OF CHICAGO 44, 111 ,  119 (paperback ed. 1994). 
314. Students for a Democratic Soc'y, The Port Huron Statement (1962) [hereinafter 
The Port Huron Statement], reprinted in id. at 329, 333. 
315. KIRKPATRICK SALE, SDS 69 (1973). 
316. MILLER, supra note 313, at 142, 153. Kaufman remained convinced that it was 
"both possible and desirable vastly to extend the frontiers of participatory institutions in 
many areas of social and political life," but by the late 1960s he warned that "uncritical 
exuberance" about participatory democracy had obscured "the nature and limits of a 
democracy of participation. For if participation provides an answer to many problems, it 
does not answer every problem; nor does it serve in any old form." Arnold S. Kaufman, 
Participatory Democracy: Ten Years Later, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM, supra note 36, at 
201, 203-04, 206. 
317. See, e.g. , MILLER, supra note 313, at 55-61. 
318. The Port Huron Statement, supra note 314, at 333. 
319. MILLER, supra note 313, at 310. 
1758 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1699 
contradictions in the rhetoric of the New Left are by now well known, 
and we will return to them shortly. But they should not be overstated. 
For all their differences, people who invoked the concept of 
participatory democracy in the 1960s tended to agree on several key 
points. 
First, they shared Kaufman's discomfort with the consumerism that 
led the pluralists to see democracy as solely a mechanism for 
delivering good policies. They thus disagreed with the pluralists about 
the purposes of democracy. Advocates of participatory democracy 
thought much of the value of democracy lay in the way it facilitated 
individual development and enriched social interaction. In the words 
of the Port Huron Statement, politics in a participatory democracy 
served "the function of bringing people out of isolation and into 
community, thus being a necessary, though not sufficient, means of 
finding meaning in personal life."320 Nor was it simply a matter of 
personal satisfaction. Political consumerism, like economic 
consumerism, stunted society as well as its members. By making 
people alienated, helpless, and stupefied, it blocked critical thinking 
and prevented the emergence of alternative forms of collective life.321 
In this respect the rhetoric of participatory democracy drew heavily 
from the broader attack on consumerism in the 1960s. That attack, 
characteristically couched as a call to replace "conformity" with 
"authenticity," was embraced with special fervor by the 
counterculture, but its presence was felt more widely. It reflected a 
growing discomfort, particularly among intellectuals, with the power 
of modem advertising, and a mounting sense that middle-class life in 
America had become too passive, too comfortable, too manipulated, 
and too shallow.322 
Second, believers in participatory democracy disagreed with the 
pluralists about the processes of democracy. The pluralists had 
distrusted mass politics and had placed their faith in leaders, guided by 
scientific and technical experts. That strategy obviously made no sense 
if political participation was essential for individual development. But 
the pluralists' emphasis on leadership and expertise ran into trouble in 
the 1960s on its own terms as well. The Vietnam War shook 
320. The Port Huron Statement, supra note 314, at 333. 
321. See id. at 330-31 .  This theme in the Port Huron Statement drew heavily on the work 
of C. Wright Mills. See MILLER, supra note 313, at 78-91; MILLS, supra note 24, at 298-324. It 
was influentially expanded from a neo-Marxist perspective in HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE­
DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 
(1964). 
322. See, e.g. , CROSS, supra note 62, at 146-55. The best-selling works of Vance Packard 
were particularly influential in this regard. See VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN 
PERSUADERS (1957); VANCE PACKARD, THE STATUS SEEKERS (1959); VANCE PACKARD, 
THE WASTE MAKERS (1960); see also DANIEL HOROWITZ, VANCE PACKARD AND 
AMERICAN SOCIAL CRITICISM 148-52 (1994). 
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confidence in the technical competence of experts and elites and, more 
importantly, in precisely those features of the political system on 
which pluralists relied to make leadership democratic: the 
commitment of elites to core democratic norms, the disciplining 
function of electoral competition, and the accommodation of interests 
facilitated by group competition. The secrecy and deception practiced 
by "the best and the brightest" made the whole notion of "rules of the 
game" seem almost farcical. As two social scientists asked in the early 
1970s, " [i]f the Kennedys and McNamaras and Rowstows and 
Johnsons can conceive, plan, and initiate a 'secret war,' how are we to 
remain confident that the principles of representative democracy rest 
secure in the inward convictions of the elite?"323 That same pattern of 
opacity, combined with the turbulence and violence of the 1960s, made 
elections seem, in many quarters, increasingly beside the point,324 and 
eroded confidence in the ability of interest-group politics to 
accommodate peacefully the concerns of ordinary people. 
With regard to this last point - the disenchantment with interest­
group politics - the New Left could draw on escalating skepticism 
about pluralism within mainstream social science. The belief that 
organized groups could be relied upon to represent all interests, no 
matter how diffuse, came under particularly heavy attack. The 
influential political scientist E.E. Schattschneider spoke in 1960 for a 
growing group of critics: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the 
heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably about 
90 percent of the people cannot get into the pressure system . . . .  The 
system is skewed, loaded and unbalanced in favor of a fraction of a 
minority."325 The notion that interest-group politics had a built-in bias 
received a particularly strong boost in 1965, when Mancur Olson 
published The Logic of Collective Action. Olson pointed out that the 
pluralist optimism about group politics rested on an unsubstantiated 
assumption that, whenever existing groups failed to take sufficient 
account of an important interest, a new group would organize to 
represent that interest. Not only was this idea unsubstantiated, Olson 
argued, it was almost certainly false. Microeconomic analysis 
confirmed what politicians and journalists had always known: small 
"special interest" groups found it easier than larger groups to organize 
323. PREWITI & STONE, supra note 35, at 195; see also DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST 
AND THE BRIGHTEST (1972). 
324. See, e.g. , LASCH, supra note 52, at 189. "The system," Lasch wrote, "no longer 
responds to the expressed wishes of the voters. If they elect Lyndon Johnson as a dove, he 
turns into a hawk; if they try to end the war by voting for Robert Kennedy, the arbitrary, 
unpredictable, and meaningless act of an assassin thwarts this choice as well." Id. 
325. E.E. SCHA TTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 35 (1960). 
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and therefore to wield political power. Narrow, "vested interests" 
therefore could defeat the broader public interests, "which are 
normally supposed to prevail in a democracy. "326 
Third, and as a consequence of the foregoing, advocates of 
participatory democracy in the 1960s tended to differ strongly with the 
pluralists on the question of proximity - that is, the issue of how close 
America actually was to achieving the democratic ideal. (Partly for this 
reason, they were also less impressed with the particularity of 
American democracy.) For most of the 1960s, participatory democracy 
was both a rhetoric of critique and a strategy of attack. As rhetoric, it 
took aim at "complacency" and "contentment"327 by identifying what 
was missing in American democracy. As strategy, it endorsed political 
involvement as a means of developing, among other things, the 
individual's powers of critical thought. 
Fourth, and notwithstanding the preceding points of contrast, 
supporters of participatory democracy tended to agree with the 
pluralists that democracy had more to do with culture than with 
institutions. They shared what I have been calling the social-science 
paradigm. True, they rejected the reliance the pluralists had placed on 
two fixtures of that paradigm, consumerism and group theory. But 
believers in participatory democracy tended to talk about consensus as 
much as the pluralists. It was a different kind of consensus - a 
consensus reached through face-to-face discussions rather than 
through overlapping elites and "social training."  And advocates of 
participatory democracy, unlike the pluralists, tended to see the 
formation of a framing consensus as a key part of democratic politics, 
rather than a precondition for it. Again, Schattschneider put it well: 
"Political conflict is not like an intercollegiate debate in which the 
opponents agree in advance on a definition of the issues. . . . [T]he 
definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice 
of conflicts allocates power. "328 Still, the consensus reached in 
participatory democracy appealed, like the pluralist consensus, to the 
post-Lockean ideal of "an ever-widening identification of self and 
world, individual and society."329 Not for nothing did the conferees at 
Port Huron call themselves Students for a Democratic Society. Writing 
in 1967, the sociologist Richard Flacks - who had himself been one of 
those conferees - identified "community" and "anti-institutionalism" 
326. OLSON, supra note 35, at 127-28. 
327. The Port Huron Statement, supra note 314, at 329, 330. Here, too, the influence of 
C. Wright Mills was apparent. 
328. SCHATISCHNEIDER, supra note 325, at 68. 
329. SKLANSKY, supra note 34, at 228. 
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as two of "the main value themes which characterize the student 
movement. "330 
Nor did participatory democracy as developed in the 1960s reject 
the emphasis the pluralists had placed on personality. If anything, 
participatory democracy gave psychology a new, heightened 
importance by stressing the role of politics in personal growth.331 
Political participation did not just deepen the individual's critical 
faculties; it also assisted the growth of a democratic personality: self­
confident, public-minded, civically engaged, and "authentic." 
Authenticity, in particular, figured prominently in New Left thinking. 
The concept of authenticity was notoriously hard to pin down, but it 
drew heavily on the "humanistic psychology" of Abraham Maslow and 
his followers, a psychology that departed from Freudianism by 
stressing the universal human drives for meaning and "self­
actualization. "332 
There was obvious tension between the notion of an "authentic" 
personality and the idea that personality was shaped by politics. This 
tension was merely one aspect of larger divide in the rhetoric of 
participatory democracy. One strand of this rhetoric emphasized 
community, consensus, and rational deliberation. Another strand 
stressed a kind of romantic existentialism, the "re-assertion of the 
personal" in politics.333 In his perceptive history of the New Left, 
Jam es Miller describes participatory democracy as combining "two 
distinct political visions" :  the "face-to-face community of friends 
sharing interests in common," and the "experimental collective, 
embarked on a high-risk effort to test the limits of democracy in 
modern life."334 Miller calls the two visions "contradictory."335 That 
may exaggerate the conflict: there can be plenty of daring in efforts 
toward community. But he is surely right that reconciling the two 
images proved difficult: "The will to act can easily be sapped by 
endless debate. And thoughtful discussion is rarely advanced through 
heroics."336 All of this is to say that although participatory democracy 
330. Richard Flacks, The Liberated Generation: An Exploration of the Roots of Student 
Protest, 23 J. Soc. ISSUES 52, 56-57 (1967). On Flacks and SDS, see MILLER, supra note 313, 
at 157-83. 
331. See, e.g. , PATEMAN, supra note 36, at 24-25; Connolly, supra note 36, at 10-11 .  
332. See, e.g., A.H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954); CARL R. 
ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961). On the influence of humanistic psychology on 
New Left ideology, see, for example, LASCH, supra note 52, at  181-82, and Harry R. Targ, 
Social Science and a New Social Order, 8 J. PEACE RES. 207, 218 n.6 (1971). 
333. MILLER, supra note 313, at 101 (quoting Tom Hayden). 
334. Id. at 146. 
335. Id. at 147. 
336. Id. at 146. 
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shared the emphasis pluralism had placed on both consensus and 
personality, it never combined those two emphases as seamlessly as 
pluralism had. 
B. The Apologetic Turn 
In the 1970s and 1980s, when participatory democracy moved back 
from the world of manifestos to the world of scholarship, the 
"consensus" strand and the "experimental" strands began to separate. 
The first strand figured in the revival of civic republicanism, in some 
versions of communitarianism, and more recently in the escalating 
academic enthusiasm for deliberative democracy. The second strand 
has been less prominent and harder to categorize, beyond saying that 
it has tended to focus on strategies of popular "empowerment."337 
Both strands have continued to view democracy as more a matter 
of culture than of institutions. Communitarianism and CIVIC 
republicanism followed Tocqueville in stressing public spirit and the 
norms of community involvement.338 Deliberative democracy has been 
less a comprehensive account of American politics than a 
philosophical argument for a particular democratic ideal, an ideal 
characterized chiefly by the nature of political discussion rather than 
by structural arrangements. The core idea is that we should arrive at 
political decisions through sincere public debate, based on arguments 
that "appeal to reasons that are shared or could come to be shared by 
our fellow citizens. "339 As for the "experimental" strand of 
participatory democracy, scholars writing in this tradition have focused 
their attention on building movements rather than institutions. 
Participatory democracy has meant for them not any specific set of 
structural arrangements but instead a process of progressive liberation, 
337. For the former, see, for example, JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY 
DEMOCRACY (1980); PATEMAN, supra note 36; and MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S 
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PuBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996). For the latter, see, 
for example, Frug, supra note 308, at 1295-96; Phillip Green, 'Democracy' as a Contested 
Idea, in DEMOCRACY 2, 14-18 (Phillip Green ed., 1993); and Hannah Fenischel Pitkin & 
Sarah M. Shumer, On Participation, 2 DEMOCRACY 43 (1982). Some work continued to 
straddle the divide, most notably BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: 
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984). 
338. See, e.g., SA!<DEL, supra note 337; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). 
339. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 14 
(1996); see also, e.g. , Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 407 (James Bohman & 
William Rehg eds., 1997); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First 
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 279-85 (1991). For a helpful overview, see 
Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 
371 (2000). For a skeptical treatment, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative 
Democracy's Attempt to Turn Politics into Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (2002). 
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an "ideal under which the possibilities of joint transformation of social 
life are collected. "340 
Alongside these descendents of New Left ideology emerged a third 
form of participatory democracy, what might be called the status-quo 
version. Robert Dahl predicted in 1970 that participatory democracy 
would soon prove "only a youthful fashion of the sixties, which the 
youth of the seventies will disdain as the foolish ideas of their 
elders."341 It never quite worked out that way. Instead something 
stranger happened: participatory democracy became a lasting fixture 
of mainstream political rhetoric, but as a strategy of stability rather 
than an avenue of critique. Richard Nixon, for example, promised in 
his 1968 campaign "an expanded democracy" in which "the people can 
participate, they can be involved, their voices can be heard and 
heeded."342 He called as President for giving "all Americans . . .  full 
and effective participation in the decisions that affect their lives."343 
Arnold Kaufman pointed out the obvious: the appeal of participation 
for a politician like Nixon lay less in its transformative potential than 
in its power to "allay discontent."344 Participation was "a double-edged 
political instrument"; instead of promoting "radical change" it could 
easily result in "the disappearance of outside critics - those who 
possess the cool detachment and ability to calculate consequences that 
come with having little identification with the organization, no axe to 
grind, no piece of the action."345 What Kaufman did not foresee was 
that participation would become not just "an instrument of co­
optation"346 but a rhetoric of apology - that the very possibility of 
340. Frug, supra note 308, at 1296. 
341. ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 81 (1970). 
342. Richard M. Nixon, Toward an Expanded Democracy (June 27, 1968), in NIXON 
SPEAKS OUT: MAJOR SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS BY RICHARD M. NIXON IN THE 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1968, at 9, 15 (1968) [hereinafter Nixon, Expanded 
Democracy]. 
343. Richard M. Nixon, The State of the Union, Address Before a Joint Session of 
Congress (Jan. 22, 1971), in 7 WEEKLY COMPILATION PRES. Docs. 89, 96 (Jan. 25, 1971) 
[hereinafter, Nixon, State of the Union]. The development was transatlantic. General 
DeGaulle called in the late 1960s for a "policy of participation" for French laborers. See 
Kaufman, supra note 316, at 210-11 .  A decade later the British government committed itself 
"to strengthen our democracy by providing new opportunities for citizens to take part in the 
decisions that affect their lives." Queen Elizabeth II, The Queen's Speech, in 396 PARL. 
DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1, 4 (1978). 
344. Kaufman, supra note 316, at 211 .  Nixon also used the rhetoric of participatory 
democracy to support the conservative strategy of shifting power from the federal 
government to states, localities, and the private sector. See Nixon, Expanded Democracy, 
supra note 342, at 16; Nixon, State of the Union, supra note 343, at 94. 
345. Kaufman, supra note 316, at 211 .  
346. Id. 
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involvement would be used to defend existing arrangements as 
democratic. 
Before explaining how that has happened, I should say a bit more 
about deliberative democracy. The growing body of political 
philosophy that invokes that label varies in its claims (and in its 
clarity), but some generalizations seem safe. Like participatory 
democracy, deliberative democracy is a reaction against aspects of 
democratic pluralism, including the notion that politics is and should 
be largely a matter of aggregating and balancing preexisting interests. 
Unlike participatory democracy, though, deliberative democracy does 
not stress the effects of political involvement on human development, 
either at the level of the individual or at the level the community.347 
Instead, deliberative democracy is primarily a theory of "democratic 
legitimacy"348 - that is to say, of the "normative essence of 
democracy,'' what makes democracy morally appealing.349 Advocates 
of deliberative democracy find that essence in the idea of collective 
self-determination. They further argue that collective self­
determination requires that political decisions be made through 
sincere public debate, in which "we offer considerations that others 
(whose conduct will be governed by the decisions) can accept," instead 
of simply "count[ing] their interests in deciding what to do, while 
keeping our fingers crossed that those interests are outweighed. "350 
Although justified first and foremost on grounds of political 
morality, public debate of this kind is said to have two practical 
benefits as well. The first is that decisions made in this matter are 
likely to be smarter and better informed.351 This part of the argument 
for deliberative democracy harks back to John Dewey's championing 
of face-to-face dialogue as a means of "securing diffused and seminal 
intelligence,'' a notion that appealed greatly to C. Wright Mills and, 
through his influence, found its way into the Port Huron Statement.352 
The second practical benefit of sincere public debate is that it can 
make losers more willing to accept the outcome. Dewey noted this 
benefit as well,353 but he downplayed it for reasons that are easy to 
understand. Mollification always serves the interest of stability, but 
stability - depending on the circumstances - may or may not serve 
the cause of justice, or even the cause of overall material welfare. This 
347. See Freeman, supra note 339, at 378. 
348. Cohen, supra note 339, at 407. 
349. Post, supra note 339, at 282. 
350. Cohen, supra note 339, at 415. 
351. See, e.g. , Freeman, supra note 339, at 383. 
352. DEWEY, supra note 149, at 217; see also MILLER, supra note 313, at 84-85; MILLS, 
supra note 24, at 298-301; The Port Huron Statement, supra note 314, at 336. 
353. DEWEY, supra note 149, at 208. 
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is why Kaufman worried about the potential of participatory 
democracy to allay discontent. And it is presumably for this reason 
that modern advocates of deliberative democracy echo Dewey in 
downplaying the pacifying advantages of sincere public debate. 
Pluralism had lost favor, after all, in part because of its "preoccupation 
with the stability of the political system"354 and its relative inattention 
to "whether or not the situation stabilized is itself desirable. "355 
Nonetheless, concerns about actual, objective "legitimacy" prove 
hard to separate from concerns about perceived legitimacy. Certainly 
this happens often in arguments for deliberative democracy. The 
"value of self-determination" slides over into the imperative "to instill 
a sense of self-determination. "356 Considerations of moral 
"acceptability" slide into questions of practical acceptability.357 Most 
advocates of deliberative democracy stress that they are describing an 
ideal: deliberation among "free and equal citizens . . .  motivated by 
justice or the common good."358 And the practical acceptability of 
decisions in that kind of society might be thought an especially good 
indication of their moral acceptability. But most advocates of 
deliberative democracy also insist that they are not simply constructing 
a thought experiment along the lines of John Rawls's "original 
position." It is "actual deliberation" that matters,359 and they tend to 
recommend doing as much as possible to facilitate deliberation, even 
in our imperfect society.360 Their reform proposals tend to focus on 
mechanisms for changing attitudes toward public debate rather than 
on changing economic and political structures. Amy Guttmann and 
Dennis Thompson, for example, stress in their influential account the 
need for schools "to develop their students' capacities to understand 
different perspectives, communicate their understandings to other 
people, and engage in the give-and-take of moral argument with a 
view to making mutually acceptable decisions. "361 
354. PATEMAN, supra note 36, at 1 .  
355. LIVELY, supra note 26, at 82. 
356. Post, supra note 339, at 281-82 (emphasis added). 
357. See, e.g. , GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 339, at 41-42. 
358. Freeman, supra note 339, at 380. 
359. E.g. , GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 339, at 16. 
360. See, e.g. , id. at 358-61; Schroeder, supra note 339, at 1 11-13. On the tendency of 
arguments for deliberative democracy to finesse the problem of the second best, see Jon 
Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 339, at 3, 18, and Frederick Schauer, Talking as a Decision 
Procedure, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 17, 
20-26 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999). 
361. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 339, at 359. Joshua Cohen may be an 
exception in this regard. See Cohen, supra note 339, at 412-13. 
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There are two points to be made here. The first is that deliberative 
democracy, perhaps even more than 1960s-style participatory 
democracy, tends to focus attention · on the cultural underpinnings of 
democracy at the expense of the institutional structures of 
decisionmaking. The second is that the rhetoric of deliberative 
democracy has something of a conservative tilt. It emphasizes the 
importance of people understanding each other, respecting each 
other's positions, and accepting political decisions with which they 
disagree. It directs attention away from the possibilities that some 
arguments are incoherent, that some political positions are unworthy 
of respect, and that some systems should be overthrown. 
There is nothing intrinsically conservative about the theory of 
deliberative democracy: even if true democracy depends on public­
spirited deliberation among free and equal citizens, deliberation in the 
real world of today might do nothing to promote legitimacy. The first 
task might be to strengthen freedom and equality, not to promote 
deliberation. But advocates of deliberative democracy tend to urge 
more deliberation in the here and now, alongside incremental efforts 
to improve the conditions of deliberation.362 The point is not just that 
deliberation in the real world can be the enemy of action.363 The point 
is that even describing real-world political debate as a form of 
"deliberation" tends to suggest that the outcomes of that process are 
worthy of respect. 
The same is true of "participation." Like deliberation, participation 
in government can be pacifying; this is the point Kaufman stressed at 
the end of the 1960s. Equally important, though, the mere possibility 
of participation can be invoked to legitimize decisions as democratic. 
Used in this way, participatory democracy becomes a rhetoric of 
apology. 
Justice Breyer, for example, sees "participatory democratic self­
government" as a core constitutional value, and he urges judges to pay 
it more attention.364 But the kind of participation he has in mind is 
what we already have. "[T]oday's citizen,'' he explains, "does 
participate in democratic self-governing processes."365 Here is how 
Justice Breyer describes that process: 
Serious complex changes in law are often made in the context of a 
national conversation involving, among others, scientists, engineers, 
businessmen and -women, and the media, along with legislators, j udges, 
and many ordinary citizens. . . . That conversation takes place through 
many meetings, symposia, and discussions, through journal articles and 
362. See, e.g. , Schroeder, supra note 339, at 1 16-17. 
363. This is a trade-off Schroeder stresses. See id. at 121-23. 
364. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 248 (2002). 
365. Id. at 249. 
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media reports, through legislative hearings and court cases. Lawyers 
participate fully in this discussion, translating specialized knowledge into 
ordinary English, defining issues, creating consensus. Typically, 
administrators and legislators then make decisions, with courts later 
resolving any constitutional issues that those decisions raise. This 
"conversation" is the participatory democratic process itself.366 
There is good reason for the quotation marks around 
"conversation." Breyer's version of participatory democracy is far 
from the face-to-face deliberation that Dewey had in mind, and even 
further from the romantic existentialism of "the experimental 
collective." It is far from anything we ordinarily think of as a 
"conversation."  It is not really a "conversation" at all; the term 
functions here as an apologetic metaphor. It suggests that our system 
is democratic, and its decisions therefore entitled to respect, because it 
is "open to participation," and participation of a relatively attenuated 
sort.367 As we will see, it is this apologetic, status-quo version of 
participatory democracy that has wound up having the greatest impact 
on criminal procedure law and scholarship. 
C. The Allure of the Past 
There is an additional way in which the rhetoric of participatory 
democracy has become more conservative. This has to do with the 
waning attraction of modernity. The student radicals who popularized 
"participatory democracy" in the 1960s had conflicting attitudes about 
industrialization and urbanization. The ideal of the "experimental 
collective," associated with the "authenticity" strand of their thinking, 
drew heavily on the values of modern urban life: "spontaneity, 
imagination, passion, playfulness, movement - the sensation of being 
on edge, at the limits of freedom."368 The Port Huron Statement took 
notice of "the growing complex of 'city' problems," but it attributed 
366. Id. at 263. 
367. Id. at 253 (emphasis added). The watered-down, status-quo version of participatory 
democracy forms a key part - probably the rhetorical core - of "contented republicanism," 
one of the four democratic "discourses" that political scientists John Dryzek and Jeffrey 
Berejikian identified in the cross-section of Americans they studied in the early 1990s. John 
S. Dryzek & Jeffrey Berejikian, Reconstructive Democratic Theory, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
48, 52 (1993). Contented republicans treat "political equality as an established fact," perceive 
"no structural impediments" to more extensive participation, and believe that politics is 
"already pervaded by public spirit," so that "all that needs to be done is to make the most of 
it." Id. at 55, 58. Tellingly, none of the four discourses found by Dryzek and Berejikian 
include the key tenets of pluralism: "the aggregation and articulation of preferences through 
organized interest groups, leavened by a democracy that can be only representative, never 
direct." John S. Dryzek, The Informal Logic of Institutional Design, in THE THEORY OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 103, 117 (Robert E. Goodwin ed., 1996). 
368. MILLER, supra note 313, at 147. On this theme, see also KENNETH KENISTON, 
YOUNG RADICALS: NOTES ON COMMITTED YOUTH 275-77 (1968). 
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those problems not to urbanization but to "the present system of 
economic priorities and lack of public planning."369 The solution was 
not a retreat from modernity but the forward-looking creation of a 
new "model city."370 On the other hand, though, the "consensus" 
strand of participatory democracy, the strand inherited from Arnold 
Kaufman and C. Wright Mills, was conceived from the outset as an 
exercise in intellectual recovery, an effort to restore pride of place to 
ideas and forms of social interaction that modernity had pushed aside. 
There was a mild touch of nostalgia to the enterprise, stronger and 
more calculated in the case of Mills than in the case of Kaufman.371 
The element of nostalgia in New Left rhetoric grew more pronounced 
as the decade progressed. It resonated with a key theme of the 
counterculture: the desire to return to simpler, more honest ways of 
living. And it fed and in turn drew strength from the romantic 
portrayal of the Vietnamese Communists as pure-hearted practitioners 
of '"rice-roots' democracy."372 
There was rarely anything that sentimental in the academic 
defenses of participatory democracy that began to emerge in the 
1970s. But the theme of intellectual recovery remained pronounced, 
particularly in work associated with the "consensus" strand of 
participatory democracy.373 In this way the academic literature on 
participatory democracy differed strikingly from the work of the 
pluralists, who saw themselves as developing a new, more 
sophisticated account of democracy. The backward-looking posture of 
the "consensus" strand of participatory democracy grew more 
noticeable in the "republican revival" of the 1980s, and it can be found 
as well in some of the recent calls for deliberative democracy. 
The chief function of intellectual recovery in the literature on 
participatory democracy and deliberative democracy has been as a 
tool of critique. But the backward-looking posture of much of that 
literature has also helped to give it an anti-modern spin. Coupled with 
the rhetoric of consensus, deliberation, and reason, the tum to the past 
has helped to make theories of participatory democracy and 
deliberative democracy compatible, in ways pluralism never was, with 
the values of order, decorum, and public safety. Those values are in 
strong tension with the experimental, "authenticity" strand of 1960s­
style participatory democracy, and they are downplayed in academic 
discussions of participatory democracy that draw on that strand. But 
369. The Port Huron Statement, supra note 314, at 366. 
370. Id. 
371. See, e.g. , MILLS, supra note 24, at 350-61. On Mills's use of "classical democracy" as 
a Weberian ideal-type, see MILLER, supra note 313, at 83-91. 
372. STAUGHTON LYND & THOMAS HAYDEN, THE OTHER SIDE 200 (1966). 
373. See, e.g., MANSBRIDGE, supra note 337; PATEMAN, supra note 36. 
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the theme of authenticity finds no place in the dominant tradition of 
scholarship on participatory democracy, the tradition that includes 
civic republicanism and deliberative democracy. Nor is it part of the 
mainstream, apologetic version of participatory democracy. In most of 
its current forms, therefore, participatory democracy tends to highlight 
the importance of order and public safety. It lacks the enthusiasm the 
pluralists had for the spontaneity and freedom of modern urban life. 
(Some of that enthusiasm, of course, was in fact a casualty of the 
radical experimentalism of the late 1960s, or more precisely of the 
backlash it elicited - the backlash that fueled Nixon's 1968 "law and 
order" campaign, and that made "The Andy Griffith Show" the 
highest rated television series of 1967-68.)374 
* * *  
We are now in a position to summarize what the various theories 
of participatory democracy and deliberative democracy have to say 
about the purposes, processes, proximity, and particularity of 
democracy.375 We will start with processes, because this is the area in 
which these theories are most in accord. Even here, the answers 
provided by postpluralist democratic theory are far less unified and 
consistent than the answers provided by pluralism. Once we get to the 
other elements of democratic theory, the range of disagreement 
becomes even broader. 
Processes. Theories of participatory democracy and deliberative 
democracy reject the pluralists' reliance on leadership elites, group 
competition, and periodic elections. They insist on the centrality of 
what pluralism scorned: widespread political participation. They tend 
to share the pluralists' assumption that democracy is more a matter of 
culture than of institutions. But the cultural patterns they emphasize 
are different: instead of bargaining and adherence to "rules of the 
game," we have public spiritedness, political engagement, authenticity 
(in the case of 1960s-style participatory democracy), empowerment (in 
the case of scholarship drawing on the "authenticity" strand), and/or a 
commitment to reason and civility (in the cases of civic republicanism, 
deliberative democracy, and the "consensus" strand of 1 960s-style 
participatory democracy). 
Purposes. Theories of participatory democracy and deliberative 
democracy largely reject the assumption of democratic pluralism that 
democracy is simply a procedural tool for avoiding instability and 
374. See MILLER, supra note 313, at 6. On the resurgence in the 1970s of the "anti­
modern" themes of "tradition, order, hierarchy, and authority," see GARLAND, supra note 
280, at 98-102. 
375. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
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authoritarianism. But the newer theories disagree regarding the 
purposes to be substituted for those of the pluralists. The radical 
version of participatory democracy championed in the 1960s followed 
Arnold Kaufman in emphasizing the importance of politics in human 
development. The more recent, mainstream version of participatory 
democracy stresses the role played by participation in making people 
feel connected to and satisfied with their government. And 
deliberative democracy sees democracy first and foremost as a 
prerequisite for political legitimacy. 
Proximity. Participatory democracy in the 1960s was a form of 
critique; it stressed the distance between true democracy and the 
current state of American politics. The more mainstream version of 
participatory democracy that began emerging in the 1970s turned 
participatory democracy into a rhetoric of apology. The key difference 
between this new version of participatory democracy and the older, 
1960s version was that the new version was much less demanding; the 
"participation" it envisioned was much closer to what already existed. 
Deliberative democracy, for its part, is first and foremost a theory of 
the democratic ideal, with no necessary implications for the question 
of proximity. Advocates of deliberative democracy often seem to 
assume, however, that we are sufficiently close to the ideal that the 
problem of the second-best can be overlooked. 
Particularity. Participatory democracy and deliberative democracy 
have sometimes been developed in ways that suggest the American 
experience is in fact sufficiently unique so that foreign comparisons 
are unlikely to be helpful. (This has been particularly true of some of 
the scholarship on civic republicanism.) But the new theories do not 
share the strong, consistent theme of American exceptionalism found 
in democratic pluralism. 
IV. PARTICIPATION, DELIBERATION, AND POLICING 
I turn now to the ways in which criminal procedure, and our ideas 
about the police more broadly, have reflected the slow shift away from 
democratic pluralism and toward theories of participatory democracy 
and deliberative democracy. The course of influence here was not as 
smooth as in the case of pluralism; it was punctuated and redirected in 
important ways by the extraordinary politics of the late 1960s. Before 
examining the ways in which today's criminal procedure law and 
scholarship reflects the turn away from pluralism, I need to discuss 
some false starts and lost opportunities: the neighborhood policing 
movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s and the efforts around the 
same time to bring a measure of workplace democracy to policing. The 
fate of those initiatives is bound up with the history of the New Left, 
with the nature of police activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and 
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with the emergence, in the 1980s, of "community policing" as the new 
orthodoxy of law enforcement. 
A. The Police and the Sixties 
To a degree that now appears remarkable, the police figured 
hardly at all in the early thinking of student radicals in the 1960s. The 
Port Huron Statement, rarely faulted for brevity or narrow focus, says 
not a word about the police. By the end of the decade, of course, 
police - often in riot gear - had become a fixture of New Left 
iconography.376 In retrospect this seems a predictable manifestation of 
themes present in New Left thinking from the outset: the 
rebelliousness, the suspicion of authority, the "anti-institutionalism."377 
But it also reflected the course of protest politics in the 1960s, a 
sequence of events only partly determined by the ideology of student 
activists. 
To begin with, the escalating war in Vietnam pushed the student 
movement beyond tactics of lawful protest and into increasing conflict 
with the police, confrontations that culminated in the debacle outside 
the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago and, two years later, in 
the shootings at Kent State. During this same period, Black protest 
grew more militant, and urban rioting became widespread. The police 
response to all of these events was often disproportionate, 
unsophisticated, emotional, and inflammatory. 
The urban rioting itself was typically sparked by police activity and 
fueled in significant part by accumulated resentment of law 
enforcement in the inner city. Among the causes of that resentment 
were some of the central achievements of police professionalism: the 
insulation of police departments from local political control; the 
militaristic training of officers; the replacement of precinct stations 
and foot patrols with centrally dispatched patrol cars; the aggressive 
employment of the "stop and frisk";  and personnel policies -
including standardized entry examinations and the elimination of 
residency requirements - that severely limited the hiring of minority 
376. See, e.g. , BENJAMIN BARBER, THE DEATH OF COMMUNAL LIBERTY: A HISTORY 
OF FREEDOM IN A SWISS MOUNTAIN CANTON 273-75 (1974). An outdoor assembly of 
thoughtful alpine villagers, photographed heroically from below, appears over the caption 
"Direct Democracy." To illustrate "Representative Democracy," Barber selected a 
photograph of police dragging away a protester. Id. 
377. Flacks, supra note 330, at 56-58; see also, e.g., MILLER, supra note 313, at 7 (setting 
student politics of the 1960s in the context of a broader, "unfettered cultural spirit," in which 
"musicians, movie directors, and student radicals all tried to lay waste to some part of the old 
order: no more melody, no more narrative, no more governing structure; no taste, no reason, 
no law and order"). 
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officers.378 In combination, these practices alienated the police from 
inner-city residents, contributed to widespread racism among the 
police, and sharpened the sense in which the police officer in the 
ghetto seemed, in James Baldwin's resonant words, "like an occupying 
soldier in a bitterly hostile country. "379 
But the police were controversial in the late 1960s for reasons that 
went beyond their operational practices. The police themselves 
entered the political fray, vocally and visibly. They complained bitterly 
about their public image, they attacked the restrictions imposed. on 
them by the Supreme Court, they spoke out against left-wing groups 
ranging from the Communist Party to the Black Muslims to the 
ACLU, and they organized against efforts to insert civilians into police 
disciplinary procedures. All of this occurred not just at the level of 
police executives but also at the level of the rank and file. Law 
enforcement unionism, long crippled by the public backlash against a 
failed strike by Boston police officers in 1919, began to surge in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, and in a strongly politicized form. The 
rallying issues included not only working conditions and compensation 
but also, crucially, opposition to civilian review boards and related 
efforts at police reform.380 And these were some of the tamer forms of 
police politics in the late 1960s. The less tame forms included active 
participation in reactionary organizations, organized brutality against 
political protesters, open defiance of civilian authorities, and vigilante 
attacks on Black militants.381 
By the end of the 1970s, when policing was among the most heavily 
organized of all public occupations, police unions had joined "the 
mainstream of American trade unionism," devoting the bulk of their 
attention to working conditions, job security, and the "bread-and­
butter . . .  issues that have been near and dear to the hearts of U.S. 
trade unionists for decades."382 But the politically charged nature of 
police organizing in the late 1960s and early 1970s left two lasting 
impacts on efforts to bring participatory democracy to policing. The 
first had to do with community supervision of police departments, and 
the second had to do with efforts to give police officers themselves a 
degree of democratic control over the nature of their work. 
378. See, e.g. , FOGELSON, supra note 251, at 243-68. 
379. JAMES BALDWIN, NOBODY KNOWS MY NAME: MORE NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 66 
(1962). 
380. See supra notes 302-303. 
381. See, e.g. , FOGELSON, supra note 251, at 239-42; LASCH, supra note 52, at 206-07; 
SKOLNICK, POLITICS OF PROTEST, supra note 4, at 183-88. 
382. John Thomas Delaney & Peter Feuille, Police, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN 
AMERICAN INDUSTRY: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 265, 
301 (David B. Lipsky & Clifford B. Donn eds., 1987); see also, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 
302, at 93-99. 
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The first set of effects was more obvious. Rank-and-file police 
organizations actually succeeded in killing off civilian review boards by 
the end of the 1960s, suing to invalidate Philadelphia's Police Advisory 
Board, launching a successful ballot referendum to abolish New York 
City's Civilian Complaint Review Board, and fighting off efforts to 
create similar panels in other cities.383 The victory proved transitory. 
Civilian oversight boards began to reappear in the 1970s, particularly 
in the wake of Watergate, and have continued to spread. Today 
Samuel Walker counts roughly 100 police agencies across the country 
subject to some form of citizen oversight, including eighty percent of 
the departments in the fifty largest cities. Citizen oversight, he 
concludes, is now "firmly established as an important feature of 
American policing."384 Still, the strong resistance that police unions 
initially displayed to civilian review boards (and, in many cases, have 
continued to display),385 succeeded in making panels of this kind the 
central battleground of police reform throughout the 1970s and well 
into the 1980s. It drew attention away from other, more far-reaching 
proposals for reasserting public control over policing. If the relatively 
mild notion of civilian review of disciplinary decisions was 
controversial, anything more radical seemed off the table. 
There was another reason, also associated with the politics of the 
late 1960s, that proposals for strong community control of police 
departments never gained traction. The proposals became tainted by 
their association with militant forms of left-wing radicalism. An 
important case in point was the 197 1  ballot measure in Berkeley that 
would have reorganized the city's police into three neighborhood­
based departments, each governed by a separate, elected council of 
civilians. The proposal lost by a two-to-one vote.386 Even some liberals 
sympathetic to police reform had doubts about the plan,387 but the real 
cause of the lopsided defeat may have been the ballot measure's 
association with the Black Panthers (who provided the impetus for the 
proposal) and certain other radical groups (who conspicuously 
supported it). Jerome Skolnick, who thought the proposal flawed but 
deserving of serious consideration, complained at the time that a 
favorable vote had been "made to appear a vote for the kind of people 
who go around screaming 'Off the Pigs. "'388 
383. See, e.g. , FOGELSON, supra note 251 ,  at 284-86. 
384. WALKER, supra note 302, at 40. 
385. See, e.g. , Michael Fehr, The 1992 Police Civilian Review Board Controversy in San 
lose, in POLICE ASSOCIATION POWER, POLITICS, AND CONFRONTATION: A GUIDE FOR THE 
SUCCESSFUL POLICE LABOR LEADER 259 (John Burpo et al. eds., 1997). 
386. See, e.g. , FOGELSON, supra note 251 ,  at 296-300. 
387. See, e.g. , GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 145. 
388. Skolnick, supra note 13, at 372. 
1774 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1699 
The defeat of the ballot measure drew nationwide notice. If efforts 
to bring the police under neighborhood control failed even in 
Berkeley, the prospects for success elsewhere seemed dim. And, in 
fact, similar proposals, also tainted by association with left-wing 
militants, were easily defeated in Chicago and Washington, D.C. By 
the middle of the 1970s the movement for neighborhood control of 
policing seemed dead.389 "Community policing," which came into 
vogue in the 1980s and has stayed in vogue ever since, shares some of 
the rhetoric of the earlier movement but, as we will see, abandons its 
commitment to giving neighborhoods true control over the police.390 
B. Police Departments as Workplaces 
If police activism helped to take proposals for strong community 
control of policing permanently off the table, it ironically had a similar 
effect on proposals to bring participatory democracy inside police 
departments, efforts to give police officers themselves significant 
control over the nature of their work. Much of the thinking about 
participatory democracy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly 
the "consensus" strand of that thinking, focused on the workplace as 
the ideal locus of collective self-determination. Workplaces were small 
enough for true face-to-face discussions and important enough to 
make participation manifestly worthwhile.391 For a brief moment at the 
end of the 1960s, it looked as though workplace democracy might 
become a theme of efforts at police reform. William Westley, when his 
doctoral dissertation was finally published in 1970, suggested that the 
alienated and repressive mentality of the police could be remedied in 
part by encouraging police unionization and "involving as many 
policemen as possible in decision making on all aspects of the 
department's job."392 He was echoing George Berkley, who had argued 
a year earlier that strong, democratic police unions and widespread 
participation by officers in departmental decisionmaking would help 
train the police in the "rules and values" of democracy.393 But the 
389. See FOGELSON, supra note 251, at 300. 
390. See Michael E. Buerger, The Limits of Community, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
COMMUNITY POLICING: TESTING THE PREMISES, supra note 17, at 270; Frug, supra note 13, 
at 81. 
391. See, e.g. , DAVID JENKINS, JOB POWER: BLUE AND WHITE COLLAR DEMOCRACY 
(1973); MANSBRIDGE, supra note 337, at 278-302; PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND 
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); PATEMAN, supra note 36, at 109-10. 
392. WESTLEY, supra note 14, at xvii. 
393. BERKLEY, supra note 1, at 29-39. John Angell carried the argument even further in 
1971. The "basic hope for correcting the dysfunctional trends of American police 
organizations," he suggested, was to bring policing in line with the participatory, "humanistic 
democratic values of the United States," especially as reflected in "the trend toward 
employee involvement in decision-making processes." John E. Angell, Toward .an 
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frightening form taken by police activism in the late 1960s soon dulled 
the appetite of virtually all scholars and police reformers for bringing 
workplace democracy to law enforcement. 
Still, support lingered throughout the 1970s for giving police 
officers a certain kind of voice in the management of their work. Calls 
for thoroughgoing democracy within police departments, along the 
lines suggested by Berkley and Westley, quickly went out of fashion. 
But several departments experimented in the 1970s with "team 
policing," a loosely defined idea that generally involved a designated 
group of officers working cooperatively and with a degree of collective 
operational autonomy to address the problem of a particular 
neighborhood.394 Those experiments drew support, in part, from an 
emerging interest, among social scientists in the 1970s, in the notion 
that rank-and-file police officers could and should contribute 
intellectually to the improvement of police tactics and procedures. The 
general theme of this scholarship was that police work, and 
particularly the commonplace tasks of peacekeeping, required far 
greater skill and understanding than had previously been 
acknowledged, and that getting officers to think explicitly and 
systematically about their jobs would make them more effective and 
less alienated. 
The first of these advantages - greater effectiveness - was 
stressed most famously by Egon Bittner, who argued that policing 
needed to become a true profession, with its own traditions of 
scholarship and research-based academic programs.395 Bittner thought 
it was for "scholarly policemen," not law professors or social scientists, 
to "develop an intellectually credible version of what police work 
should be like."3% He had no illusions that academic training, even in 
the hands of "scholarly policemen," could teach aspiring officers 
everything they needed to know. But he thought it could give them 
Alternative to the Classic Police Organizational Arrangements: A Democratic Model, 9 
CRIMINOLOGY 185, 187, 193-94 (1971). That required, among other things, abolishing the 
chain of command. Id. at 194-95. Angeli's ideas attracted a good deal of attention from 
police executives in the early 1970s, although the notion of eliminating middle management 
proved too radical even for reform-minded departments. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, 
Middle Management and Police Democratization: A Reply to John E. Angell, 12 
CRIMINOLOGY 363 (1975); John E. Angell, The Democratic Model Needs a Fair Trial: 
Angeli's Response, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1975). 
394. See, e.g. , PETER B. BLOCH & DAVID SPECHT, NEIGHBORHOOD TEAM POLICING 
(1973); WILLIAM G. GAY ET AL., NEIGHBORHOOD TEAM POLICING (1977); LAWRENCE W. 
SHERMAN ET AL., TEAM POLICING: SEVEN CASE STUDIES (1973). 
395. EGON BITTNER, THE FuNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY (1970), 
reprinted in EGON BITTNER, ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 89, 162-68 (1990). On Bittner's 
impact, see, for example, William D. Darrough, Book Review, 70 Soc. FORCES 846 (1992), 
and P.K. Manning, Book Review, 20 CONTEMP. Soc. 435 (1991). 
396. BITTNER, supra note 395, at 166. 
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what it gave, say, lawyers: a set of "generalized methods and 
approaches to facts and problem solving," an inquisitive and studious 
frame of mind, and habits of methodical, dispassionate reasoning.397 
William Muir echoed and expanded some of these themes in a 
widely praised study published in 1977.398 Muir did not call for 
academic schools of policing staffed by officers-turned-scholars. But 
he did think it crucial for police officers to engage in ongoing and 
collective reflection about the nature of their work. He thought this 
was how officers became mature, fair-minded, and wise - how they 
became, in short, people who could be trusted with power. Muir was 
highly impressed with the efforts that Chief Charles Gain made to 
infuse the work of the Oakland Police Department with "dignity and 
moral meaning" by satisfying officers' "appetite for understanding."399 
Gain ran the department from 1967 to 1973. He ruled with a heavy 
hand and was never popular with the rank and file; in 1971 the 
Oakland Police Officers' Association voted no confidence in his 
administration. But he was a dedicated reformer, and his vision of 
reform included encouraging many of the same qualities of mind that 
Bittner thought police officers needed: inquisitiveness, methodical 
reasoning, and self-reflection. To that end he overhauled the 
department's training program, "inviting participation, discussion, 
argument, and questioning in every class,"400 and he welcomed outside 
researchers interested in police reform. 
Three of those researchers themselves mimicked Gain's approach, 
asking a specially recruited group of rank-and-file officers to come up 
with ways to reduce violence between officers and citizens. With the 
outside scholars serving largely as consultants, the officers set their 
own agenda, carried out their own research, and devised their own 
proposals. One of those proposals, a "Peer Review Panel" for 
counseling and assisting officers with a history of violent encounters, 
appeared to prove effective. The scholars came away impressed with 
the ability of rank-and-file officers to serve as "agents of change,'' not 
only in the day-to-day operation of the Peer Review Panel, but also in 
coming up with the idea for the panel, and in carrying out the research 
on which it was based.401 
397. Id. at 165. 
398. MUIR, supra note 303. 
399. Id. at 253. 
400. Id. 
401. TOCH ET AL., supra note 303. The study was reprinted and expanded in HANS 
TOCH & J. DOUGLAS GRANT, POLICE AS PROBLEM SOLVERS (1991). The Peer Review 
Panel and many of Gain's other innovations were eliminated by Gain's successor for 
budgetary reasons. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DA YID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: 
POLICE INNOVATION IN SIX AMERICAN CITIES 151-52 (1986). Toch and Grant note that 
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The thrust of all this work - Bittner's, Muir's, the Oakland 
violence study, and to a lesser extent the "team policing" movement 
- was to embrace police discretion and to find ways to make its 
exercise more informed, methodical, and collectively self-reflective, 
rather than to control discretion from above (the strategy of "second 
wave" police professionalism) or from outside (the idea behind 
judicial oversight and civilian review boards).402 The idea harked back, 
in a way, to a distinction the sociologist Reinhard Bendix had drawn in 
the late 1950s between totalitarian and nontotalitarian responses to 
the "strategies of independence" adopted by employees in a 
bureaucracy - responses, that is to say, to employees' "tacit evasion 
of rules and norms" through the application of individual judgment.403 
Bendix suggested that totalitarian regimes sought systematically to 
suppress independent judgment by employees, while nontotalitarian 
regimes sought to capitalize on it, through "managerial appeals . . .  
addressed to the good faith of subordinates."404 Skolnick drew 
explicitly on Bendix's distinction and saw clearly the tension it created 
with efforts to rein in police discretion. The "dilemma of the police in 
democratic society," Skolnick suggested, "arises out of the conflict 
between the extent of initiative contemplated by nontotalitarian 
norms of work and restraints upon police demanded by the rule of 
law."405 Skolnick found "forceful normative claims" on each side of 
this conflict, but ultimately his primary allegiance was to "the ideal of 
legality," which he took to be the "highest stated commitment" of 
"democratic society."406 Scholars like Bittner and Muir struck the 
balance the other way. Skolnick's position, as we have seen, was 
consistent in important ways with democratic pluralism; Bittner's and 
"[t]he Oakland police began to experience violence problems almost soon as the 
interventions were discontinued." TOCH & GRANT, supra at 85. 
402. See also, e.g. , DAVID H. BAYLEY & HAROLD MENDELSOHN, MINORffiES AND THE 
POLICE: CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA 198-200 (1969) (calling police officers "exceedingly 
knowledgeable . . .  about the requirements for successful police work," noting that their 
knowledge remained "unorganized and unexploited," and arguing that officers "must begin 
openly and creatively to study and discuss the discretionary aspects of their work"). 
403. See Reinhard Bendix, Industrialization, Ideologies, and Social Structure, 24 AM. 
Soc. REV. 613, 619-22 (1959), reprinted in REINHARD BENDIX, WORK AND AUTHORITY IN 
INDUSTRY 434, 444-48 (Harper Torchbook 1963) (1956). On Bendix, see Paul Hollander, In 
Pursuit of the Great Questions of History: Reinhard Bendix and American Sociology, 20 
CONTEMP. Soc. 762 (1991). 
404. Bendix, supra note 403, at 619-22. 
405. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 2, at 231-32. 
406. Id. at 230. 
1778 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1699 
Muir's were consistent with increased sympathy in the 1970s for 
notions of participatory democracy.407 
During the 1980s, though, views like Bittner's and Muir's grew 
marginalized, and, except among line police officers themselves, the 
taste for bringing even a mild form of workplace democracy to 
policing all but disappeared.408 Team policing remained a "buzz phrase 
in police circles," but it lost its earlier connotation of participatory 
management.409 The diminished enthusiasm for giving police officers 
greater control over the nature of their work likely had several causes: 
lingering concerns with the disturbing character of police organizing in 
the late 1960s; escalating budgetary constraints and a correspondingly 
heightened emphasis on public sector managerialism; diminishing 
aversion to military-style hierarchy as the Vietnam War receded; and 
- a matter to which we return momentarily - monopolization of the 
police reform agenda by community policing. Possibly, too, the 
growing power of police unions made it more difficult for departments 
to explore new strategies of collaborative decisionmaking that 
circumvented seniority systems or bypassed the union hierarchy.410 By 
the 1990s, in any event, the idea of employee participation had largely 
dropped off the screen of police reform. The theme is entirely absent, 
for example, from a recent, otherwise balanced encyclopedia article on 
police and democracy by the sociologist Gary Marx, despite the fact 
that both Berkley and Muir appear in the bibliography.41 1  
C.  The New Orthodoxy 
And so we come to community policing. Writing in 1977, Robert 
Fogelson noted that critics of 1950s-style police professionalism, while 
proliferating, as yet lacked "anything like a military analogy or a 
professional model that might draw them together."412 A decade later 
407. In this regard, see also John M. Jermier & Leslie J. Berkes, Leader Behavior in a 
Police Command Bureaucracy: A Closer Look at the Quasi-Military Model, 24 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 1 ,  16-19 (1979) (finding that "participative leadership" raised the morale of police 
officers, and suggesting that "much of police authoritarianism and perhaps police brutality" 
might be traceable to "the authoritarian command model"). 
408. Among the holdouts were GUYOT, supra note 17, and TOCH & GRANT, supra note 
401. 
409. SKOLNICK & BAYLEY, supra note 401, at 214-15. Writing in 1986, Skolnick and 
Bayley identified "three dimensions of strategic change" lumped together by the phrase 
"team policing": "decentralization of command, integration of service delivery, and 
mobilization of communities in their own defense." Id. at 215. 
410. See, e.g. , id. at 160. 
411. Gary T. Marx, Police Power, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEMOCRACY 954 (Seymour 
Martin Lipset ed., 1995) . A revised version of the essay appears as Gary T. Marx, Police and 
Democracy, in POLICING, SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 35. 
412. FOGELSON, supra note 251, at 301. 
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that assessment seemed quaintly anachronistic. Community policing 
was by the late 1980s what it remains today: the orthodoxy of police 
reformers and law enforcement executives alike. It is an orthodoxy 
notorious for meaning different things to different people, but at its 
core lies a rejection of the form of police professionalism that came to 
be epitomized by the Los Angeles Police Department under William 
Parker: arrogant, heavy-handed, technologically driven, and aloof.413 
Much of the spirit of the community policing movement was 
anticipated in the criticism that began to be leveled at the LAPD in 
the 1960s. Paul Jacobs's 1966 critique in the Atlantic, for example, 
condemned Parker's repressive tactics, particularly in minority areas 
of Los Angeles, but made clear that " [t]he overwhelming majority of 
the people living in the ghettos of Los Angeles are not seeking to rid 
their communities of the police."414 Rather they wanted a different 
kind of police. They wanted the police to take time to learn about the 
people they patrolled, to shift their emphasis away from arrests, and 
"to act as the lady from Watts remembered they once did, to 'come to 
the house and talk to the kids if they did something bad. "'415 
The notion that the police should work with communities, rather 
than against them, became the heart of the community policing 
movement. The theme is community partnership, not community 
control: with minor exceptions, community policing programs are 
implemented unilaterally by the police.416 Still, from the outset the 
movement has appealed in part to the sense that community policing is 
"more democratic than conventional policing," because it improves 
"the public's capacity to influence policing."417 Underlying this appeal 
have been ideas about democracy far more congruent with 
participatory democracy than with democratic pluralism. 
We will return repeatedly to the linkages between participatory 
democracy and community policing in the pages that follow, but a few 
of the connections are worth noting now. First, and most obviously, 
the rhetoric of community policing drew heavily on the emphasis that 
participatory democracy placed on the involvement of ordinary 
citizens, precisely the political mechanism the pluralists had spurned 
413. For a sympathetic overview of the new orthodoxy, see Debra Livingston, Police 
Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New 
Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997). 
414. Paul Jacobs, The Los Angeles Police: A Critique, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1966, at 95, 101. 
415. Id. 
416. See, e.g. , Buerger, supra note 390, at 270-71; Frug, supra note 13, at 81. 
417. Peter K. Manning, Community Policing as a Drama of Control, in COMMUNITY 
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY, supra note 17, at 27, 43; see also, e.g. , Michael C. Dorf & 
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 
327-32 (1998). 
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above others. Of equal importance, the new rhetoric typically assumed 
the existence of a unitary, easily defined "community" or "public" -
also an assumption the pluralists had rejected, and an assumption for 
which the community policing movement has frequently been 
faulted.418 Finally, the community policing movement has included 
from the get-go an element of nostalgia for a friendlier and more 
orderly past, the past recalled by "the lady from Watts." The very 
phrase "community policing" summons forth images of clean, safe 
sidewalks walked by "beat cops (usually with brogues) giving 
homespun and salubrious advice. "419 The nostalgia wrapped up in the 
term - out of keeping with pluralism's embrace of modernity but fully 
in step with certain versions of participatory democracy - contributed 
significantly to its ambiguity: the 1950s represented both the apogee of 
the policing practices that the new movement purported to reject, and 
the golden age of orderliness it sought to recover. Aggressive "stop 
and frisk" campaigns, for example, might be a hallmark of heavy­
handed police professionalism, but they also could be (and were) 
justified as efforts to "work with communities" in restoring a sense of 
safety and order.420 
D .  Antipluralism in Contemporary Criminal Procedure 
The emergence of community policing as the new common 
language of police reform coincided with the end of the Burger Court 
and the beginning of the Rehnquist Court. William Rehnquist was 
elevated to Chief Justice in 1986, the same year that Antonin Scalia 
was appointed to the Supreme Court. By the early 1990s, the 
Rehnquist Court was beginning to chart a distinctive course in 
criminal procedure, often with Scalia's prodding. During this same 
period the academic field of criminal procedure changed, too. There is 
widespread agreement about that, if not on the precise nature of the 
change or even its general direction. What seems clear is that the 
418. See, e.g. , Buerger, supra note 390, at 272-73; Carl B. Klockars, The Rhetoric of 
Community Policing, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY, supra note 17, at 
239, 247-50; cf Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of "Community," 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 343. Not all arguments for community policing are vulnerable to this 
objection. David Thacher, for example, praises community policing for "exposing police 
more systematically to a diversity of values" and "putting a premium on their ability to 
secure cooperation from the groups that are committed to those values." David Thacher, 
Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 765, 795 (2001). But much 
of what makes Thacher's views interesting is precisely that they are unconventional. More 
about this later. See infra text accompanying notes 530-534. 
419. TOCH & GRANT, supra note 401, at 248. On the nostalgia of the community 
policing movement for a cleaner, more orderly past, see also Buerger, supra note 390, at 272, 
and Manning, supra note 417, at 30, 35. 
420. See, e.g. , HARCOURT, supra note 293, at 10, 19, 173-75, 177-78; Kahan & Meares, 
The Coming Crisis, supra note 305, at 1163. 
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generation of legal scholars who began writing about criminal 
procedure in the late 1980s and early 1990s approached the subject in 
different ways than their predecessors, whose careers and outlooks 
had been shaped so strongly by the controversies surrounding the 
Warren Court and its legacy. 
Criminal procedure scholars now are a diverse lot, and many, 
perhaps most, of them are sharply critical of the Rehnquist Court. Nor 
has the Rehnquist Court's approach to criminal procedure been 
entirely consistent. Nonetheless, I want to suggest there are some 
themes held in common both by some of the most important criminal 
procedure scholarship of the past decade and by some of the most 
interesting things the Supreme Court has had to say on the subject. 
The themes include an enthusiasm for community participation, a 
premium placed on transparency, a distrust of elites and expertise, a 
preoccupation with legitimacy, and a retreat from modernity. Each of 
these themes, I will suggest, is consistent with the shift away from 
pluralism as the dominant understanding of American democracy and 
toward theories of participatory democracy and deliberative 
democracy. Three other features of criminal procedure jurisprudence 
and scholarship today - the continued treatment of the police as a 
breed apart, the persistent de-emphasis of institutional structure, and 
the comparative neglect of inequality - reflect important points of 
continuity between pluralism and the theories which have supplanted 
it. 
In def ending these claims I will make no effort to survey 
contemporary criminal procedure scholarship comprehensively. Nor 
will I try to identify global motifs of the Rehnquist Court's approach 
to criminal procedure. In each case the field is too diverse .  Both at the 
level of jurisprudence and at the level of scholarship, criminal 
procedure is less unified and coherent than it was in Warren and 
Burger Court eras - just as democratic theory today is less unified 
and coherent than it was when pluralism was the reigning orthodoxy. 
So the discussion here necessarily will be selective. I will highlight 
certain, particularly noteworthy developments in criminal procedure 
jurisprudence and scholarship, developments that seem to reflect 
assumptions about American democracy that are different from the 
assumptions that animated criminal procedure in the years of the 
Warren and Burger Courts. 
On the scholarship side, I will focus chiefly on the work of Akhil 
Amar, Dan Kahan, and Tracey Meares. I should say a word or two 
about why - particularly since, although Kahan and Meares are 
frequent collaborators, grouping them with Amar may seem odd. 
Amar is famously textualist; his chief goal is to wring sense from the 
words of the Constitution. Kahan and Meares, in contrast, are 
concerned above all with contemporary problems of social control, 
1782 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 103:1699 
and Meares, in particular, is a committed empiricist.421 But the work of 
all three scholars merits special attention here, and for similar reasons. 
First, in each case it is exceptionally thoughtful work, cutting across 
traditional debates in criminal procedure. Whatever their faults, 
neither Amar nor Kahan nor Meares follows the pattern that people 
like Robert Weisberg already found tiresome more than a decade ago: 
attacking or defending the criminal procedure legacy of the Warren 
Court largely in the terms set by the Warren Court itself.422 All three 
scholars are creative, sophisticated, and quite self-conscious in urging a 
break with criminal procedure scholarship of the Warren and Burger 
Court eras. Second, the work of all three scholars has clearly touched 
nerves. Often (but not always) the ensuing debate has taken the form 
of an intergenerational dispute - adding to the impression that we are 
dealing here with something new. And, in each case, there is a 
widespread sense that the something new is somehow representative: 
these are scholars that seem to have "captured the moment."423 Third, 
more than many other criminal procedure scholars, Amar, Kahan, and 
Meares explicitly incorporate the theme of collective self-government 
into their work. All three scholars take democracy seriously. Fourth 
and finally, the very differences between Amar on the one hand and 
Kahan and Meares on the other will prove useful for a certain kind of 
analytic triangulation: their shared points of departure from traditional 
approaches to criminal procedure are less likely to be idiosyncratic 
and more likely to reflect broader intellectual trends. 
1. The Enthusiasm for Community Participation 
The rhetoric of community policing, as we have seen, appeals 
strongly to notions of popular participation in government, and more 
specifically to notions of community participation - notions, that is to 
say, that communities exist; that they have coherent views and 
421. See Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law 
and Procedure - And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851; Tracey L. Meares & 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (2000). 
422. See Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal 
Scholars, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 530-31 (1992). 
423. Ronald F. Wright, Book Review, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 557 (1997) (reviewing 
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 
(1997)); see also, e.g., Seidman, supra note 305, at 2282 (arguing that Amar's work 
"simultaneously symbolizes and helps propel the flood tide away from criminal procedure 
liberalism," and therefore forms "part of a significant movement that has produced a secular 
change in the politics of criminal procedure"). For comparable reactions to the work of 
Kahan and Meares, see, for example, HARCOURT, supra note 293, at 37-45; David Cole, 
Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice 
Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999); and Richard H. Pildes, The New Progressives, 
BOSTON REV., April/May 1999, at 21. 
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interests; and that law enforcement, and the criminal justice system 
more generally, can and should reflect those interests. These same 
notions are reflected in some of the most influential criminal 
procedure scholarship of the last decade or so; they are an important 
part of what makes that scholarship novel and important. 
Take, for example, Amar's widely discussed call for renewed 
reliance on civil juries to set appropriate bounds on law 
enforcement.424 Amar shares Tocqueville's famous enthusiasm for the 
jury as the preeminent instrument of participatory democracy. Like 
Tocqueville, Amar praises the jury both as a school of democratic 
virtue and as a site of popular sovereignty. Tocqueville thought the 
first function was the most important: he was unsure whether the jury 
was "useful to those who have lawsuits," but he was certain it instilled 
"practical intelligence and good political sense" in the jurors 
themselves.425 Amar, on the other hand, is much more taken with the 
jury as a vehicle for community control of the criminal justice system. 
He praises the educative role of the jury, but his argument here feels 
slight. First and foremost, the jury represents for Amar "the common 
sense of the common people. "426 
424. See, e.g. , Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 285, at 817-19; see 
also Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 
1 169 (1995) [hereinafter Amar, Reinventing Juries]. 
425. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 38, at 262. 
426. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 285, at 818; cf Akhil Reed 
Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 77 (2000) 
(praising "the sound instincts of ordinary Americans"); Akhil Reed Amar, Three Cheers 
(and Two Quibbles) for Professor Kennedy, 111  HARV. L. REV. 1256, 1265 n.26 (1998) 
[hereinafter Amar, Three Cheers] (arguing that juries "should function as the democratic 
lower house of a bicameral judiciary," facilitating "a common conversation affirming and 
nurturing a deliberative democracy"). Amar's work is part of a broader academic trend 
toward renewed appreciation for the virtues of juries as instruments of participatory and 
deliberative democracy. For other notable examples, see JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE 
JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 6 (1994) (praising juries for 
reflecting "the values and common sense of the people"); Lani Guinier, No Two Votes: The 
Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1485-87 (1991) (proposing "to 
promote the deliberative process" by restructuring local legislative bodies "in the image of 
the ideal, consensus-driven jury"); Jenia lontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 
89 VA. L. REv. 311 (2003) (describing the jury as a "model deliberative democratic body"); 
Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1533, 1538 (1993) (arguing that juries can and should provide "community representation in 
criminal trials"); and Richard A. Primus, When Democracy ls Not Self-Government: Toward 
a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal luries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417, 1420 (1997) 
(arguing that "[t]he conception of democracy most appropriate to juries" is a "form of 
deliberative democracy . . .  that sees deliberation as a means to the accurate discovery of 
exogenous facts"). The Supreme Court, too, now inclines toward seeing the jury as a model 
instrument of democracy. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (2004) (reasoning 
that "[j]ust as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive 
branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary"). 
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Or, closer to home, consider the enthusiasm that Kahan and 
Meares show for local communities taking law enforcement into their 
own hands.427 That enthusiasm extends not just to the direct 
involvement of private citizens in policing through volunteer patrols, 
campaigns of unofficial "shaming," and collaborations with law 
enforcement by churches and civic organizations. It also includes 
efforts by local governments to strike their own balances between 
liberty and security. If a particular community believes it needs, say, 
an aggressive anti-loitering policy to combat street gangs, or blanket 
inspection of homes for evidence of drug trafficking, Kahan and 
Meares think courts should look askance on claims that the policy 
violates civil liberties .428 Now that racial minorities "are no longer 
excluded from the nation's democratic political life," courts by and 
large should honor the outcome of the local democratic process.429 
Like Amar, Kahan and Meares share none of the discomfort the 
pluralists showed with widespread political participation. Also like 
Amar, they rest their argument on an assumption the pluralists found 
utterly untenable: that there exists, in any particular polity, an 
identifiable "public" or "community" position on controversial policy 
questions, embraced by ordinary citizens as well as political leaders, 
and rising above the narrow interests of particular groups.430 That 
assumption in turn rests on other beliefs, also rejected by the 
pluralists: that ordinary people are rational and well-informed about 
matters of public concern and that politics can and does proceed 
through reasoned discussion. Inner-city residents, in particular, "are 
427. See, e.g. , Kahan, Collective Action, supra note 12; Kahan & Meares, The Coming 
Crisis, supra note 305; Meares, Praying, supra note 12. For a more qualified argument along 
similar lines, see Livingston, supra note 413, at 646-50, 653-70. 
428. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural 
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197 (hereinafter Meares 
& Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking]. 
429. Id. at 207; see also, e.g. , Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are 
Wrong: Chicago's Paradox of Unwanted Rights, BOSTON REV., April/May 1999, at 4, 5 
(hereinafter Meares & Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong]; cf Craig Bradley, The Middle Class 
Fourth Amendment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1126-28 (2003) (suggesting that rising 
political power of racial minorities has rendered increasingly irrelevant "the great theme of 
the Warren Court - that the criminal justice system had to be massively reformed to protect 
the constitutional rights of all citizens"). 
430. This assumption is also shared by another important strand of contemporary 
criminal procedure scholarship: the strand calling for greater participation of victims in the 
criminal justice system. George Fletcher, for example, argues for increased participation of 
victims in criminal trials in order to "facilitate the public's expressing solidarity with victims." 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
257 (1995). On the growing use of criminal victimization to build social solidarity, see 
GARLAND, supra note 280, at 143-44; Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime 
Metaphors, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1035, 1042-43 (2002); and Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: 
Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1111, 1 128-35 
(2000). 
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reasonable people,"431 and if left to their own devices will decide 
questions of criminal procedure through a process of collective 
deliberation.432 
Now, Kahan and Meares do not write chiefly about democracy. As 
coauthors they are concerned first and foremost with the informal 
social mechanisms - the "norms" - of crime control. Nor is Amar 
writing mainly about democracy. The vision of democracy one 
encounters in the work of these scholars is largely implicit. For all that, 
the vision is recognizably rooted in the antipluralist tradition of 
participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. Here, for 
example, are Kahan and Meares: 
[T]he worst consequence of the ongoing commitment to the 1960s 
conception of rights may be its disempowering effect on inner-city 
communities. Criminologists have long recognized that . . .  crime both 
creates and is sustained by atomization and distrust, which in turn make 
it harder for individuals to engage in the cooperative self-policing 
characteristic of crime-free communities. A healthy democratic political 
life can help repair these conditions. That is precisely what residents of 
the inner city enjoy when they are free to decide for themselves whether 
to adopt building searches, gang-loitering ordinances, curfews and the 
like. Thus, in addition to standing in the way of potentially effective law­
enforcement policies, the 1960s conception of rights pre-empts 
deliberative experiences that reduce crime through their effect on public 
dispositions and habits.433 
It is all there: the concern with "atomization" and 
"disempowerment," the emphasis on cooperation and deliberation, 
the focus on habits of participation, and the metaphor of social 
"health. "434 The vision of participatory democracy invoked by Kahan 
and Meares is far from precise. They are vague, for example, regarding 
the contours of the inner-city "community," what it means for 
members of that community to decide matters "for themselves," and 
what the preconditions for "deliberative experiences" might be, other 
than the withdrawal of judicial oversight. Their vagueness on these 
matters is noteworthy, and we will return to it later. For now, though, 
the important points are these. First, Kahan and Meares, like Amar, 
draw on a vision of democracy. Second, that vision of democracy, 
431. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Meares and Kahan Respond, BOSTON REV., 
April/May 1999, at 22. 
432. Meares & Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, supra note 429, at 6. 
433. Id. ; accord Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 305, at 1 179. 
434. The health metaphor is also found in many discussions of community policing. The 
Oakland Police Department's early effort at community policing, for example, used the 
slogan "Beat Health." See SKOLNICK & BAYLEY, supra note 401, at 159-62. The idea of 
neighborhood "health" resonates strongly with the theme of orderliness, to which we will 
return below. 
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although thinly articulated, parts with pluralism in placing great weight 
on notions of community participation. Third and finally, the kind of 
participation that Kahan and Meares have in mind is, essentially, the 
kind of participation we already have today: the only structural change 
they propose is a relaxation of judicial review. Their argument is 
consistent with what I have called the status-quo version of 
participatory democracy.435 
An enthusiasm for community participation, even in its status-quo 
version, is difficult to reconcile with the thrust of current criminal 
procedure doctrine, most of which was constructed during the Warren 
and Burger Court eras and, as we have seen, echoes democratic 
pluralism both in stressing the protection of individual dignity and in 
giving little weight to majoritarianism. This is precisely the reason 
Kahan and Meares think that criminal procedure faces a "coming 
crisis."436 The Supreme Court has yet to modify criminal procedure 
doctrine to place greater weight on local participatory politics. But 
there are scattered signs that it may be moving in that direction. 
Community participation still plays no formal role in criminal 
procedure doctrine, but it has begun to be part of the rhetorical 
atmosphere of some of the Court's decisions. 
The change may be most striking in the Court's treatment of 
searches in public schools. The Burger Court had treated searches of 
students by school personnel the way it treated other searches by 
government agencies other than the police: subject to lesser restraints 
than police searches, but still requiring a "balance" between 
government objectives (here, the "need to maintain an environment in 
which learning can take place") and individual dignity ("the 
schoolchild's legitimate expectations of privacy").437 For the Burger 
Court, the notion that school teachers should be seen as agents of their 
students' parents - the old doctrine of in loco parentis - flew in the 
face of "contemporary reality. "438 Teachers and school administrators 
were not parents; they were "representatives of the State."439 In 
contrast, when the Rehnquist Court upheld a school district policy 
mandating drug testing for student athletes, Justice Scalia's opinion for 
the majority explicitly embraced the doctrine of in loco parentis and 
stressed, furthermore, that before adopting the policy the district had 
solicited the views of parents at a public meeting and that the parents 
435. See supra text accompanying notes 341-346. 
436. Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 305, at 1154. 
437. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). 
438. Id. at 336. 
439. Id. 
June 2005] Police and Democracy 1787 
in attendance all favored the proposed rule.440 Several years later, 
when the Court upheld a policy by a different school district requiring 
drug tests not just for athletes but for all students engaged in 
extracurricular activities, Justice Breyer took occasion to show the 
practical implications of the views he had expressed in his lecture on 
"participatory democratic self-government."441 Concurring in the 
Court's decision, Breyer emphasized that the local school board had 
held "public meetings designed to give the entire community 'the 
opportunity to be able to participate' in developing the drug policy."442 
Since the ultimate question of constitutional interpretation raised in 
the case seemed "close," Breyer thought it "important" that the school 
board had used a "democratic, participatory process to uncover and to 
resolve differences. "443 
Scalia and Breyer are not generally seen as kindred spirits. They 
have staked out starkly adverse positions, for example, on the 
appropriate methods of constitutional adjudication.444 When they are 
both drawn to emphasize community participation in thinking about 
student drug testing, despite the fact that current Fourth Amendment 
doctrine makes this factor irrelevant, something is afoot. 
The student drug testing cases are not, strictly speaking, cases 
about the police, even though the threat of police involvement always 
hovers in the background. But notions of community participation 
have also begun to seep into the rhetoric of cases addressing police 
practices, if only, so far, in the dissents. Take City of Chicago v. 
Morales,445 which addressed the constitutionality of a Chicago 
ordinance that criminalized loitering by gang members - an 
ordinance that Kahan and Meares defended as precisely the kind of 
"innovative community policing measures" that inner-city residents 
440. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650, 654-55, 665 (1995). Kahan and 
Meares read Vernonia to stand, in fact, for the proposition that "random drug-testing of 
student athletes is exempted from the warrant requirement" because parents, "who naturally 
take their children's interests to heart," have "significant influence in the political process." 
Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 305, at 1173. Well, yes and no. The political 
participation of parents played no role in the formal, doctrinal explanation the Court gave 
for its decision, but it surely was part of the rhetorical atmosphere of the Court's opinion. 
441. See supra notes 364-367 and accompanying text. 
442. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 841 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
443. Id. Predictably, Justice Breyer is also impressed with the democratic function juries 
serve in representing the moral sense of the community. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 
615-16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
444. Compare, for example, the textualist manifesto in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MA TIER 
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1977), with the call for greater 
attention to "real-world consequences" in Breyer, supra note 364, at 246-47, 249, 269-71 .  
445. 527 U.S. 41  (1999). 
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wanted and should be allowed to adopt.446 The Illinois courts struck 
the measure down on vagueness grounds, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed. For a majority of the justices, the case was not about 
community self-determination; it was about unconstrained police 
discretion.447 But the dissents, by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, 
saw the case roughly the same way as Kahan and Meares. Justice 
Thomas, in particular, pointed out that the ordinance was the product 
of a "democratic process" that included "extensive hearings" at which 
"[o]rdinary citizens" came forward to testify about gangs in their 
neighborhoods. 448 
The dissenters touched relatively lightly on this theme; their chief 
concern was not community participation but the need to allow police 
officers some discretion in order to maintain "a safe and orderly 
society."449 We will return to that concern below. For now, though, the 
most important point about the Supreme Court's decision in Morales 
is that democracy entered into the discussion only through the limited 
use that the dissenters made of the rhetoric of community 
participation and self-determination. The majority never tied its 
concerns about police discretion to any recognizable notion of 
democracy. There was no discussion of police states, no coded 
references to authoritarian mentalities.450 As a result, the focus on 
446. Kahan & Meares, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 428, at 198; see also 
Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 305, at 1166; Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. 
Meares, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 805, 820-21 
(1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Meares, Order in the Inner City]; Tracey L. Meares, Place and 
Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 700 (1998). When the Supreme Court took up Morales, 
Kahan and Meares filed an amicus brief on behalf of twenty Chicago neighborhood groups 
supporting the loitering law. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood 
Organizations in Support of Petitioner at 2, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) 
(No. 97-1121). Other neighborhood groups, and several prominent organizations 
representing members of racial minorities, joined amicus briefs opposing the ordinance. See 
Brief Amicus Curiae of See Foreverffhe Maya Angelou Public Charter School in Support of 
Respondents, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121); Brief of Amici 
Curiae National Black Police Association, et al., in Support of Respondents, City of Chicago 
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121); Brief of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood 
Safety, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 
U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121); Brief of National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, et 
al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) 
(No. 97-1 121). 
447. Morales, 527 U.S. at 60-64; see also id. at 70 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
448. Id. at 100-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 97-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined the dissent by Justice Thomas. Id. at 98. 
449. Id. at 87 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 98 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (charging 
that the Court had "unnecessarily sentenced law-abiding citizens to lives of terror and 
misery"). 
450. Professor Raymond points to other evidence that the trope of the police state may 
be going out of fashion in criminal procedure jurisprudence, or at least that consensus 
regarding the rhetoric's acceptability may be breaking down. See Raymond, supra note 240, 
at 1223-24. 
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police discretion felt a little rootless and insubstantial. Even two of the 
justices who joined in the judgment felt obliged to agree with Justice 
Thomas that "some degree of police discretion is necessary to allow 
the police 'to perform their peacekeeping responsibilities 
satisfactorily. "'451 
2. The Premium on Transparency 
The enthusiasm for community involvement in contemporary 
criminal procedure scholarship is accompanied by, and often overlaps 
with, an emphasis on the public exposure of policing strategies. This 
theme is muted in the work of Amar (although congenial to his focus 
on popular sovereignty), and it is largely absent from the work of 
Kahan and Meares. It is front and center, though, in Erik Luna's 
recent argument that democracy requires "transparent policing,'' by 
which he means visibility of what the police do and how they decide to 
do it.452 And Luna has good company. Jerome Skolnick, for example, 
has recently called openness "a master ideal of democratic policing,'' 
and William Bratton - who formerly headed New York City's police 
department and now is Chief of Police in Los Angeles - has stressed 
the need for police agencies to open themselves up to "scrutiny and 
public exposure."453 
Pluralism, with its emphasis on elites, made widespread 
dissemination of information about the government seem relatively 
unimportant - perhaps even counterproductive. Partly for this 
reason, public visibility of policing never became a central part of 
criminal procedure law or scholarship in the Warren and Burger Court 
eras. True, certain key rulings of the Warren Court were motivated by 
a concern about police secrecy. One thinks particularly of the rulings 
giving criminal defendants the right to counsel at custodial 
interrogations and postindictment lineups; in each case the Court 
made clear that part of its objective was to give defense counsel the 
451. Morales, 527 U.S. at 65 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 109 (Thomas, J . ,  
dissenting)). Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Id. at 64. That opinion 
was also notable for its pointed suggestions regarding how the Chicago ordinance might be 
redrafted to cure its vagueness. Id. at 66. The ordinance was subsequently reenacted in a 
form that incorporated most of Justice O'Connor's suggestions. See HARCOURT, supra note 
293, at 51-52; Erik Luna, Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1125, 
1 141-43 (2000). On the equivocal tone taken by the justices in the majority, see, for example, 
Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 
SUP. CT. REV. 141, 144-45. 
452. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2000). 
453. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, ON DEMOCRATIC POLICING 2 (1999); William J. Bratton, 
Dispelling New York 's Latest Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, § 4, at 19. For other echoes of 
Luna's argument, see, for example, William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, lll 
YALE L.J. 2137, 2167, 2180 (2002). 
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information they would later need to challenge the admissibility of 
evidence obtained improperly.454 The point, though, was to get 
information to the defense in order to improve the fairness of the 
adversarial process, not to expose the police to general public scrutiny. 
Theories of participatory democracy and deliberative democracy, 
on the other hand, make the broad visibility of government 
decisionmaking much more important.455 This may be particularly true 
of a status-quo theory of participatory democracy like the one Justice 
Breyer has defended: a theory that ties the legitimacy of our current 
system of government to the metaphorical "conversation" that takes 
place in the media, at public hearings, at professional meetings, and so 
on.456 Without disclosure, this conversation cannot take place; with 
disclosure, legitimacy becomes almost automatic. It is therefore not 
surprising that Luna draws heavily on rhetoric similar to Breyer's, 
stressing the role of transparency in "[e ]mpowering citizens," "giving 
them a voice in the decisionmaking process," and "establish[ing] a 
basis for trust in otherwise distrusting communities."457 
3. The Distrust of Elites and Expertise 
The enthusiasm for community involvement and the premium 
placed on public discussion are only two of the contemporary trends in 
criminal procedure that reflect a shift from democratic pluralism to 
theories of participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. 
Another is the strain of anti-elitism. This often takes the form, both in 
scholarship and in jurisprudence, of hostility to claims of professional 
expertise and pronounced distrust of the "political stratum" in which 
the pluralists placed so much confidence - particularly judges, 
administrators, and civil libertarians. 
The problem of police discretion, such a central preoccupation of 
Warren Court criminal procedure, exercises the current generation of 
criminal procedure scholars much less. Kahan and Meares are hardly 
454. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). 
455. See, e.g. , GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 339, at 95-127. 
456. See supra notes 364-366 and accompanying text. 
457. Luna, supra note 452, at 1120. Luna strives for a degree of catholicity regarding 
democratic theory; he claims that transparent policing is important under any plausible view 
of collective self-rule. Id. at 1130-31. But he sees only "two rough approaches to democratic 
decisionmaking in American politics: populism and progressivism." Id. at 1 127. That 
framework blurs the differences between varieties of participatory democracy, and it hides 
the significance of democratic pluralism by reducing it to simply another version of 
progressivism. The heart of Luna's argument, in any event, appeals to the need to build trust 
and legitimacy by giving people a "voice" in decisionmaking - the characteristic agenda of 
what I have been calling status-quo participatory democracy. 
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alone in calling for a relaxation of "discretion suspicion."458 But the 
remedy of judicial oversight, which made so much sense from the 
perspective of democratic pluralism, worries scholars today -
including Amar, Kahan, and Meares - a good deal more. Because 
they understand democracy in vaguely Rousseauian terms, as the 
collective formation of a community will, judicial review does not 
strike them as exercise in the mediation of intergroup conflicts. Rather 
it appears to them as it always appeared to the Warren Court's critics: 
as the abrupt imposition of a decision from above. It looks like the 
polar opposite of democracy. This is an increasingly common theme of 
the Supreme Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence as well, 
particularly the opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. 
The notion is hardly new that judicial oversight of policing 
frustrates democracy. Again, this was always part of the case against 
the Warren Court. But the argument has clearly gained ground over 
the past couple of decades. One reason for that - although certainly 
not the only reason - is that background ideas about democracy have 
changed. Democratic pluralism has lost its hold, and the theories of 
participatory democracy and deliberative democracy that have 
supplanted it make judicial oversight harder to defend. 
They make other forms of elite governance harder to defend, as 
well, including the reliance on expertise of varying kinds - judicial, 
administrative, and clinical - in the formation and execution of 
criminal- justice policy. Jonathan Simon and others seem right, for 
example, to link the recent popularity of mandatory sentences and 
"zero-tolerance" policies to disenchantment with the kind of 
"individualized justice" previously dispensed by "expert judges, and 
supported by a panoply of normalizing professionals (psychologists, 
social workers, probation officers, and so on)."459 
Like many of today's criminal procedure scholars, Meares is an 
empiricist. So is Kahan, to a lesser extent. This creates for them a 
problem similar to the one that confronted the pluralists: in principle 
458. See Tracey L. Meares, Terry and the Relevance of Politics, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
1343 (1998); Kahan & Meares, When Rights Are Wrong, supra note 429, at 5;  see also, e.g., 
Livingston, supra note 413, at 650-70. 
459. Jonathan Simon, Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 
1418 (2002); see also GARLAND, supra note 280, at 150-52; Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, 
Democratic Government, and the Decline of Expert Authority: Some Reflections on 'Three 
Strikes' in California, 28 Pac. L.J. 243, 253-56 (1996). Tellingly, the federal sentencing 
guidelines, which are an important part of the trend that these scholars describe, see 
GARLAND, supra note 280, at 151; Zimring, supra, at 256, have themselves been attacked as 
an exercise in anti-democratic "technocracy." William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 586 (2001) .  Stuntz probably reflects the general view 
among scholars today when he suggests that "[t]o the extent that criminal law deals with 
contestable, and contested, moral questions, one might imagine trading a good deal of 
expertise for a little democracy." Id. 
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they believe that claims of expertise should bow to politics, but they 
also think that social science has important lessons to teach about 
current problems and their solutions. Meares, in fact, has called 
repeatedly for greater reliance on social-science research in criminal 
procedure.460 The pluralists' respect for social science led them toward 
a broader respect for professional and technical expertise.461 But for 
scholars like Meares and Kahan, anti-elitism appears to trump 
scientism. (It is hard to tell for sure, because Meares and Kahan see no 
conflict between what social science has to say about policing and what 
inner-city residents already know.)462 Although Meares argues that 
judges should pay more attention to recent work in criminology, she 
never makes a similar claim about local politicians or community 
activists. With Kahan, she respects the unmediated "local knowledge" 
of "average citizens," and presumes that community leaders speak on 
behalf of their constituents.463 
4.  The Preoccupation with Legitimacy 
The status-quo version of participatory democracy shares with 
deliberative democracy, in its most common forms, an overriding 
emphasis on legitimacy, both actual and perceived. Deliberative 
democracy, as we have seen, is first and foremost a theory about 
legitimacy: that is to say, about what makes democracy both worthy of 
respect (actual legitimacy) and likely to achieve respect (perceived 
legitimacy). Likewise, the status-quo version of participatory 
democracy - the version reflected in the criminal procedure work of 
scholars like Amar, Kahan, and Meares, and the version that has 
begun to make itself felt in criminal procedure jurisprudence -
stresses the value of participation in making governmental decisions 
more acceptable to those affected by them. 
In the last decade or so the theme of legitimacy has become 
increasingly prominent in criminal procedure jurisprudence and 
scholarship. One way this has happened is through renewed attention 
in criminal procedure to the "countermajoritarian difficulty," a 
development that also reflects, as we have seen, a strain of anti-elitism. 
Amar, along with other scholars, sees the jury as in large part a device 
for giving "legitimacy" to the criminal justice system.464 Amar argues 
460. See sources cited supra note 421. 
461. See supra text accompanying notes 150-152. 
462. See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 305, at 1 163. 
463. Id. at 1176-80; see also id. at 1168. 
464. See Amar, Reinventing Juries, supra note 424, at 1182; see also, e.g. , Akhil Reed 
Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 681-82 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, 
Sixth Amendment First Principles]; Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double 
Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (1995). 
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for textualism in similar terms: "A Constitution that speaks in the 
name of the people and that draws its legitimacy from ratification by 
the people - ordinary citizens - should be presumed to use words in 
their ordinary sense, absent a strong countervailing argument. "465 And 
legitimacy looms large for Kahan and Meares, as well. It figures not 
only in their arguments for increasing community participation in 
policing,466 but also in their enthusiasm for law enforcement strategies 
and penal policies that rely less on deterrence than on the moral 
authority of the law,467 and on the trust that police departments build 
in the communities they patrol.468 
Trust and moral authority were important to the pluralists, too, but 
in different ways. The pluralists thought that a successful democracy 
required widespread commitment, particularly among elites, to a set of 
core values. Most of these - the "rules of the game" - had to do with 
the peaceful resolution of intergroup conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
therefore, the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system 
tended to be valued not as a goal in and of itself, nor even as a way to 
make the system more effective in controlling crime, but rather as a 
way to protect social stability by building nationwide consensus. And 
the chief strategy for bolstering that legitimacy was not widespread 
participation in policing, or in government more generally; it was 
instead the visible commitment by political elites, including the 
Supreme Court, to substantive values thought to transcend group 
politics, particularly human dignity.469 
5 .  The Retreat from Modernity 
As we have seen, criminal procedure doctrine and scholarship in 
the 1960s and 1 970s echoed the pluralist embrace of modernity in 
465. Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor 
Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1048 (1998). 
466. See, e.g. , Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 305, at 1 184; see also 
Kahan, Collective Action, supra note 12, at 1531-35; Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal 
Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859 
(1999) [hereinafter Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law); Meares, Praying, supra note 12, at 
1612-29. 
467. See, e.g. , Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 391 (2000) [hereinafter Meares, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement). 
468. See, e.g. , id. at 414; Kahan, Collective Action, supra note 12, at 1530, 1536-37; 
Meares, Praying, supra note 12, at 1629; Meares, supra note 306, at 216. Luna, similarly, 
stresses the importance of trust in the police. Transparent policing, he explains, is not itself 
trust, but is "a process that helps build trusting relationships." Luna, supra note 452, at 1 194. 
This is also why William Bratton values openness in policing: "A police organization that 
willfully shuts itself off from scrutiny and public exposure can lose public trust." Bratton, 
supra note 453. 
469. See supra Part 11.F. 
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three ways: in an enthusiasm for the new, quasi-scientific, technology­
intensive methods of "second wave" police professionalism; in the 
abandonment of original intent as a guide to interpreting the criminal 
procedure provisions of the Constitution; and in the relatively low 
priority given to values of order, decorum, and safety.47° Criminal 
procedure today, both in the courts and in the academy, is marked by 
the opposite tendencies: a disenchantment with police professionalism; 
a return to original intent; and a renewed appreciation for order, 
decorum, and safety. In each of these respects, contemporary criminal 
procedure reflects the backward-looking posture characteristic of 
much (although certainly not all) of the rhetoric associated with 
participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. 
We have already touched on the disenchantment with the 
technologically-intensive form of police professionalism epitomized in 
the 1950s and early 1960s by William Parker's Los Angeles Police 
Department. The roots of the community policing movement lay in 
that disenchantment. Even today, the manifold strategies grouped 
together under the umbrella of community policing probably share, 
above all else, a rejection of Parker-style police professionalism. (That 
may be one reason why the LAPD has found it particularly difficult to 
align itself credibly with the new orthodoxy.)471 Criminal procedure 
scholars overwhelmingly join in that rejection and in the embrace of 
community policing. Kahan and Meares have been particularly vocal 
champions of community policing, but their enthusiasm is widely 
shared. 
Amar's efforts to return criminal procedure to "first principles" 
through a renewed attention to original intent have been more 
controversial. But they have drawn so much criticism in part because, 
in many quarters, they have been so well-received. Even some of 
Amar's critics now fight on the ground of original intent.472 In sharp 
contrast to the situation twenty-five years ago, when both the Supreme 
Court and its critics seemed in broad agreement that neither the 
language nor the history of the Fourth Amendment were of any 
470. See supra Part 11.E. 
471. See, e.g. , REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL: A REPORT TO 
THE LOS ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS CONCERNING THE OPERA TIO NS, 
POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES OF THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT IN THE WAKE 
OF THE RAMPART SCANDAL 56-62 (2000) (hereinafter REPORT OF THE RAMPART 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL]. 
472. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1707 (1996) (reviewing William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: 
Origins and Original Meaning (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate 
University) (on file with author)); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth 
Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925 (1997). 
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help,473 many if not most criminal procedure scholars now view history 
as "crucial to an understanding of the Fourth Amendment" - and, for 
that matter, of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment as well.474 
Today's Supreme Court is of a similar mind. Led by Justice Scalia 
and Justice Thomas, the Court over the last decade has started paying 
much more attention to history in criminal procedure. The trend is 
particularly striking in Fourth Amendment law, where a solid majority 
of the Court has made the primary criterion for identifying 
constitutional violations "whether a particular governmental action . . .  
was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law 
when the Amendment was framed. "475 
Amar's work exemplifies not only the return to history in 
constitutional criminal procedure but also the heightened appreciation 
for orderliness. The orderliness that most concerns Amar is 
jurisprudential: he has a pronounced aversion to doctrinal "mess,"476 
and a strong attraction to interpretations that are "snug," "well­
fitting," and "aesthetically pleasing."477 Complaints about the 
untidiness of Fourth Amendment law are hardly new,478 but Amar 
makes those complaints with special insistence. The heavy emphasis 
he places on doctrinal coherence and consistency is mirrored by a 
473. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
474. Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of 
Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1149, 1 169 
(1998); see also, e.g. , William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 3 n.1 (1997) (noting that history "is becoming the 
dominant subject matter" of Fourth Amendment studies). 
475. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999); accord Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 
559, 563 (1999); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). For discussions of this 
development, see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000), and Kathryn R. Urbonya, Determining Reasonableness Under 
the Fourth Amendment: Physical Force to Control and Punish Students, 10 CORNELL J.L. & 
PuB. POL'Y 397, 411-12 (2001). 
476. E.g. , Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 
1814 (1997); Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 285, at 759, 761; Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 123, 
1126 (1996); Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, supra note 464, at 712. 
477. Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and 
Populism, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1659, 1662 (1997); see also, e.g. , Akhil Reed Amar, 
Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 684 (2002). Amar recognizes that the Constitution is not "a 
mere objet d'art," Akhil Reed Amar, lntratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 799 (1999), 
and that "proper constitutional interpretation must in the end be more than merely 
aesthetically pleasing," Akhil Reed Amar, Continuing the Conversation, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 
579, 582 (1999). But he has a plain preference for interpretations that clear away "jumble," 
e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 285, at 758, and that make text 
and doctrine "beautifully cohereO," Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution Versus the Court: 
Some Thoughts on Hills on Amar, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 214 (1999). 
478. See, e.g. , Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . .  Has 
Not . . .  Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255. 
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more general appreciation for the virtues of order, decorum, and 
safety. Among the central themes of his work has been the importance 
of factual accuracy in criminal procedure: the importance of avoiding 
not only the conviction of the innocent, but also the acquittal of the 
guilty. In interpreting the Fourth Amendment, for example, he urges 
us to keep in mind that "the people are more 'secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects'" when "rapists, burglars, and murderers 
are convicted. "479 
In this respect he is representative. It is hard today to find scholars 
who think the "basic purpose" of criminal procedure is solely to 
protect the individual from the state, or that "[i]t inflicts no tangible 
harm on anyone when a criminal evades punishment."480 Resignation 
about the risks of criminal victimization has become much less 
common. In part this reflects the successful, and long overdue, effort 
by feminist scholars over the past twenty years to draw greater 
attention to the gendered tilt of private violence, and to the systems of 
subordination it enforces.481 But it also reflects a renewed emphasis on 
order and safety more broadly, and a diminished willingness to accept 
a certain level of crime as the price of freedom, spontaneity, and the 
related attractions of modern urban life. 
The freedom and spontaneity of modern urban life, in fact, have 
lost much of their luster. The "broken windows," or "order 
maintenance," approach to policing pioneered by James Q. Wilson in 
collaboration with George Kelling - an approach sometimes taken as 
the essence of community policing - views street-level urban disorder 
as the seedbed of crime, and treats it accordingly. Kahan and Meares 
have been especially taken with the broken-windows theory,482 but in 
this respect they have hardly been outliers among criminal procedure 
scholars: on the contrary, this is another respect in which their work 
has seemed to have captured the moment.483 Dissenting voices are 
479. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 285, at 793. On Amar's 
overarching effort "to reorient criminal procedure toward questions of factual guilt and 
innocence," see Seidman, supra note 305, at 2283. 
480. Luban, supra note 282, at 91. 
481. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women 's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": 
A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 507-09 (1992); Robin West, Equality 
Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 45, 
46-48 (1990). 
482. See, e.g. , Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of 
Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2488 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social 
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 367-73 (1997); Kahan & Meares, The Coming 
Crisis, supra note 305, at 1163-64; Kahan & Meares, Order in the Inner City, supra note 446, 
at 822-24. 
483. See, e.g. , Livingston, supra note 413, at 578-91. Dorothy Roberts exaggerated little 
in 1999 when she described scholarly, political, and media support for the broken windows 
theory as "virtually unanimous." Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the 
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starting to be heard, and even Kahan's enthusiasm has grown more 
qualified.484 But broken-windows policing, and the "aesthetic of 
orderliness"485 to which it appeals, continue to enjoy broad support. 
Some of that support may reflect the way in which the image of clean, 
orderly neighborhoods resonates with the nostalgia often associated 
with participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. 
Many of the criticisms of order-maintenance policing have 
themselves appealed to notions of democracy - including, in 
particular, notions of popular participation and public deliberation. In 
different ways, Bernard Harcourt and Jonathan Simon have both 
suggested that the aggressive patrol tactics associated with broken­
windows policing can corrode the sense of shared fate and collective 
agency required for meaningful self-govemment.486 The fact that both 
champions and critics of order-maintenance policing draw on the 
rhetoric of participation and deliberation is a sign of the degree to 
which pluralism has been supplanted as the dominant theory of 
American democracy. But it also reflects the malleability of the new 
rhetoric, and it underscores the need for greater rigor in discussions of 
the relationship between democracy and policing. 
6. The Continued Treatment of the Police as a Breed Apart 
One way in which theories of participatory democracy and 
deliberative democracy have not influenced contemporary thinking 
about the police is by altering the longstanding conception of the 
police as a breed apart. The notion of an "authoritarian personality" 
has fallen into disfavor, but scholars today still show little affinity for 
any vision of democracy that includes political participation by, or 
deliberation among, police officers themselves. The experiments 
Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 778 
(1999). 
484. For a particularly important critique, see HARCOURT, supra note 293, at 59-216, 
which draws in part on Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social 
Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. 
Soc. 603 (1999). Kahan gives broken windows policing a "mixed" assessment in Kahan, 
Collective Action, supra note 12, at 1527-30. Even Wilson now calls the broken windows 
theory "speculation" and expresses uncertainty regarding whether "improving order will or 
will not reduce crime." Dan Hurley, On Crime as Science (A Neighbor at a Time), N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at Fl (quoting James Q. Wilson). 
485. HARCOURT, supra note 293, at 27. 
486. See, e.g. , id. at 180; Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn ": 
Implications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law 
Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 179, 202 n.7 (2000); Jonathan Simon, Governing 
Through Crime, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM, supra note 284, at 171, 180, 185. Simon 
expands his argument in his forthcoming book, JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH 
CRIME: CRIMINAL LAW AND THE RESHAPING OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1965-2000 
(forthcoming). 
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during the 1970s with bringing participatory management and rank­
and-file intellectual engagement to policing have not been renewed. 
The rhetoric of community policing, meanwhile, calls for the police to 
be partners of the community, not part of the community itself. In 
reality, the relationship falls far short of true partnership: community 
policing as actually practiced rarely intrudes much on the operational 
autonomy of the police.487 But community policing does even less to 
make the police a genuine part of the community. Almost always, a 
police department engaged in community policing remains, in every 
significant respect, "a force of outsiders."488 
It is telling in this regard that the reinstatement of residency 
requirements for police officers has never become part of the 
community policing agenda. Even James Q. Wilson - no fan of 
community control of the police - had some sympathy in the late 
1960s for the view that officers should live in the neighborhoods they 
patrol.489 A few departments in fact brought back residency 
requirements in the early 1970s, but police unions strongly opposed 
the idea, and in most cases the opposition was successful.490 Since the 
1970s, the number of departments imposing a residency requirement 
appears to have declined.491 The notion that police officers should be 
fully "integrated with the community" - the notion that appealed so 
strongly to George Berkley and William Westley at the end of the 
1960s - has been all but discarded.492 So too has the related notion, 
also shared by Berkley and Westley, that the internal operations of 
police forces should conform as closely as possible to the democratic 
"norms and values" of the larger society.493 
Democratic pluralism did not lead to calls for greater participation 
by police officers in the internal operation of police departments or in 
the political life of the broader community because pluralism de­
emphasized political participation as a general matter, particularly 
among people, like police officers, who might be expected to have 
authoritarian personalities. Pluralism inclined scholars to think of the 
police as a breed apart, moreover, because pluralism suggested that all 
groups were essentially breeds apart, and that only the political elite 
could be counted on to share democratic values. Theories of 
487. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 13, at 81. 
488. Id. 
489. See WILSON, POLICE BEHAVIOR, supra note 3, at 291. 
490. See, e.g. , FOGELSON, supra note 251, at 306-07. 
491. See Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach 
to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable With the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 
1253, 1295-96 (2000). 
492. WESTLEY, supra note 14, at xvii, 193; see also BERKLEY, supra note 1, at 39. 
493. BERKLEY, supra note 1, at 29; see also WESTLEY, supra note 14, at xvii-xviii. 
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participatory democracy and deliberative democracy might be thought 
more amenable to the idea that the police, along with everyone else, 
should participate as much as possible in collective self-governance. 
And for a few years in the early 1970s that idea was in fact 
sympathetically received. The dictates of democracy for people in 
general were thought fully applicable to the police. For a variety of 
reasons, though, largely having to do with the specific politics of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, that notion has largely been abandoned. 
Thus this first point of continuity with pluralist-influenced thinking 
about police. 
7.  The Persistent De-emphasis of Institutional Structure 
As we have seen, the theories of participatory democracy and 
deliberative democracy that have gained favor in the last few decades 
share with democratic pluralism an emphasis on culture rather than on 
institutions. Like pluralism, that is to say, the new theories are 
grounded in what I have called the social-science paradigm: the 
inclination of American intellectuals since the late nineteenth century 
to take psychology and sociology, rather than political economy, as the 
keys to understanding politics and society. The continuing hold of this 
approach has meant that today, as in the 1950s and 1960s, most 
thinking about reconciling police with democracy focuses heavily on 
issues of culture and tends to neglect questions of institutional 
structure: both the internal decisionmaking structures of police 
departments and the external processes of political control. This is the 
second point of continuity with the ideas about the police developed 
during the Warren and Burger Court eras. 
Discussions of the inner workings of police departments persist in 
stressing the group psychology of the police and in treating formal 
structures of decisionmaking as largely irrelevant. In the words of one 
police scholar, " [r]esearchers have generally neglected studying police 
organizations in favor of studying police work - including situations, 
encounters, strategies, and occupational characteristics - and police 
officers their attitudes, feelings, beliefs, behaviors, and 
interactions."494 A recent overview finds that theories about the causes 
of police misconduct, for example, fall into three categories: 
"sociological theories which focus on situational factors such as the 
conduct of suspects, the context of suspect-police encounters and such 
factors as gender, race, and socioeconomic status; psychological 
theories, which emphasize officer attitudes and personality traits; and 
organizational theories, which explore the role of organizational 
494. EDWARD R. MAGUIRE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN POLICE 
AGENCIES 39 (2003). 
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culture."495 Sociology, psychology, and culture - institutions are not in 
the picture. Similarly, the blue-ribbon commissions appointed after 
each police scandal inevitably underscore the importance of changing 
the culture and mindset of the department at issue.496 The emphasis 
that scholars like Kahan and Meares have placed on extralegal norms 
has, if anything, only increased the interest of scholars and 
policymakers in the "milieu" of policing and drawn attention even 
further away from institutional structure.497 The questions that rarely 
get asked about policing today are the ones that would have seemed 
most obvious to, say, the authors of The Federalist Papers, had they 
foreseen the emergence of modern police departments: How should 
law enforcement be organized to best assure that the powers given to 
police officers are used wisely and fairly? What departmental 
structures will best harness and counterbalance the ambitions of police 
officers, aligning their collective objectives with public purposes? 
Criminal procedure scholars rarely ask structural questions about 
external political control of police departments either. In fact, the 
declining influence of democratic pluralism may have pushed scholars 
further away from these questions. Kahan and Meares again are 
illustrative. They argue that a range of strategies they associate with 
"the new community policing" - specifically, loitering laws, curfews, 
and blanket searches of housing projects - deserve judicial deference 
because they reflect the considered judgments of the affected, inner­
city communities about how best to "balance liberty and order. "498 But 
they give little attention to the structures through which these 
communities actually make decisions, in large part because they see 
this matter as unproblematic: inner-city communities deliberate, reach 
collective agreements, and then have those agreements carried out by 
their political representatives. In the 1 960s, it is true, "law enforcement 
495. Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct 5 (May 2003) 
(unpublished paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=412620 (last visited Mar. 18, 2005). 
A revised version of the paper appears under the same title at 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 
(2004). 
496. See, e.g. , REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL, supra note 
471, at 48-71. 
497. Armacost, supra note 495, at 6; see also, e.g. , Waldeck, supra note 491, at 1263-71 .  
Erik Luna's recent call for greater attention to the "institutional design" of  policing is 
noteworthy in two respects: first, because his attention to institutional questions is unusual, 
and second, because so many of his institutional recommendations turn out to be aimed, in 
fact, at altering the culture of policing - modifying "social norms," facilitating "discourse 
and deliberation," creating a "sense of empathy," and so forth. Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and 
Institutional Design, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183 (2003). On the "social meaning turn" in 
criminal law scholarship, see Harcourt, supra note 486, and Robert Weisberg, Norms and 
Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
467 (2003). 
498. See, e.g. , Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 305, at 1160-61, 1167, 
1177, 1183. 
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officials were accountable only to representatives of the white 
majority."499 But voting-rights legislation fixed that problem. So today 
courts should get out of the way and allow inner-city residents "to 
decide for themselves whether to adopt building search, gang-loitering 
ordinances, curfews and like policies."500 Chicago's gang-loitering law 
deserved particular deference, because it "was to be enforced only 
after consultation with 'local leaders' and 'community organizations' 
- the representatives of the average citizen."501 
The heavy emphasis the pluralists placed on interest groups forced 
them to pay a certain, minimal amount of attention to institutional 
structure: elections had to keep government officials in check, and 
decisionmaking needed to be sufficiently decentralized to allow 
multiple points of access. But where the pluralists saw interest groups 
competing with each other, Kahan and Meares see a unified 
community.502 They vacillate about whose views they are describing -
sometimes it is "inner-city residents," sometimes "inner-city 
minorities," sometimes "African Americans. "  But the views ascribed 
to the community in question, however it is defined, are clear and 
coherent: a desire for more law enforcement; fervent support for "the 
new community policing"; a "strong sense of 'linked fate' with inner­
city law-breakers, with whom they are intimately bound by social and 
familial ties"; "an intense commitment to individual liberty"; 
sensitivity to "the risks associated with excessive discretion" and to 
"the political dynamics that surround law enforcement"; and, 
ultimately, a "judgment that in today's political and social context, the 
continued victimization of minorities at hands of criminals poses a 
much more significant threat to the well-being of minorities than does 
the risk of arbitrary mistreatment at the hands of the police. "503 
This faith in a coherent, unified public will - the same faith that 
has Amar praising the ability of juries to "represent the people "504 - is 
part of what leads Kahan and Meares to disregard questions about the 
structure of democratic decisionmaking. They applaud, for example, 
the "strategic alliance[s]" that police in Boston and Chicago have 
499. Id. at 1 159. 
500. Id. at 1179. 
501. Id. at 1183; see also id. at 1170. 
502. For criticism of Kahan and Meares on this score, particularly in connection with the 
Chicago loitering Jaw, see, for example, Reenah L. Kim, Legitimizing Community Consent to 
Local Policing: The Need for Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on 
Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 482-88 (2001), and Roberts, 
supra note 483, at 822-26. 
503. Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 305, at 1 163, 1165-67, 1 170, 1 178. 
504. E.g. , Amar, Reinventing Juries, supra note 424, at 1 182; Amar, Three Cheers, supra 
note 426, at 1265 n.26. 
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formed with Black church leaders; they see these alliances, which have 
included police-sponsored prayer vigils and arrangements giving 
selected church authorities "a say in the disposition of potential 
offenders," as promising examples of "the New Community 
Policing."505 Kahan and Meares are hardly alone here, and the 
arrangements in question may in fact deserve praise. But they raise 
some fairly obvious questions about evenhandedness and democratic 
control - leaving aside the problem of religious establishment. Those 
questions all but disappear when Kahan and Meares discuss police­
church collaboration, because church leaders and everyone else in the 
inner city are assumed to share the same interests.506 For similar 
reasons, the threats to democratic control posed by privatized policing 
more generally vanish from Kahan's perspective. Even unofficial 
campaigns of sustained harassment - "private shaming" - strike 
Kahan as unqualified blessings.507 From his perspective, in fact, this is 
community policing at its best. Because these campaigns are 
conducted not by the police but by that imagined collective - "the 
citizens themselves" - Kahan sees little reason to fear abuse.508 
The institutional mechanisms traditionally relied upon for 
democratic control of the police - city councils, mayors' offices, and, 
more recently, civilian oversight agencies - continue to receive 
relatively little attention from criminal procedure scholars.509 The 
matter of civilian oversight deserves special comment. Agencies of this 
kind continue to proliferate; there are now perhaps a hundred across 
the country. The vast majority of big-city police departments are now 
subject to some form of civilian oversight.510 The institutional structure 
of that oversight varies widely. There are boards of part-time 
volunteers and offices of full-time professionals. Some oversight 
agencies have independent investigative authority; some do not. Some 
agencies review citizen complaints; others advise the police on matters 
of policy. Some consist only of civilians; others include some police 
officers.511 Very little scholarly attention has been paid to how well 
505. Kahan, Collective Action, supra note 12, at 1527, 1531-34; see also Kahan, 
Privatizing Criminal Law, supra note 466, at 1862-66; Meares, Legitimacy and Law 
Enforcement, supra note 467, at 413-14; Meares, Praying, supra note 12. Both Kahan and 
Meares stress, in particular, the mantle of trust and legitimacy that Black church leaders can 
give to the police. 
506. Kahan has recently qualified his enthusiasm, but only with the warning that 
collaborations with the clergy can "embroil the state in . . .  religious rivalries" and thereby 
"extinguish trust." Kahan, Collective Action, supra note 12, at 1535. 
507. See Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law, supra note 466, at 1870. 
508. See Kahan, Collective Action, supra note 12, at 1535-38. 
509. For notable exceptions, see WALKER, supra note 302; Kim, supra note 502; Luna, 
supra note 452, at 1167-69. 
510. See WALKER, supra note 302, at 40. 
511. See Kim, supra note 502, at 476-77. 
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these agencies operate or to whether certain variations have been 
more successful than others in making the police, in one sense or 
another, more democratic. In particular, an unusual coalition of police 
administrators and liberal-minded police reformers have warned for 
decades that certain common forms of civilian review can actually 
undermine democratic control of police forces by diffusing 
responsibility and undermining the chain of command.512 We know far 
less than we should about whether they have been proved right. 
8. The Comparative Neglect of Inequality 
The emphasis that both pluralism and its rivals have placed on 
culture at the expense of structure is related to another point of 
continuity: the tendency to downplay what the political theorist Ian 
Shapiro recently has called "the oppositional traditions of democratic 
politics"513 - those dimensions of democracy, that is to say, that have 
to do less with collective self-government than with ongoing resistance 
to "arbitrary hierarchy and domination."514 Shapiro points out that, 
both historically and in our time, " [t]hose who fight for democracy 
often define their goals reactively"; they are driven less by a utopian 
vision than by the conviction that certain existing and unjustified 
forms of domination should be abolished.515 There is a long history of 
viewing this leveling impulse as the core of democracy. Tocqueville, 
for example, thought the democracy he found exemplified in America 
was first and foremost a matter of "equality of condition[s]" - and, 
more precisely, a matter of sweeping aside the powers and privileges 
of monarchs and aristocrats.516 Lincoln famously drew on the same 
idea when he tied democracy to ending slavery: "As I would not be a 
512. See, e.g., BERKLEY, supra note 1, at 146-47; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 142, 150-
51. Chief William Bratton of the Los Angeles Police Department has made the same 
complaint about the system under which serious disciplinary actions against LAPD officers 
are adjudicated by a Board of Rights, consisting of two command officers and a civilian: 
" [A]s chief of police, I lack the necessary ability to control and impose discipline on my staff. 
Giving the chief - a chief who is directly accountable to civilian management - that power 
would help ensure the proper delivery of the appropriate message." William J. Bratton, 
Power to Discipline LAPD Officers is Out of the Chiefs Hands, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at 
B13. 
513. Ian Shapiro, Three Ways to Be a Democrat, 22 POL. THEORY 124, 138 (1994) 
[hereinafter Shapiro, Three Ways], reprinted in IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S PLACE 109-36 
(1996) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S PLACE]. 
514. IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 30 (1999) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, 
DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE]; see also IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3-4, 
50-52 (2003) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY]. 
515. SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 514, at 1 .  
516. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 38, a t  3-6. On Tocqueville's use of  old-world aristocracy 
as the "contrast-model" for democracy, see, for example, Connolly, supra note 36, at 22. 
1804 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1699 
slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of 
democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the difference, 
is no democracy."517 And when W.B. Gallie identified democracy a 
half-century ago as an "essentially contested concept," he argued that 
what held the concept together was "a long tradition (perhaps a 
number of historically independent but sufficiently similar traditions) 
of demands, aspirations, revolts and reforms of a common anti­
inegalitarian character."518 The core use of the term democracy, Gallie 
suggested, was to invoke "certain political aspirations which have been 
embodied in countless slave, peasant, national, and middle-class 
revolts and revolutions, as well as in scores of national constitutions 
and party records and programs" - aspirations that were "centered in 
a demand for increased equality" and were advanced against regimes 
committed to prolonging "gross forms of inequality."519 
As Shapiro points out, this understanding of democracy, which 
subjects all patterns of social hierarchy to "presumptive, but 
rebuttable, suspicion," has been pushed to the sidelines since the rise 
of pluralism in the 1950s.520 The faith the pluralists put in leadership 
elites, the emphasis they placed on stability, the confidence they had in 
the complex balance of cross-cutting interest groups - all these 
factors led the pluralists to downplay concerns of continuing 
inequality, and gave them little enthusiasm for the notion of 
democracy as a tradition of opposition. Political equality has played a 
larger role in theories of participatory democracy and deliberative 
democracy. These theories, as we have seen, were crafted largely in 
response to pluralism's perceived defects, not the least of which was its 
elitism. But in the mainstream version of participatory democracy, the 
version that has had the most influence on criminal procedure, the 
element of egalitarianism has lost most of its bite. Like the pluralists, 
people who invoke the mainstream version of participatory democracy 
tend to start with the assumption that, in pertinent respects, the 
United States is already egalitarian.521 (Kahan and Meares are good 
examples.) That assumption - particularly when combined with the 
apologetic cast of mainstream participatory democracy, and the 
emphasis it shares with deliberative democracy on "getting along" -
517. 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 532 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
On the rhetorical tradition invoked by Lincoln's definition of democracy - a tradition that 
saw slavery less as the antithesis of freedom than as "the antipode of democratic equality" -
see David Brion Davis, American Equality and Foreign Revolutions, 76 J. AM. HIST. 729, 
744-46 (1989). 
518. Gallie, supra note 32, at 136. 
519. Id. at 134. 
520. Shapiro, Three Ways, supra note 513, at 138. 
521. On this theme, see supra note 367 and accompanying text. 
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minimizes the ongoing significance of "demands, aspirations, revolts 
and reforms. "522 
Despite the half-century tendency of democratic theory to neglect 
the "anti-inegalitarian" dimension of democracy, criminal procedure 
in the Warren Court era was famously preoccupied with issues of 
illegitimate inequality, particularly those associated with race. 
Pluralism had little to do with this preoccupation, but it may, as I have 
already suggested, have contributed to Supreme Court's reluctance to 
tackle the problem of racism in the criminal justice system explicitly, 
and its tendency to treat instances of inequity as aberrational rather 
than systemic. The gingerly, subtextual manner in which the Warren 
Court pursued racial equality in criminal justice eventually made it 
much easier for its successors to drop the pursuit altogether.523 It 
would not have been so easy, perhaps, if the accounts of democracy 
that have largely supplanted pluralism underscored the importance of 
continuing opposition to entrenched systems of unjustified hierarchy 
- if, that is to say, the most influential theories of participatory 
democracy and deliberative democracy incorporated the "spirit of 
democratic oppositionalism."524 But they did not. 
The spirit of democratic oppositionalism is missing not just from 
current criminal procedure jurisprudence, but also, as I have suggested 
parenthetically, from the work of scholars like Kahan and Meares. The 
most troubling assumption of that work - the assumption of a unified, 
coherent, and easily identified community will - diverts attention not 
only from questions of institutional structure but also, and more 
fundamentally, from the ongoing power dynamics of inner-city 
politics. It tends to obscure, too, the ways in which local police 
practices can reinforce (or alleviate) regional and nationwide patterns 
of domination, matters to which I will return below. 
* * *  
It bears reiterating that the work of Kahan and Meares, like the 
work of Amar, is neither a microcosm of criminal procedure 
scholarship today nor a reliable reflection of the state of criminal 
procedure jurisprudence. On the whole, for example, criminal 
522. On the tendency of recent democratic theory to overlook the value of dissensus, 
see, for example, SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 514, at 14-15; Stephen A. 
Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373, 386-87 (1993); and 
Shapiro, Three Ways, supra note 513, at 133-34. 
523. On the lost subtext of racial equality in criminal procedure jurisprudence, see, for 
example, Devon W. Carbado, ( E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 974-
1034 (2002), and David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the 
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 316-23. 
524. Shapiro, Three Ways, supra note 513, at 139. 
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procedure scholars cannot be faulted for ignoring the relationship 
between police practices and racial inequality, although they rarely 
view that relationship through the lens of "anti-inegalitarianism." Still, 
the manner in which Amar, Kahan, and Meares draw on theories of 
participatory democracy and deliberative democracy is instructive. It 
demonstrates again that ideas about democracy influence ideas about 
policing. It helps explain why criminal procedure scholarship and 
jurisprudence from the 1960s and 1970s, written under the sway of 
democratic pluralism, can seem incomprehensible or silly to scholars 
and judges writing today, with different notions about democracy. It 
warns us about issues that criminal procedure scholarship more 
broadly continues to slight. And it underscores the need for more 
careful thinking about the relationship between democracy and 
policing. 
It is not just that pluralism remains, in many ways, an attractive 
account of democracy. It is also that theories of participatory 
democracy and deliberative democracy have never been as coherent 
and consistent as pluralism, so that precision is particularly important 
when invoking them. Democratic pluralism is democratic pluralism, 
but the participatory democracy of Arnold Kaufman is not the 
participatory democracy of Richard Nixon. 
The first step in thinking more carefully about the relationship 
between policing and democracy is to understand the dilemmas, 
contradictions, and choices presented by democratic theory, and to see 
how those difficulties have manifested themselves in discussions about 
the police. That has been the chief task of this Article. The final part 
of the Article draws some brief, provisional lessons from the 
discussion so far. 
V. TOWARD A ROUNDED UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRATIC 
POLICING 
What lessons does all this offer for criminal procedure scholars and 
other students of policing? I think there are several. 
The first and most obvious lesson is to take democracy seriously. 
Ideas about democracy have long influenced ideas about the police. 
Conceivably they should not. But anyone taking that view has a heavy 
burden of tradition to discredit, and much of that tradition cannot be 
understood - let alone challenged - without an appreciation of the 
manifold ways in which criminal procedure and policing studies have 
reflected and incorporated distinct theories of democracy. 
The second lesson, which by now should be almost as obvious, is 
not to oversimplify. Ideas about democracy have come in complicated 
clusters. Those clusters have generally included suppositions about 
four different things: the basic purposes of democracy, the distinctive 
processes of democracy, the proximity of current arrangements to the 
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democratic ideal, and the cultural and geographic particularity of what 
democracy means. The answers given to each of these four questions 
over the past half century have varied. The main purposes of 
democracy have sometimes been thought to be social stability and the 
avoidance of authoritarian repression; sometimes the facilitation of 
human development; and sometimes the "legitimacy" of government, 
both actual and perceived. The bedrock processes of democracy have 
sometimes been found in elections, group politics, and leadership 
elites; sometimes in mass participation; and sometimes in respectful 
deliberation. Sometimes the participation or deliberation thought 
central to democracy has been roughly the same kind of participation 
or deliberation we already have; sometimes it has been a good deal 
more. Sometimes American democracy has been seen as idiosyncratic; 
at other times it has not. All of these permutations have had 
implications for how we think about the police and, more specifically, 
about what it means for law enforcement to be "democratic." 
The third and final lesson, which builds on the other two, is to 
watch for blind spots. Every theory of democracy highlights certain 
parts of our experience and directs attention away from other parts. It 
therefore helps to keep in mind the realities and possibilities that 
current ways of thinking about democracy tend to mask. 
Today that means, first and foremost, taking into account 
democratic pluralism, because the principal unifying thread of 
democratic theory over the past thirty years has been the reaction 
against pluralism. There was a lot to react against. The pluralists' own 
blind spots were legion. But if pluralism never deserved the uncritical 
acceptance it won in the 1950s, even its toughest critics acknowledged 
that the theory triumphed in part because it incorporated some 
genuine insights. Those insights included, I believe, the usefulness of 
group theory as a way of understanding American politics and the 
corresponding dangers of assuming a unified public; the grounds for 
skepticism about the feasibility, necessity, and desirability of universal 
political engagement; the limited but real ability of elections to keep 
government in check; and the democratic attractions of modernity. In 
the context of policing, keeping these insights in mind can help to 
guard against several kinds of mistakes: a romanticized picture of local 
politics; an overoptimistic expectation of community involvement in 
questions about policing; a neglect of the dangers of placing police 
powers in private hands; and a sentimental nostalgia for a clean and 
orderly past. 
If appreciating pluralism can help guard against some of the blind 
spots of current thinking about democratic policing, so can 
appreciating the ambitious varieties of participatory democracy that 
gained currency in the 1960s and 1970s. The gulf between those 
theories and the watered-down, status-quo version of participatory 
1808 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1699 
democracy that has grown so familiar can be hidden by their common 
vocabulary. So it helps to keep in mind what seemed like live options 
not so long ago. In the context of law enforcement, this means 
considering the possibilities of greatly strengthening neighborhood 
control of police departments and of involving rank-and-file officers, 
intellectually if not politically, in shaping the nature of their work. It 
also means, necessarily, grappling with the tension between these two 
agendas. Any theory of democratic policing that valorizes the 
participation of ordinary citizens in the decisions that affect their lives 
needs to address police officers themselves as well as the communities 
they patrol. 
Along with pluralism and thoroughgoing participatory democracy, 
there is a third perspective, even more foreign, it is helpful to hold in 
mind: eighteenth-century political economy. The great insights of that 
perspective are that institutions matter, that the rational pursuit of 
individual objectives matters, and that the former should take account 
of the latter. In the context of policing, this means that an appreciation 
for the role of culture in policing - the role of norms and personality 
and discourse - should not blind us to the role of institutional 
structure - chains of command and routes of advancement within 
police departments, occupational opportunities and rewards, systems 
established for internal review, mechanisms of civilian oversight, and 
external political checks. Of course culture matters. But structure 
matters, too. 
Last but emphatically not least, efforts to think systematically 
about the relationship between policing and democracy should strive 
to incorporate the perspective from which democracy is less about a 
stable system of collective self-government than about opposition to 
entrenched patterns of unjustified inequality. This view of democracy, 
what Ian Shapiro calls the spirit of democratic oppositionalism, seems 
a particularly promising vantage point for discussions of law 
enforcement because it makes apparent, in ways that pluralism and its 
most visible rivals have not, precisely why police practices matter so 
much for democracy. Why are law-enforcement policies more 
important for democracy than, say, trash-collection policies? Why 
should democracy have more implications for police departments than 
for sanitation departments? Pluralism offers no answer, beyond 
suggesting that the occupational psychology of police officers may be 
particularly worrisome. Participatory democracy and deliberative 
democracy provide no real answer, either. But once democracy is 
understood to involve ongoing opposition to patterns of unjustifiable 
hierarchy, the special salience of the police immediately becomes 
clear: the police are both a uniquely powerful weapon against private 
systems of domination and a uniquely frightening tool of official 
domination. 
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From this perspective, making policing more democratic entails 
making it as effective as possible in combating unjustified patterns of 
private domination and unthreatening as possible as a tool of official 
domination. Reconciling these goals is of course quite difficult, and so 
is balancing them against other things we want the police to do (for 
example, protecting us against crime even when it has at most a 
tenuous connection with patterns of dominance) and other things we 
want the police to avoid (for example, spending money that could 
better be spent elsewhere). But we knew all along that policing 
requires trade-offs. The virtue of the "anti-inegalitarian" view of 
democracy is that it makes clear certain important aspects of those 
trade-offs, including the fact that democracy is, as it were, on both 
sides of the balance. 
Ian Shapiro has usefully identified three basic tactics for pursuing 
an agenda of anti-inegalitarian democracy, one substantive and two 
procedural. The substantive tactic has already been mentioned: 
"presumptive, but rebuttable suspicion" of all systems of hierarchy. 
The notion is not that hierarchies should be eliminated, even were that 
possible. The idea rather is that patterns of inequality can easily 
"atrophy into systems of domination which impose on people 
unnecessarily"525 and, worse, with a false appearance of benignity: 
"escapable hierarchies masquerade as inescapable ones, involuntary 
subordination is shrouded in the language of agreement, unnecessary 
hierarchies are held to be essential to the pursuit of common goals, 
and fixed hierarchies are cloaked in myths about their fluidity."526 The 
procedural tactics are, first, to make mechanisms of collective decision 
as inclusive as possible and second, to clear space, institutionally, for 
opposition and dissent.527 Both of these procedural principles are, in 
part, efforts to accommodate and to capitalize on disagreement and 
conflict. They reflect a view of dissensus as not just a sign of a well­
functioning democracy but a precondition for it, a view that "one 
person's consensus is often another's hegemony."528 
This Article is not the place for a thorough exploration of how 
Shapiro's principles might be pursued in the context of law 
enforcement, nor for systematic application of the other lessons I have 
outlined above. I will not attempt here a complete answer to the 
question with which we started: What is democratic policing? But I do 
525. SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S PLACE, supra note 513, at 11 .  
526. Shapiro, Three Ways, supra note 513,  at 137-38. 
527. See, e.g. , SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S PLACE, supra note 513, at 7. 
528. Shapiro, Three Ways, supra note 513, at 134; see also, e.g. , SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 514, at 14-15. For a similar argument, see Gardbaum, 
supra note 522, at 386-87. 
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want to sketch in a preliminary way some of the implications for law 
enforcement of a more rounded understanding of democracy. In 
particular, I want suggest how such an understanding of democracy -
an understanding sensitive to the tradition of democratic 
oppositionalism, and mindful of the core insights of democratic 
pluralism, 1960s-style participatory democracy, and eighteenth-century 
political economy - might begin to affect our thinking about five 
important topics in contemporary policing: community policing, racial 
profiling, police privatization, police personnel practices, and public 
disclosure of law enforcement practices. Necessarily, the discussion of 
each of these topics will be tentative and incomplete - provisional 
roadmaps for arguments to be made more fully elsewhere. What I 
hope to demonstrate here is not what democracy, properly 
understood, has to say about these areas of controversy, but the kind 
of inquiries required in order to answer that question. 
A. Community Policing 
A notoriously varied collection of programs march under the 
banner of community policing, and some of them claim justification 
for reasons related only tangentially to any theory of democracy. Even 
the most sophisticated understanding of democracy therefore cannot 
tell us, by itself, which of these programs deserve support. But it can 
warn us away from certain mistakes in trying to answer that question, 
and it can flag certain issues that deserve close attention. 
First and foremost, a rounded view of democracy makes clear why 
community policing, no matter how it is defined, should not be 
understood or defended as a way to make the police more answerable 
to "the public." This way of thinking ignores what the pluralists rightly 
stressed: the heterogeneity of interests in any community -
particularly in a modern, urban community. Ignoring that 
heterogeneity means ignoring the ways in which law enforcement 
tactics can reflect and reinforce patterns of social hierarchy. The 
interests of shopkeepers are not necessarily the interests of the 
homeless, the interests of African Americans in the inner city may 
differ from those of Latinos, and so on. No single set of interests 
should be valorized as belonging to "the community."529 
This does not mean that community policing cannot be justified as 
an exercise in promoting democracy. It simply means that the 
justification, to be plausible, cannot rely on the notion that there is a 
unified community with desires that are clear, coherent, and 
529. For thoughtful elaboration of this point, see Kim, supra note 502. For evidence that 
Chicago's community policing programs have been less successful and less popular among 
the city's burgeoning Latino population than among Blacks, see WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., 
COMMUNITY POLICING AND "THE NEW IMMIGRANTS": LATINOS IN CHICAGO (2002). 
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consistent. A promising account that carefully avoids that fallacy has 
been provided by the police scholar David Thacher. He describes 
community policing as an effort to reduce the "institutional 
segregation" of police departments by opening new channels of 
communication and cooperation with a variety of outside groups, both 
governmental and nongovernmental.530 These groups are inevitably 
"more localized than 'the general public, '" and Thacher warns against 
reducing community policing to "an apple-pie issue of 'getting closer 
to the community."'531 But he points out that the very existence of 
fundamental disagreement within the community can make 
community policing valuable for two related reasons. The first is that 
different kinds of channels give voice to different groups and can even 
elicit different sentiments from the same group.532 The second reason, 
which flows from the first, is that creating multiple channels for public 
communication with the police makes it more likely the police will be 
forced to confront conflicts between values. That process of 
confrontation makes space within police decisionmaking for the 
articulation of "dissident values," and it also helps officers to develop 
precisely the kind of professional maturity that William Muir praised a 
quarter-century ago.533 
Institutional segregation has its advantages, of course. Asking a 
single organization like a police department to reconcile conflicting 
objectives, like keeping the peace while seeking justice and 
maximizing liberty, can be a recipe for paralysis - or for giving some 
goals little more than lip service. Sometimes the best strategy is to 
allow each organization to pursue its own, narrow mission, with values 
balanced through interagency competition.534 This was more or less the 
strategy of democratic pluralism: police pursue crime control, courts 
pursue the rule of law, prosecutors pursue justice, and they all keep 
each other in check. It was a more successful strategy than we 
530. Thacher, supra note 418, at 765, 768. Elsewhere, Thacher has given a slightly 
different account of community policing, suggesting that the partnerships it forges function 
as "sites of public deliberation about the common good." David Thacher, Equity and 
Community Policing: A New View of Community Partnerships, 20 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5 
(2001). I prefer the account focusing on a reduction in institutional segregation: among its 
attractions is precisely that it avoids reliance on the vague, Rousseauian notion of "the 
common good." (I am influenced here, as well, by Ian Shapiro, who points out that an anti­
inegalitarian conception of democracy has the advantage, among others, that it "does not 
revolve around trying to render Rousseau's project coherent." SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S 
PLACE, supra note 513, at 6-7; see also, e.g., SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY, supra note 514, at 10-34.) 
531. Thacher, supra note 418, at 791-92. 
532 See id. 
533. See id. at 722, 792-95. 
534. Thacher points this out himself. See id. at 767 & n.3. 
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sometimes acknowledge. But there is no doubt that the extreme · 
degree of institutional segregation achieved by big-city police 
departments in the 1950s and 1960s made some problems associated 
with the police much worse and too often made the police instruments 
for the reinforcement of social hierarchy rather than tools for 
empowering the disempowered. So Thacher seems right that 
community policing, understood as a program for opening up new 
channels of communication with the police, can be an attractive way to 
democratize law enforcement. 
Whether community policing serves that purpose, though, will 
depend on the kinds of channels that it opens up - whether it gives 
voice to disempowered groups and marginalized perspectives or 
simply grants another avenue of access to people and viewpoints 
already well served by the political process. More avenues of the latter 
sort may be beneficial - but not because they promote democracy. 
And in some circumstances they may be harmful, precisely because 
they may exacerbate the risk that the police will become instruments 
for reinforcing unjustifiable forms of hierarchy. For community 
policing to be democratizing in the way Thacher identifies, it should 
help lend influence to groups and interests to whom the police 
otherwise unlikely to be adequately attentive. 
On this score, some structural strategies for community 
participation are more promising than others. In Chicago, for example, 
a citywide program of "beat meetings,'' strongly supported by the 
police department and accompanied by energetic efforts at outreach, 
appears to have drawn disproportionately heavy participation from 
Black residents of economically depressed, high-crime neighborhoods 
- not a group traditionally well represented in the formulation of law 
enforcement policy. The degree to which the beat meetings have 
actually affected policing practices remains unclear, and rates of 
participation among Latinos have been disappointing. But the levels of 
attendance in poor Black neighborhoods have been impressive, and 
the meetings appear to be genuine exercises in two-way 
communication.535 In contrast, Chicago's system of district advisory 
535. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., TAKING STOCK: COMMUNITY POLICING IN 
CHICAGO 8-11 (2002) (hereinafter SKOGAN ET AL., TAKING STOCK); Archon Fung, Street 
Level Democracy: Pragmatic Popular Sovereignty in Chicago Schools and Policing 14, 30-33 
(1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.archonfung.net/papers/SLD99.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2005).  Aside from their democratizing effects, Chicago's beat meetings 
probably have other important benefits. By getting residents to work together on 
neighborhood problems, see SK OGAN ET AL., TAKING STOCK, supra, at 10, the meetings 
appear to build the "collective efficacy" that recent, influential research suggests may reduce 
violent crime. See Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel 
Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918 (1997); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. 
Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in 
Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. Soc. 603 (1999). Sampson and his coauthors define 
"collective efficacy" as "social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to 
intervene on behalf of the common good." Sampson et al., supra, at 918. 
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committees - groups of community leaders who meet with their local 
police commander - have been far less successful, partly because the 
committee members have been selected by the police and tend, by 
definition, to come from what the pluralists called "the political 
stratum."  The team of researchers led by the crime scholar Wesley 
Skogan, who have generally been quite impressed by community 
policing in Chicago, report that the district advisory committees tend 
not to represent residents' views, but instead pursue an agenda set 
largely by the police department, and "receive more advice than they 
give."536 Moreover, the committees often "are dominated by long­
established leaders with an insular view of their functions," who "fail 
to reach out to new members of their community."537 As a result, the 
committees "noticeably under-represent Latinos, even in heavily 
Latino areas,"538 and entirely exclude "smaller but rapidly growing 
immigrant groups (particularly Asians). "539 
Some of the success of the beat meetings, and some of the failure 
of the district advisory committees, may have to do with factors unique 
to Chicago. The point I wish to stress here is not that "town hall" 
exercises like Chicago's beat meetings are likely to do better than 
police-appointed committees of worthies in introducing new voices 
into police policymaking (although that probably is true, at least when 
the "town hall" exercises are executed as well as they have been in 
Chicago, and - a matter to which we will return later - receive the 
kind of institutional support they have enjoyed there ) .540 The point 
simply is that different programs of community participation in 
policing can be expected to have different levels of success in exposing 
the police to "dissident values," and that those differences deserve 
attention if we truly want community policing to make policing more 
democratic. 
536. SKOGAN ET AL., TAKING STOCK, supra note 535, at 12. 
537. WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., CHICAGO COMMUNITY POLICING EVALUATION 
CONSORTIUM, COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, YEAR SEVEN: AN INTERIM REPORT 6 
(2002); see also id. at 96-103. 
538. Id. at 6. 
539. SKOGAN ET AL., TAKING STOCK, supra note 535, at 12. 
540. "During the 1990s, an average of seven police officers attended each beat meeting, 
including the beat sergeant, the beat officers on duty, and a few beat team members from 
other shifts. To encourage attendance by the latter, they are paid overtime at a yearly cost of 
nearly $1 million." SKOGAN ET AL., TAKING STOCK, supra note 535, at 8. The department 
also trained both officers and civilian participants in decisionmaking and interpersonal skills, 
and the city paid for "roving teams of community organizers and trainers" to "mobilize 
residents around public safety issues." Fung, supra note 535, at 19. Whether support at these 
levels can be expected in the future is uncertain. See id. ; SKOGAN ET AL., TAKING STOCK, 
supra note 535, at 30. 
1814 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1699 
A rounded view of democracy - in particular, a view that 
incorporates a degree of presumptive discomfort with entrenched 
social hierarchies and, relatedly, an appreciation for the benefits of 
dissensus - has another implication for the broad array of programs 
lumped together under the title of community policing. It gives reason 
to be wary of a certain subset of those programs, the segment 
associated with the "broken windows" or "order maintenance" 
strategy of controlling crime by suppressing street-level disorder. The 
pluralists were right to see democratic value in the freedom and 
fluidity of modern urban life, just as Tocqueville was right to praise the 
"tumult" and "confusion" he found in nineteenth-century America. 
Disorder loosens things up; it clears space for dissent and makes 
patterns of dominance easier to attack. It can also be its own worst 
enemy: taken too far, it can make self-government impossible and 
clear the way for new, more malignant forms of dominance. But once 
democracy is understood as, at least in large part, a matter of anti­
inegalitarianism, the are strong grounds to think that it benefits from a 
strong dose of disorder. That is why people like Bernard Harcourt and 
Jonathan Simon have cause to worry that broken-windows policing, 
with its heavy emphasis on orderliness, may undermine democracy. 
That does not mean broken-windows policing should be 
abandoned. In some circumstances, it may do more to help democracy 
than to hurt it. If, for example, street-level disorder really does breed 
serious crime - a matter that is far from certain - then allowing that 
disorder to continue may create worse patterns of dominance than the 
ones it helps to alleviate. Even if street-level disorder has little to do 
with serious crime, it may threaten democracy in other, more direct 
ways. It might chill grass roots political participation, for example, by 
making people afraid of their neighbors and dispirited about the 
prospects for community improvement. And even if a particular level 
of disorder is, on balance, good for democracy, that benefit may not be 
worth the costs. Democracy is not the only thing we care about.541 Still, 
a rounded view of democracy gives reason to be concerned about the 
"aesthetic of orderliness, cleanliness, and sobriety"542 that accompanies 
and motivates broken-windows policing. This is not the only 
consideration weighing against the broken-windows approach, and it 
may not be a dispositive one. But it deserves more attention than it 
has received. 
541. On the reasons to think that order maintenance might be "an intrinsically 
appropriate goal for policing," regardless whether the strategy actually reduces serious 
crime, see, for example, David Thacher, Order Maintenance Reconsidered: Moving Beyond 
Strong Causal Reasoning, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 387 (2004). 
542. HARCOURT, supra note 293, at 27. 
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B. Racial Profiling 
While not nearly so ill-defined as "community policing," the term 
"racial profiling" has been applied to a spectrum of different police 
practices, relying on race to various degrees, in assorted ways, and in a 
range of factual settings.543 As with community policing, a rounded 
view of democracy cannot tell us precisely what to think about all of 
these practices, or even what to think of the paradigmatic case: the 
systematic use of race (almost always along with other factors) in 
selecting subjects for investigative attention. Once again, though, it 
can highlight some important questions and help guard against certain 
kinds of mistakes. 
It can warn us, in particular, not to be too quick to minimize the 
social costs, and more specifically the democratic costs, of 
systematically focusing law enforcement scrutiny on members of 
traditionally disfavored minority groups. For reasons I will explain, a 
rounded view of democratic policing casts doubt on two related 
notions about racial profiling. The first is that racial profiling is 
tangential to the central concerns of criminal procedure; this is a view 
to which the Supreme Court has appeared sympathetic.544 The second 
notion is that racial profiling is troubling chiefly to the extent that it is 
irrational - to the extent, that is to say, that it reflects raw racial 
animus, a "taste for discrimination,"545 or fails to take into account the 
ways that racial profiling can wind up posing practical problems for 
law enforcement. 
What these ways of thinking overlook are the heavy burdens that 
racial profiling can place on democracy. Those costs are hard to 
appreciate without a view of democracy that includes a healthy 
element of anti-inegalitarianism. For an unreconstructed pluralist, 
racial profiling presents no special problem: racial minorities, like all 
other groups, are assumed capable of defending themselves through 
the political process. For a believer in participatory democracy - even 
in its watered-down, mainstream version - things are more 
complicated. By insulting its targets, undermining their trust in law 
enforcement, and giving them a sense of second-class citizenship, 
racial profiling could alienate them from the whole project of 
543. For a helpful overview, see Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling 
Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002). 
544. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); Sklansky, supra note 523, at 277-
79, 284-91, 307-23. 
545. GARY s. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16-17 (2d ed. 1971). For a 
helpful overview and critique of studies of racial profiling proceeding from this assumption, 
see Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil 
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1275, 1291-1314 (2004). 
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collective self-government. On the other hand, perhaps the sting of 
unfairness will galvanize the victims of racial profiling, making them 
more likely to become politically active. It could go either way. 
Once democracy is understood as in large part a matter of anti­
inegalitarianism, the democratic costs of racial profiling become more 
apparent. Racial profiling threatens to reentrench patterns of social 
hierarchy - and not just any patterns of hierarchy, but the ones based 
on race. It may reinforce, that is to say, those systems of illegitimate 
dominance most notorious, at least in America, for their severity, 
pervasiveness, and intractability. It could do this in three different 
ways. 
The first way racial profiling may reinforce racial hierarchy is 
through sheer numbers, imprisoning and otherwise bringing within 
penal supervision a greatly disproportionate number of minority group 
members, with a range of familiar, impoverishing consequences for 
their families and neighborhoods. Bernard Harcourt has shown that 
the disproportion in rates of arrest and incarceration can greatly 
exceed any preexisting difference in rates of offending, even if 
profiling is assumed to be a "rational" policy, pursued only to the 
point at which minority rates of offending match those among the 
wider population - a result he calls the "ratchet effect. "546 The second 
way racial profiling can reinforce racial hierarchy is by training 
members of minority groups in patterns of public subservience. 
Stopped by the police again and again, they learn to adopt roles of 
exaggerated deference and severely diminished self-agency - roles 
that can easily carry over to other arenas of social life.547 The third way 
is by confirming racial stereotypes: suggesting, through higher rates of 
arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, that the profiled groups really 
are more prone to crime. 548 
Several things are worth noting about the mechanisms through 
which racial profiling threatens to reinforce racial hierarchy. First, they 
are mutually reinforcing. The ratchet effect can exacerbate the 
disproportionate numbers of African Americans and Latinos in 
prisons and on probation or parole, and thereby worsen the apparent 
546. See Harcourt, supra note 545, at 51-54. On the consequences of high rates of arrest 
and incarceration on minority neighborhoods, see also, for example, Richard Banks, Beyond 
Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 594-97 (2003); Roberts, 
supra note 483, at 815-16 & n.143. 
547. The best discussion of this problem I know is Carbado, supra note 523. On the ways 
in which criminal justice practices can help to shape self-identity, particularly with respect to 
race, see also IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, RACISM ON 'TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 
(2003). "More than ever," Haney L6pez argues, "we know ourselves by how the police and 
the courts treat us. If we receive respect, courtesy, fair treatment, and due process, we are 
white; if we are harassed, beaten, arrested, or detained by executive fiat, we are black, 
brown, yellow, or red." Id. at 11 .  
548. See, e.g. , Banks, supra note 546, at 577-78, 598. 
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confirmation of racial stereotypes.549 The diminished self-agency 
taught through repeated contacts with the police may wind up 
reinforcing racial stereotypes, too. In turn, racial stereotypes -
particularly the assumption that certain groups are more prone to 
criminality - can raise the level of subservience that members of 
those groups feel obliged to perform for the police.550 
Second, profiling threatens to reentrench dominance in the ways I 
have described only to the extent that it targets a traditionally 
disadvantaged group. Selectively stopping white motorists, for 
example, will not trigger these mechanisms of hierarchy 
reinforcement. (It might trigger other mechanisms of hierarchy 
reinforcement, depending on why the white motorists are stopped and 
what happens after they are stopped. Imagine, for example, that they 
are stopped in a minority neighborhood to warn them that the area is 
unsafe.) So it is probably a mistake to lump tactics of that kind 
together with the targeting of racial minorities under the term "racial 
profiling." On the other hand, profiling on the basis of a characteristic 
such as religion or national origin could easily reentrench dominance 
in the same way as profiling on the basis of race: applying selective 
scrutiny to Moslems or to Arab Americans is, in this respect, very 
much like applying selective scrutiny to African Americans.551 
Third, the concerns that racial profiling raise for democracy by 
threatening to reinforce racial hierarchy do not depend on the fact that 
profiling involves conscious discrimination by law enforcement 
officers. Any law enforcement tactic resulting in heavily 
disproportionate rates of arrest, conviction, and incarceration of 
members of racial minorities may reinforce racial hierarchy by 
disrupting minority neighborhoods and reinforcing racial stereotypes. 
Minority group members are most likely to feel the need to adopt 
roles of exaggerated deference and subservience if they believe that 
they attract suspicion because of their race, but that impression can be 
created by the presence of pervasive stereotypes of minority 
criminality, with or without a conscious policy of racial profiling. 
Accordingly, the problems that racial profiling poses for democracy 
549. See Harcourt, supra note 545, at 53-54. 
550. See Carbado, supra note 523, at 982. 
551. At least from the standpoint of democracy - and probably from any other 
standpoint - the Justice Department therefore has placed itself on thin ice by distinguishing 
sharply between "racial profiling," which it continues to condemn, and profiling based on 
nationality, which it defends. See Gross & Livingston, supra note 543, at 1419-21. There is a 
difference, of course, between discriminating on the ground of nationality and discriminating 
among United States citizens on the ground of national origin. But Gross and Livingston 
seem right that "[t]he Department's focus on visitors from countries with an active al Qaeda 
presence . . .  raises the specter of ethnic profiling," by "produc[ing] an interview list that is 
dominated by Middle Eastern men." Id. at 1419-20. 
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may also be posed by other law enforcement practices that lack the 
element of conscious targeting but nonetheless have a lopsided impact 
on minority suspects. Richard Banks may be right, for example, that 
much of the opprobrium directed at racial profiling should be applied 
more broadly to the war on drugs.552 
Fourth and finally, though, there is another side to the equation, 
just as with order-maintenance policing. Crime hurts minority 
neighborhoods, too. Higher rates of criminal victimization, in fact, are 
probably among the worst of the multiple inequalities suffered by 
members of racial minorities. So if racial profiling, or other tactics that 
focus law enforcement disproportionately on racial minorities, 
succeeds in reducing crime in minority neighborhoods, the gains for 
democracy - both in terms of wider participation and in terms of 
diminished inequality and the amelioration of hierarchy - may be 
greater than the costs. This is an empirical question; it is a question 
that no theory of democracy, no matter how sophisticated, can hope to 
resolve. Again, what a richer account of democracy does is make 
clearer the questions that need to be asked, and what turns on the 
answer. 
C. Police Privatization 
The past several decades have seen a dramatic shift of policing 
responsibilities from public agencies to the private sector. In the 
heydays of democratic pluralism and police professionalism - the 
1950s and 1960s - Pinkerton guards, private eyes, and the whole, old­
fashioned apparatus of private peacekeeping and criminal 
apprehension seemed on their way out. RAND researchers concluded 
in 1971 that public law enforcement already employed more people 
than private security, and that by mid-decade the disparity would be 
nearly two-to-one.553 Instead, the private security industry has 
exploded, and growth in public law enforcement has slackened. 
Private guards now greatly outnumber sworn law enforcement officers 
throughout the United States, and the discrepancy continues to widen. 
Increasingly, private security firms patrol not only industrial facilities 
and commercial establishments but also office buildings, 
transportation facilities, recreational complexes, and entire shopping 
districts and residential neighborhoods. Many Americans -
particularly wealthier Americans - are more likely to encounter a 
private security guard than a police officer on any given day. In the 
words of one industry executive, "[t]he plain truth is that today much 
552. See, e.g. , Banks, supra note 546, at 593-98. 
553. JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL WILDHORN, THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY 34 
(1971). 
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of the protection of our people, their property and their businesses, 
has been turned over to private security."554 
Whether this is a good or bad thing has been widely debated, but 
the debate has largely overlooked the implications of police 
privatization for democracy. A fair amount of attention has been paid 
to the question of how adequately private security guards are 
screened, trained, and regulated. Some attention has also been to the 
relative costs and "effectiveness" of public and private policing, and to 
differences in the degree of "accountability" shown by public police 
agencies and private security firms.555 But there has been remarkably 
little discussion of the key democratic question: effectiveness and 
accountability for whom? 
The oversight is understandable, for at least three reasons. First, 
the push for police professionalism in the 1950s and 1960s succeeded 
so well at insulating police departments from political interference that 
even today, after nearly two decades of "community policing" reforms, 
police departments often seem to operate outside the normal 
processes of local government, accountable to no one. (In fact, as we 
have seen, community policing rarely reduces the operational 
autonomy of the police. Community policing is about partnership, and 
sometimes about consultation; it is rarely if ever about control.)556 
Against this backdrop, any accountability can seem like an 
improvement. 
But that is an illusion. Even the most autonomous police 
departments are subject to some political oversight - more public 
supervision, almost certainly, than virtually any private security firm.557 
Public police agencies, moreover, understand their charge as 
protecting everyone within their jurisdiction. Their day-to-day 
practices and priorities may often fall far short of that ideal, but at 
least the ideal remains in view. And structures of local government, 
including those pertaining to the police, can be reconfigured. If we 
554. Hearings Regarding Private Security Guards: Hearing on H.R. 1534 Before the 
Subcomm. on Human Res. of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 103d Cong. 132 (1993) 
(statement of Ira Lipman, President, Guardsmark, Inc.). On the growth of private security, 
see David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 165, 1171-82 (1999). The 
trend in the United States has been mirrored throughout much of the developed world. See 
id. at 1 181. 
555. I summarize these debates in Sklansky, supra note 554, at 1188-93. 
556. See supra notes 416 & 487 and accompanying text. 
557. The Los Angeles Police Department, for example, enjoys a notorious degree of 
independence under the city charter, because the civilian commissioners who nominally run 
the department serve part-time with only modest staff support. Virtually the only real 
leverage the commissioners can exercise is to fire the police chief, but that leverage has 
turned out to be significant - as the two last chiefs of the department, both ousted by the 
commission, can testify. 
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want police departments that are less insulated from politics, we can 
get them. We had them, after all, before the 1950s. 
There is a second reason that the democratic question is rarely 
asked about private policing. It is the same reason that relatively little 
academic attention has been paid to alternative institutional 
arrangements that would strengthen the political accountability of the 
police while avoiding, if possible, some of the abuses that fueled the 
drive for political insulation of police departments in the first place. 
The reason is the pervasive and excessive de-emphasis, since the 
1950s, of the role of institutional structures in democracy. This de­
emphasis, as we have seen, is one the chief points of continuity 
between democratic pluralism and the theories of participatory and 
deliberative democracy that have largely supplanted it. If structure 
does not matter - if democracy is mainly a matter of culture - then 
the loci of institutional power lose their importance. 
There is a third and final reason for the general neglect of the 
questions that private policing raises for democracy. Those questions 
have seemed less pressing than they should because private policing is 
often assumed - erroneously - to supplement public law 
enforcement rather than displace it. In the short run, of course, private 
policing usually does supplement public law enforcement. It may even 
assist neighborhoods too poor to afford private security services by 
freeing up resources that are no longer needed in areas that can afford 
private security. Over the long term, though, police expenditures are 
unlikely to stay constant. The shift to private security represents what 
Robert Reich calls the "secession of the successful. "558 Why should Bel 
Air residents vote for higher taxes to pay for policing throughout Los 
Angeles, when they can - and already do - hire private patrols for 
their own neighborhood? It is not idle to worry that, as two prominent 
scholars of policing have suggested, "[t]he rich will be increasingly 
policed preventively by commercial security while the poor will be 
policed reactively by enforcement-oriented public police," with both 
the private and public sector working to "protect the affluent from the 
poor - the one by barricading and excluding, the other by repressing 
and imprisoning."559 That is a troubling prospect not just because it 
seems harsh, but because it seems radically anti-democratic -
something much easier to see with a rounded view of democracy, 
incorporating a strong element of anti-inegalitarianism. 
558. Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 
(Magazine), at 16. 
559. David H. Bayley & Clifford D. Shearing, The Future of Policing, 30 LAW & SOC'Y 
REV. 585, 594, 602 (1996). For anecdotal evidence that the growing reliance on private 
security has undermined political support for higher public expenditures on law 
enforcement, see Sklansky, supra note 554, at 1224 n.342. 
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One implication of such a view of democracy is that questions of 
democratic policing will often be distributive. We have grown 
accustomed to thinking that reconciling policing with democracy is 
largely a matter of deciding how much policing we will have, and that 
the more we have - for example, the more leeway and resources we 
give to the police - the more democracy is imperiled. This way of 
thinking is among the lasting legacies of democratic pluralism; it 
follows naturally from the assumption that the chief rival to 
democracy is authoritarianism, and more specifically the "police 
state."  But if democracy consists in large part of a presumptive 
hostility to hierarchy, things are more complicated in two different 
ways. 
First, policing is among other things "a form of redistribution."560 It 
redistributes resources in the same way as other government-funded 
services, from fire protection to social security, and - going beyond 
those other programs - it uses the redistributed resources to 
reallocate power by curbing the private use of coercive force. (Murray 
Kempton once described the supplanting of the Pinkerton Detective 
Agency by the FBI as "the only episode in our social history to realize 
Marx's prescription for the transformation of capitalistic private 
property into socialized property."561 But the episode is better 
understood as part of the broader socialization of law enforcement in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.)562 
Police privatization directly threatens this redistributive project. 
That does not mean that private policing is always a bad thing. There 
are aspects of democracy other than anti-inegalitarianism, and there 
are things that we care about other than democracy. In some cases, 
moreover, market-supplied policing may redistribute power downward 
in ways that public law enforcement has failed to do - as, for 
example, when private patrols hired by merchants make the streets 
safer and more welcoming for the physically frail. But the interests of 
merchants depart in predictable ways from the interests of their 
poorest neighbors, at least in anything but the very long term, and 
private security firms focus, understandably, on the interests of their 
customers. 
Leave aside the ugliest ways in which that kind of accountability 
can manifest itself - for example, harassment of deviants, physical 
560. Seidman, supra note 305, at 2315. 
561. Murray Kempton, Son of Pinkerton, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 20, 1971, at 22. 
562. For a nice discussion of this point, see Steven Spitzer & Andrew T. Scull, 
Privatization and Capitalist Development: The Case of the Private Police, 25 Soc. PROBS. 18 
(1977). 
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assaults of the homeless, and so on.563 The more important point is that 
private police are not even nominally committed, as public police are, 
to the egalitarian project of protecting all citizens from private 
violence. The defining characteristic of private policing is its "client­
driven mandate. "564 Take, for example, the more than 100 private 
guards now employed in downtown Los Angeles by business 
improvement districts - nonprofit groups of merchants and property 
owners funded by self-imposed tax assessments. The president of the 
largest of these groups brushes off calls for stronger public oversight of 
the guards: "If people are saying more accountability, than I say 
accountability to whom? . . .  It's not the city's money; it's the property 
owner's money."565 
Second, funding levels affect not just the amount of policing the 
state provides, but also the kind of policing. Efforts to open up 
channels of communication between the police and traditionally 
marginalized groups - like the "beat meetings" that have apparently 
achieved some success in Chicago - are expensive . Efforts to involve 
police officers themselves in departmental reform - like the Oakland 
violence study of the early 1970s - are expensive. Alternatives to 
racial profiling can be expensive. So can effective institutions of 
civilian oversight. The history of police reform is littered with 
promising innovations abandoned when budgets tightened. (The Peer 
Review Panel that grew out of the Oakland violence study is a good 
example.) High funding levels certainly do not guarantee innovative 
policing, but low funding levels make it much less likely. The kind of 
protection the police provide, no less than the amount of protection 
they provide, is thus partly - although only partly - a matter of the 
resources they are given. This means that the success of things like 
community policing, nondiscriminatory policing, and workplace 
democracy in policing are, in part, budgetary matters. And that means, 
in turn, that police reform, like the level of policing, will often have a 
redistributive dimension: it involves public expenditures for the 
benefit of whichever groups profit from the reforms at issue. The 
563. See, e.g. , MUIR, supra note 303, at 73-77 (discussing tactics employed by private 
police in Oakland's skid row in the early 1970s}; Heather Barr, More Like Disneyland: State 
Action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Business Improvement Districts in New York, 28 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 393, 400-03 (1997) (describing similar tactics by private security personnel in 
midtown Manhattan in the 1990s); William Wan & Erin Ailworth, Flak Over Downtown 
Security Guards, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at Bl (reporting allegations of similar conduct by 
private guards patrolling downtown Los Angeles). 
564. Elizabeth Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 
62 (2004); see Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning, Private Security: Implications for 
Social Control, 30 Soc. PROBS. 493, 499 (1983). 
565. Wan & Ailworth, supra note 563, (quoting Carol Schatz, president of the 
Downtown Center Improvement District). On business improvement districts and their role 
in the privatization of policing, see Barr, supra note 563, and Sklansky, supra note 554, at 
1 178 n.56. 
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presence of this redistributive dimension makes it particularly 
important, from a democratic perspective, to identify the beneficiaries 
of particular forms of policing. Whether the redistribution at issue 
advances or retards the cause of anti-inegalitarianism will depend on 
who stands to win and who stands to lose. 
D. Police Personnel Practices 
I have already discussed one set of ideas about police personnel 
practices that a rounded view of democracy provides reason to 
examine (or rather, to reexamine): namely, the proposals made in the 
1970s for involving rank-and-file law enforcement officers in the 
development and refinement of police operating procedures.566 I want 
here to discuss a different set of issues raised by any effort to apply a 
rounded view of democracy to policing, issues having to do with the 
demographics of law enforcement, particularly with regard to race, 
gender, and sexual orientation. 
Those demographics have changed dramatically since the 1960s. In 
1970, Blacks made up somewhere around 6% of sworn officers in the 
300 or so largest American police departments; today the figure is 
around 18%.567 In cities with populations over 250,000, 20% of sworn 
officers are Black, and 14% are Latino - up from figures of 18% and 
9%, respectively, in 1990.568 In some major metropolitan departments, 
white officers are now a minority.569 Women were 2% of sworn officers 
in large police agencies in 1972; today they are close to 13%.570 Again, 
566. See supra notes 392-407 and accompanying text. 
567. Justin Mccrary, The Effect of Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas on the Composition 
and Quality of Police 44 (Nov. 30, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www­
personal.umich.edu/-jmccrary/mccrary2004.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2005). 
568. BRIAN A. REAVES & MATIHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE 
DEPARTMENTS IN LARGE CITIES, 1990-2000, at 3 (2002). 
569. White officers comprise 48% of the police force in San Antonio, 46% in Los 
Angeles, 34% in Detroit, and 28% in Washington, D.C. ld. at 11.  
570. See KIM LONSWAY ET AL., FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., EQUALITY DENIED: THE 
STATUS OF WOMEN IN POLICING: 2001, at 6 (2002) [hereinafter LONSWAY ET AL., 
EQUALITY DENIED]. These figures are for departments with 100 or more sworn personnel. 
ld. at 2. In the largest departments, which serve cities with populations over 250,000, women 
are 16% of sworn officers. REAVES & HICKMAN, supra note 568, at 3. Women comprise a 
much larger share of the civilian workforce in large police departments. In departments with 
over 100 sworn officers, women hold more than two-thirds of the civilian positions - which 
generally are lower-paid and offer fewer opportunities for advancement. LONSWAY ET AL., 
supra, at 8. Largely to save money, American police departments have greatly increased 
their reliance on civilian employees in recent years; large departments now employ more 
civilians than sworn officers. See, e.g. , REAVES & HICKMAN, supra note 568, at 2. The stark 
gender difference between the two groups - the vast majority of officers are men, and the 
vast majority of civilian employees are women - both exacerbates and makes more 
troubling the way in which "civilianization" has tended to create two-tier departments, with 
civilian employees treated as second-class citizens. For a discussion of this problem in the 
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the figure in some departments is significantly higher, although it tops 
out around 25% .571 It is much harder to estimate the number of gay 
and lesbian officers, even those who are open about their status. But 
the mere fact that there are any openly gay officers, let alone gay 
police executives, is a sea-change from the situation thirty years ago.572 
To a great extent, of course, the dramatic changes over the past 
several decades in the demographics of policing were produced by 
court-ordered programs of affirmative action. It is far from clear 
whether comparable gains can be expected in the future, now that 
such programs have grown less co'mmon.573 The increase in the 
representation of women in large police departments, for example, 
appears to have stalled since 1999; in fact, that number has declined 
slightly.574 And minority officers and female officers alike remain 
concentrated in the lower ranks of police departments.575 
The dramatic increase in the diversity of American police forces 
and the grounds for uncertainty regarding whether that trend will 
continue have important consequences for the relationship between 
policing and democracy - at least under any view of democracy that 
includes a healthy element of anti-inegalitarianism. Three sets of 
consequences deserve special attention. 
The first pertains to the long tradition of law enforcement work -
like teaching, nursing, and certain other occupations - providing a 
means of upward mobility for marginalized social groups, particularly 
immigrants. The police professionalism movement disapproved of that 
tradition, and did a good deal to weaken it, by encouraging 
departments to abolish residency requirements, recruit outside their 
Los Angeles Police Department, see REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
PANEL, supra note 471, at 62-66. 
571. In 2000, female officers comprised 21 % of the police force in Chicago, 24% in 
Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., and 25% in Detroit. REA YES & HICKMAN, supra note 
568, at 11 .  
572. San Francisco had no openly gay officers as late as  1979; Chicago had none as 
recently as 1991. STEPHEN LEINEN, GAY COPS 11 (1993); Katy Butler, The Gay Push for S.F. 
Police Jobs, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1979, at Al. On the growing but still incomplete 
acceptance of gay officers, see, for example, Aaron Belkin & Jason McNichol, Pink and 
Blue: Outcomes Associated With the Integration of Open Gay and Lesbian Personnel in the 
San Diego Police Department, 5 POLICE Q. 63 (2002); Tracy Gordon Fox, Seminar to Focus 
on Gay Officers, HARTFORD COURANT, May 5, 2004, at Bll;  and James Sterngold, Possible 
Candidate for LAP D's Top Job is Gay - So What?, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26, 2002, at Al. 
573. See LONSWAY ET AL., EQUALITY DENIED, supra note 570, at 1 1-12; William G. 
Lewis, Toward Representative Bureaucracy: Blacks in City Police Organizations, 1975-1985, 
49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 257 (1989); Susan E. Martin, The Effectiveness of Affirmative Action: 
The Case of Women in Policing, 8 JUST. Q. 489 (1991); McCrary, supra note 567 (manuscript 
at 1-7, 32). 
574. LONSWAY ET AL., EQUALITY DENIED, supra note 570, at 6. 
575. Id. at 7; SAMUEL WALKER, CASSIA SPOHN & MARIAM DELONE, THE COLOR OF 
JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 116 (2d ed. 2000). 
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own communities, adopt written entrance exams, insulate themselves 
from local politics, and so on. These measures helped to create the 
virtually all-white police forces that patrolled major American cities in 
the 1960s and that did so much to antagonize minority residents.576 The 
dramatically increased presence of racial minorities in law 
enforcement, as in some other professions, is to be welcomed in part 
because it reopens a traditional channel of social mobility and thereby 
serves to loosen patterns of racial hierarchy. 
The remaining two consequences of more diverse departments are 
specific to policing. The first of these is that the police are less likely to 
serve as an effective weapon against private systems of entrenched 
dominance if the police themselves are drawn exclusively from the 
dominant group. This is not just a matter of symbolism, although the 
symbolism is important enough. It is a matter of with whom, and how 
strongly, the police are likely to sympathize - a matter of whose 
concerns get taken seriously and how seriously they get taken. Among 
the most important reasons to applaud the increased presence of 
women in American police departments, and to worry about the slow 
pace of that change, is that female officers appear to respond more 
effectively to complaints of domestic violence than male officers.577 
That is a critical difference, not just because domestic violence -
typically committed by men against women - accounts for half of all 
violent crime calls to the police,578 but also because it has played such a 
large role in day-to-day patterns of subjugation shaping women's 
lives.579 Likewise, among the most important effects of the increased 
racial diversity of American police forces since the 1960s is that police 
today are much less likely to ally themselves, in an organized fashion, 
with those openly hostile to the claims of equality pressed by racial 
minorities.580 Gay officers doubtless have played a similar, if less 
576. See FOGELSON, supra note 251 ,  at 248-60. 
577. See KIM LONSWAY ET AL., FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., HIRING & RETAINING 
MORE WOMEN: THE ADVANTAGES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 7-8 (2003) 
[hereinafter LONSWAY ET AL., HIRING AND RETAINING WOMEN]. Female officers may have 
other comparative strengths. Surveys suggest they are less likely to use excessive force, in 
part because they have better communication skills. Id. at 5-6. It is worth remembering, in 
this context, one of the principal lessons that William Muir drew from his field observations 
of twenty-eight police officers in Oakland in the early 1970s - a group of officers who, 
unremarkably at the time, were all male. MUIR, supra note 303, at 11 .  Becoming a good 
officer, Muir concluded, required "developing an enjoyment of talk" - a trait that "enriches 
[an officer's] repertoire of potential responses to violence," "permits him to touch the 
citizenry's souls," and, of equal importance, "provides him the chance to associate with his 
fellow officers." Id. at 4. 
578. See LONSWAY ET AL., HIRING AND RETAINING WOMEN, supra note 577, at 8. 
579. See, e.g. , Becker, supra note 481, at 507-09. 
580. There is also some evidence that hiring more minority officers increases arrests of 
white suspects but not of minority suspects, whereas hiring more white officers does just the 
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public, role in the slow transformation of the treatment of gays by the 
police.581 
The last consequence of more diverse police departments pertains 
to the longstanding understanding of police officers as a "conflict 
group," unified in their estrangement from the broader society and 
monolithic in their hostility to outside meddling. Whatever validity 
this picture of the police had in the 1960s and 1970s, it has far less now 
- in part because of the success of affirmative action in law 
enforcement and in part, ironically, because of its failure. Affirmative 
action programs succeeded in opening the doors of police departments 
to large numbers of Blacks, Latinos, and women. But it failed, often, at 
fully integrating them into the social fabric of those departments. It is 
not just that minority and female officers remain concentrated in 
lower ranks. Black and Latino officers have typically formed their own 
organizations, parallel to - and often openly suspicious of - the 
benevolent associations and police unions established when police 
workforces were homogeneously white. Often, too, patterns of 
friendship and informal networks of mentoring and trust have broken 
down along lines of race and gender. Similar but less pronounced 
divides have emerged between openly gay officers and officers who, 
for religious or other reasons, are uncomfortable around gays or who 
suspect that gays have received preferential treatment in 
promotions.582 The result is that police ethnographies have begun to 
opposite. See John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and 
Arrests, 44 J.L. & ECON. 367 (2001). Whether and how minority officers affect the incidence 
of racial profiling, in any of its various guises, is a more difficult question. See, e.g., Francie 
Latour & Bill Dedman, Minority Officers are Stricter on Minorities, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 
2003, at A19. Even where there is no effect on the rates at which whites and minorities are 
stopped, of course, there may be effects on the ways in which the stops are carried out, and 
on how they are perceived. 
581. See, e.g., LEINEN, supra note 572, at 97-121; see also, e.g. , John Cloud, The New 
Face of Gay Power, TIME, Oct. 13, 2003, at 52; John Leland, Silence Ending About Abuse in 
Gay Relationships, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2000, at Al8; Kenneth Reich, Fourth Hate Crime 
Probed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at Bl (reporting statement by Sgt. Don Mueller of the 
Los Angeles Sheriff's Office to the West Hollywood City Council that "the ferocious 
relationship that used to exist between the sheriff's station and the gay community is a thing 
of the past," that "(t]here are now many gay officers in the station, including myself," and 
that "we are determined to bring [a string of suspected hate crimes against gays in West 
Hollywood] to an end"). The systematic, often brutal harassment of gays by the police may 
have had repercussions for law enforcement more generally. William Westley, in his 
pioneering ethnography of the police, concluded that the police accurately understood the 
public to approve "extremely rough treatment" in "sex cases" - a category in which 
homosexuality was lumped together with rape, exhibitionism, and "peeping toms" - and 
that the experience of the police in these cases "enourage(d] them to use violence as a 
general resource." WESTLEY, supra note 14, at 61-63, 89-90, 107; Westley, Violence and the 
Police, supra note 178, at 37-38. 
582. See Belkin & McNichol, supra note 572. 
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report not "a single, unified occupational culture," but a workplace 
marked by "variation," "division," and "segmentation."583 
Division and segmentation of this kind is was just what some 
opponents of affirmative action in law enforcement feared.  Even some 
police officials sensitive to the need to diversify their departments 
worried that hiring quotas would undermine solidarity among officers 
by provoking resentments, hardening group identities, and promoting 
factionalism.584 The gender and race divisions that have come to 
characterize police departments may not in fact owe much to 
affirmative action; they may have more to do with the need that 
minority and female officers have felt to band together for mutual 
protection against remnants of bigotry and institutionalized 
discrimination.585 The extent of the factionalism, in any event, should 
not be exaggerated. Particularly in situations where an officer is 
physically endangered, there is a good deal of truth to the claim of 
many officers that "blue is blue." But solidarity among the rank and 
file does appear to have declined; police forces today are less cohesive 
than they used to be, and much of the division runs along lines of race 
and gender. 
The balkanization is unfortunate in some ways, but it turns out to 
have a silver lining. Racial and gender divisions have cleared space for 
dissent and debate within police workforces, opening up avenues of 
reform that might otherwise have remained blocked by monolithic 
police opposition, and bringing a healthy dose of "democratic 
oppositionalism" to the internal politics of law enforcement agencies. 
Organizations representing Black officers, for example, have often 
parted company with older, more established police unions in 
welcoming civilian review, in lobbying for restrictions on racial 
profiling, in supporting the reimposition of residency requirements, 
and more generally in calling on police departments to pay more 
attention to the needs and interests of minority residents.586 
583. Robin N. Haarr, Patterns of Interaction in a Police Patrol Bureau: Race and Gender 
Barriers to Integration, 14 JUST. Q. 53, 53, 80 (1997); see also, e.g. , Susan E. Martin, "Outsider 
Within" the Station House: The Impact of Race and Gender on Black Women Police, 41 Soc. 
PROBS. 383 (1994). 
584. See, e.g., Samuel L. Williams, Law Enforcement and Affirmative Action, POLICE 
CHIEF, Feb. 1975, at 72. 
585. See, e.g. ' NICHOLAS ALEX, BLACK IN BLUE: A STUDY OF THE NEGRO POLICEMAN 
85-113 (1969); KENNETH BOLTON JR. & JOE R. FEAGIN, BLACK IN BLUE: AFRICAN­
AMERICAN POLICE OFFICERS AND RACISM 273 (2004); HERVEY A. JURIS & PETER 
FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONISM 31, 165 (1973). 
586. See JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 585, at 165-75; w ALKER, SPOHN & DELONE, 
supra note 575, at 115-16; NAT'L ORG. OF BLACK LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES, A 
NOBLE PERSPECTIVE: RACIAL PROFILING - A  SYMPTOM OF B IAS-BASED POLICING (May 
3, 2001), available at http://www.noblenational.org/pdf/Racia!Profiling901.pdf (last visited 
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All of this suggests that the demographics of a police department 
may have a lot to do with whether, and in what ways, the department 
advances or retards at least one component of democracy, the agenda 
of anti-inegalitarianism. This suggests, in tum, that reformers who 
want to make policing consistent with democracy should pay attention 
not just to the operational practices of the police, but also to the 
various internal policies and procedures that wind up shaping who the 
police are - policies and procedures that include not only hiring 
standards, but also recruitment tactics, workplace climate, promotion 
practices, and so on.587 
They should pay attention, too, to the new possibilities that are 
opened up by the growing diversity of law enforcement personnel. The 
social fragmentation of police forces today, the splintering of the 
"police subculture," provides an additional reason for reexamining old 
proposals to give officers a greater role in shaping their work. The 
large influx of minority and female officers has made the internal 
politics of police departments far less monolithic and reactionary than 
they were thirty years ago.588 As a result, police departments may be 
safer places today for experiments in workplace democracy. 
E. Transparency 
Eric Luna has a performed a service in calling attention to the 
strong connection between democracy and the transparency of police 
decisionmaking. Luna's argument is rooted in the mainstream version 
of participatory democracy: he stresses the manner in which trust in 
the police depends on the police operating under rules and practices 
adopted openly, with ample opportunity for public input.589 But the 
Mar. 18, 2005); NAT'L BLACK POLICE ASS'N, PosmONS OF THE NATIONAL BLACK POLICE 
ASSOCIATION, at http://www.blackpolice.org/Positions.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2005) .  
587. On the manifold barriers to further integration of  police departments, see, for 
example, BOLTON & FEAGIN, supra note 585, at 119-70. The advantages of increasing the 
racial diversity of American police forces might be outweighed by the costs, if, as John Lott 
has concluded, the "lower hiring standards involved in recruiting more minority officers" has 
raised crime rates, particularly in Black neighborhoods. John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping 
Hand Put Others at Risk?: Affirmative Action, Police Departments, and Crime, 38 ECON. 
INQUIRY 239 (2000). Lott's results have not been duplicated, though, and Justin McCrary's 
recent paper calls them into serious question. McCrary, supra note 567. Using data regarding 
hiring of police officers in New York City, McCrary finds that "even aggressive hiring quotas 
change the test score distribution of new hires only minimally." McCrary, supra note 567 
(manuscript at 26-31, 33). McCrary also did a time series comparison of crime rates in cities 
that had been sued for discriminatory police hiring and in cities that had not, and an "event 
study" analysis of crime rates before and after litigation. He found little evidence that 
litigation was related to crime rates. Id. (manuscript at 26-29). 
588. Samuel Walker has been pressing this point for twenty years. See WALKER ET AL., 
supra note 575, at 115;  Samuel Walker, Racial Minority and Female Employment in Policing: 
The Implications of"Glacial" Change, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 555, 556, 565 (1985). 
589. See supra notes 452-457, 468 and accompanying text. 
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argument for transparency is, if anything, strengthened by a 
conception of democracy as, in large part, an oppositional tradition -
a tradition of anti-inegalitarianism. Oppositional traditions require 
breathing space for criticism and debate; this is why people like Ian 
Shapiro are right to stress the importance of dissensus for 
democracy.590 And dissensus is greatly facilitated by the free flow of 
information. It is hard to dissent about policies and practices that no 
one really knows about.591 (Effective criticism of racial profiling of 
minority motorists, for example, arose only when statistical studies by 
journalists and social scientists demonstrated its widespread presence.) 
As always, there are trade-offs. Sometimes effective law 
enforcement depends on a degree of secrecy - a point Luna is careful 
to acknowledge.592 Less obviously, there are trade-offs here between 
different components of democracy. Deliberative self-governance 
often requires a degree of confidentiality. That is why the 
Constitutional Convention met behind closed doors; it is why jury 
deliberations are not made public; and it is why the researchers who 
organized and documented the Oakland violence project promised 
and gave anonymity to the officers who participated. Efforts to involve 
police officers intellectually in shaping the nature of their work will 
always be in some tension with the desire to open all processes of 
police decisionmaking to public scrutiny. Similar tensions may arise 
between the goal of transparency and the goal of opening up channels 
of candid communication between the police and a wide range of 
outside groups. 
Right now, though, these trade-offs are of little practical 
significance. Given how far we are from giving rank-and-file police 
officers meaningful powers of self-governance, or from meaningfully 
reducing the operational autonomy of police departments, there is 
little reason to worry about the potentially anti-democratic effects of 
increasing the transparency of law enforcement. In the short run, even 
in the medium run, Luna seems right to view transparency as a key 
component of efforts to make policing more democratic. 
CONCLUSION 
By now it should be clear why I promised only a tentative and 
suggestive discussion of the implications for policing of a more 
590. See supra notes 527-528 and accompanying text. 
591. Regarding the nai:Ve view that genuine dissensus is most likely to arise in response 
to clumsy efforts at repression, and conversely that independent thought is smothered rather 
than assisted by official facilitation of dissent, it is still worth reading LASCH, supra note 52, 
at 203-04 & n.5. 
592. See Luna, supra note 452, at 1165. 
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rounded view of democracy. Working out those implications with care 
would require spelling out the details of the "more rounded view of 
democracy," in the same way that tracing the implications for policing 
of democratic pluralism and participatory democracy required a 
nuanced account of those sets of ideas, as they were actually held by 
flesh-and-blood people. Ultimately it will not suffice simply to suggest, 
as I have here, that a more rounded view of democracy should be 
sensitive to certain insights of pluralism, 1960s-style participatory 
democracy, and eighteenth-century political economy, and attentive to 
ongoing resonance of the tradition of democratic oppositionalism. We 
need a more complete account of the rounded view of democracy. 
What does it take to be the aim - or aims - of democracy? What 
empirical assumptions does it make about the essential processes of 
democracy? What assessment does it make about the democratic 
quality of our current arrangements, including those arrangements for 
ongoing criticism and reform? And how tied is this account to current, 
American conditions? 
For now, I leave those questions unanswered, and therefore, 
necessarily, I have offered only a provisional sketch of what a more 
rounded view of democracy might mean for policing. But I hope that 
even that provisional sketch has proven useful. I hope it has suggested 
the ways in which different ideas about democracy might lead us to 
different ideas about policing. I hope that in so doing it has reinforced 
one of the chief lessons of the earlier sections of this Article: that our 
thoughts about policing are bound up with, and depend upon, the way 
we understand democracy. The widespread intuition that democracy 
and policing have important implications for each other is well 
founded. Indeed the implications are wider and more various than is 
often assumed. But the implications also turn out to depend 
powerfully on our understanding of democracy - what it is, and what 
it can and should be. Our notions of democratic policing can be no 
more sophisticated, and no better, than our notions of democracy. 
